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A new ant colony optimizer, the “tabu ant colony optimizer” (TabuACO) is 
introduced, tested, and applied to a contemporary problem. The TabuACO uses both 
attractive and repulsive pheromones to speed convergence to a solution. The dual 
pheromone TabuACO is benchmarked against several other solvers using the traveling 
salesman problem (TSP), the quadratic assignment problem (QAP), and the Steiner tree 
problem. In tree-shaped puzzles, the dual pheromone TabuACO was able to demonstrate 
a significant improvement in performance over a conventional ACO. As the amount of 
connectedness in the network increased, the dual pheromone TabuACO offered less 
improvement in performance over the conventional ACO until it was applied to fully-
interconnected mesh-shaped puzzles, where it offered no improvement.  
The TabuACO is then applied to implement a transactive energy market and 
tested with published circuit models from IEEE and EPRI. In the IEEE feeder model, the 
application was able to limit the sale of power through an overloaded transformer and 
compensate by bringing downstream power online to relieve it. In the EPRI feeder 
model, rapid voltage changes due to clouds passing over PV arrays caused the PV 
contribution to outstrip the ability of the substation to compensate. The TabuACO 
application was able to find a manageable limit to the photovoltaic energy that could be 
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   Symbol Description 
 𝛒   pheromone deposition or evaporation factor 
 
µ   mean 
 
σ   standard deviation 
 
 𝝉   pheromone concentration 
 
ACO  “ant colony optimization” or “ant colony optimizer” 
AMI  advanced metering infrastructure 
CDF  cumulative distribution function 
DER  distributed energy resource 
DG  distributed generation 
G&T  generation and transmission 
ISO  independent system operator 
PDF  probability density function 
PV  photovoltaic 
RTO  regional transmission organization 
QAP  quadradic assignment problem 





1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1. ORGANIZATION OF THIS DISSERTATION 
This dissertation will describe an area of research in computational intelligence in 
the form of advancements in ant colony optimization. The ant colony optimizer (ACO) is 
identified in Section 1.2. The subject of this research is called the “tabu ant colony 
optimizer” (TabuACO). The TabuACO is identified in Section 1.3. A literature review in 
Section 2 compares the TabuACO to other research efforts. Section 3 describes the 
several different versions of the TabuACO that have been tested against various solvers 
using several different benchmark problems. After demonstrating the performance and 
scalability of the optimizer, this dissertation proceeds to apply the algorithm to a practical 
problem in Section 4. The optimizer is applied to the energy market. An introduction to 
the smart grid is provided, along with a background of the operation of the energy 
market. Transactive energy is explained in Section 4.4. The TabuACO is applied to the 
transactive energy market in Section 4.7-4.8. Section 5 offers conclusions. Section 6 
offers ideas for future work.  
1.2. BACKGROUND 
Ants solve problems in nature, and their technique serves as a computational 
paradigm. 
1.2.1. Ants in Nature. Ants communicate in nature by laying down pheromones  
along the trails they travel [1]. The pheromone is an odorless chemical that serves to 
attract other ants and evaporates over time.  
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It is believed that at least one species of ants is able to lay a repulsive pheromone 
to discourage exploration of known unproductive trails [2]. 
Ants have a scent which is inherited from the queen ant. If an ant encounters a 
pheromone trail from another nest, it will usually not mistake it for its own. This allows 
an ant to ignore seemingly “irrelevant” trails if it so chooses. Ants compete with other 
species for the available food sources, and must contend with other factors such as 
predators, unfavorable weather conditions, and efficient use of resources over time. Ants 
do not have a centralized “leader” but instead work instinctively as agents on behalf of 
the interests of the collective whole. It could be argued however that different ant species 
employ different methods to reach their objectives.  
While foraging for food ants also detect pheromones in the environment. These 
pheromones are placed by other ants (of the same species) to communicate a particular 
meaning.  Pheromones evaporate over time, butwhile they are still present, they can serve 
to mark the trail to an important food source. The pheromone, even in small quantities, 
can influence foraging ants to walk to the find. As they return to the nest with their 
payload, the successful ants will lay down pheromone to mark the trail. The new 
pheromone deposit will supplement the evaporating pheromone. Thus, between the 
repeated deposits and ongoing evaporation, trails are created. These trails enable ants to 
walk in groups along lines between the nest and the food source. 
Ants that find alternative routes also lay pheromone, but the faster route allows 
more trips and more ants to lay more layers of pheromone than the longer route. This 
buildup of pheromone allows the optimal solution to emerge. This solution is stored in, 
and described by, the environment.  
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1.2.1.1. Ants have various diets and unique pheromones. Ants lack the  
equipment necessary to chew and digest food. Instead, they squeeze the juices from 
various foodstuffs. Different species of ants favor different sources of food. Some species 
prefer sweets, others prefer protein, and others will grow their own fungus. The harvester 
ants (for example Pogonomyrmex rastratus and P. pronotalis) favor seeds in their diet. 
Research shows that more than 87% of the items carried to the nests are seeds, and 93% 
of the seeds are grass seeds [3]. Argentine ants on the other hand prefer to feed on other 
insects (when available), and then when the supply of insects is depleted, changeover to 
feed on sweet plant sap [4]. The leaf cutting ant (atta cephalotes) cuts leaves to grow 
fungus for larvae while adults imbibe liquid directly from the crushed leaf tissue [5]. 
1.2.1.2. Some species collaborate between nests. A pheromone trail left by a  
foraging ant from one nest could be worthless to ants from another nest. Yet examples 
have been found of collaboration among nests on those occasions in which a super colony 
of the same species is formed over a vast area [4] [6]. 
1.2.1.3. At least one species of ant can deposit repulsive pheromones. It would 
be “expensive” for an ant to mark all of the places that are determined to be unproductive 
while foraging. However, it is not necessary to mark every unproductive location, nor is 
it necessary to mark the length of every trail to empty locations. It would be sufficient to 
merely mark the start of unproductive trails. This is precisely where the Pharaoh ant 
(monomorium pharaonis) lays a repulsive pheromone to mark unrewarding trails [2]. 
1.2.2. The Ant Colony Optimizer. The ant colony optimizer (ACO) is a 




The ACO is recognized as one of the five nature-inspired computational 
intelligence (CI) paradigms: 
• Artificial Neural Networks 
• Fuzzy Systems 
• Evolutionary Computation 
• Genetic Algorithms 
• Swarm Intelligence 
Ant colony optimization was developed by Dorigo [7].  Dorigo’s original work 
explored the use of an ACO to develop a closed Hamiltonian graph to solve a traveling 
salesman problem.  ACOs which develop Hamiltonian graphs generally begin by 
sprinkling ants throughout the search space. The ants lay pheromone in relation to the 
quality of a find. With successive deposits and evaporations, an optimal solution emerges 
in the pheromone pattern. 
ACOs can also be applied to develop a minimum spanning tree within graphs or 
trees. ACOs that develop spanning trees generally allow ants to originate from a nest, 
forage for a “prize,” and lay attractive pheromone back to the nest in proportion to the 
quality of the find. Ants that forage in this way must generally remember the path home. 
The formation of loops is a possibility when random foraging is allowed. The algorithm 
must (typically) trim any loops after foraging has detected a food source and prior to 
pheromone application.  
In many cases, the ACO is a particularly good fit in situations where the problem 
maps nicely to a graph (with nodes and edges). When a network exists that must be 
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optimized according to some cost function the ACO is usually appropriate. The ACO 
algorithm can be very simple yet effective [8]. 
1.3. THE TABU ANT COLONY OPTIMIZER 
A generalized description of the TabuACO is provided in this section. 
Customizations of the algorithm follow in subsequent sections, with a particular 
application of the algorithm at the end. 
1.3.1. Dual Pheromones. The tabu ant colony optimizer (TabuACO) is different 
than a conventional ACO in that it employs two distinct pheromones to speed 
convergence to a solution. Each pheromone serves a distinct purpose. Much like a 
conventional ACO, an attractive pheromone is laid in response to a positive find. Unlike 
a conventional ACO, a repulsive pheromone is laid in response to a negative find. In this 
sense, the algorithm combines the benefits of a tabu-search algorithm with the benefits of 
an ACO. The precise rules for deposition, evaporation, and path selection vary by 
application and are described in Section 3.  
1.3.2. Multinest. Some problems lend themselves to a situation in which  
multiple nests can be activated to simultaneously compete and/or collaborate in the 
solution of the problem. When applied this way, each ant must know its nest of origin, 
the travel rules and constraints which govern the implementation of the problem (such as 
what constitutes a “find,” any cost to travel, or authorization to spend funds), and how to 
compute the score (the objective function). For a multinest ACO to work, the software 
must issue at least one ant from each of the nests and allow the ants to collaborate.  
Quite often the purpose of multinest activity is to leverage a parallel processing 
effort to speedily solve a single problem [9]. However, it is possible that each nest could 
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work to satisfy its own objectives. It is possible for each nest to have its own success 
criteria. The application of the TabuACO for the energy market was coded to support 
multinest operation. However, a single processor1 was used as the computing resource in 
the tests which follow. 
1.3.3. Graph Navigation. The TabuACO algorithm requires a graph with  
reference directions in order for ants to navigate and properly interpret the sign of the 
pheromone. Figure 1.1 provides an example. The black arrows represent edges with a 
reference direction. They should not be interpreted as unidirectional edges. The blue 










                                            FOOD 




The proposed ant-inspired method uses a directed graph in order to navigate. This 
allows a directional pheromone to be laid down by ants. To achieve directionality, and 
                                                 
1 The processor was usually a multi-core processor, but this property was not exploited. Section 
6.1.3 describes the use of parallel processing as a future work. 






Node or Edge 
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allow ants to roam freely, a pheromone value between [-1, +1) is used instead of the 
conventional [0, 1) range. A positive value influences the ant to go in the direction of the 
arrowhead.2 A negative value influences the ant to go in the direction of the tail.1 A 
pheromone value of zero implies no influence to the stochastic path selection process.1 
Some optimization problems impose additional constraints beyond a simple travel 
cost or prize. This additional data can be modeled in the graph and observed by the 
foraging ant. Nodes and edges can be modeled to have a location, and thus edges can 
have lengths. 
 Nodes and edges can have a transit cost represented in the model under multiple 
costing schemes. There can be a financial cost as well as an efficiency or loss of service 
cost. A network and its model can have capacity constraints. If a node or edge cannot 
carry the full payload the ant is authorized to bring back to the nest, then the ant must 
abide by this restriction and lessen her ambitions to be no more than what the “weakest 
link” can support along the path she chooses. If the ant should wander back across this 
weak link in the path, then this constraint imposed by the solution can be lifted (by 
popping it from a stack) and the new minimum link capacity serve as the payload 
constraint. 
To keep the solution viable from a traffic perspective, additional capacity 
constraints can be tracked and enforced by the ants as they forage. When an ant traverses 
an edge, the records pertaining to that assed must first be checked to see if there is 
sufficient uncommitted capacity to carry the payload the ant has in mind. If the network 
has made prior commitments to other ants, the ant may have to reduce its expectations 
                                                 
2 This is the case for both attractive and repulsive pheromones. 
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regarding the payload that can be carried over a given link. (The network itself may have 
capacity limits at certain nodes or edges.) The ant will eventually return in the opposite 
direction across the link. If the ant returns across the edge in the reverse direction empty 
handed, the temporary reservation originally placed in the prior crossing is discarded. 
When the ant returns across the edge with food, the temporary reservation is adjusted to 
the actual payload size the ant is carrying.  
Multiple evaluations may occur over a series of time intervals. Each time period 
may present slightly different circumstances, but within the same network. Pheromone 
information, developed over the course of one interval, serves as the initial conditions for 
the successive interval. Ants must deliver food at a certain rate in order to satisfy the 
requirements of the nest. If food is removed from a source, it is gone for the duration of 
the evaluation interval, but more food may appear at the same location in a future 
interval. 
To keep the solution viable from the ant’s perspective, constraints are imposed by 
the ant as she travels. Ants start from their nest and memorize the path home by utilizing 
a stacking mechanism. They are given the authority to acquire a certain amount of food, 
and expend a limited amount of resources in doing so. The ant may have to settle for a 
smaller payload than expected for a variety of reasons:  
• The food source might have less food than the ant’s maximum (or authorized) 
payload. 
• The network may impose constraints on the size of the payload. 
• A cost may be associated with the ant’s travel and thus reduce the ant’s 
purchasing capacity upon arrival at the food source.  
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Travel costs might correspond to the fuel expended by the ant in delivering the 
payload, or to the cost incurred by the ant for using the network. A nonzero travel cost 
encourages ants to forage near home and not wander infinitely far away.  
These constraints correspond to real-world constraints in the ecosystem. The ants 
themselves may have payload capacity constraints. Some species are larger than others 
and can simply carry heavier payloads. An ant may have stamina limitations in her ability 
to reach a distant food source and carry food back to the nest. 
Section 4.8 explores the idea of the ant identifying the constraints within the 
model and pursuing a solution that abides by those constraints. A common model of the 
electrical grid is studied and the capacity constraints of the distribution asset observed. 
Yet, despite this capability, it may not be enough. Many complex phenomena can occur 
which might outstrip a simple model’s ability to account for all of the possible capacity 
constraints. For example, on the electrical grid a shortage of reactive power can often be 
remedied by closing a switch to engage a capacitor bank. Tap changers can make voltage 
corrections in response to conditions on the grid. Distributed generation will often cause 
voltage to rise locally. To model all of these phenomena in addition to the basic power 
flow, the complexity of the software must grow considerably. At some point it implies 
that the software architecture should change so that engineering analysis is performed 
separately from the routing optimization. This is precisely what occurs in section 4.9. A 
more advanced analysis of a much larger network occurs. An external engineering 
analysis package is utilized to validate proposed routing solutions. 
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2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of the state of the art is an important aspect of any research. A proper 
literature review is necessary to ensure that the research does indeed further man’s 
knowledge.  
2.1. ACO LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are have been numerous developments in the field of Ant Colonly 
Optimization since its inception.  
2.1.1. ACO Origins. Ant colony optimization was first suggested as a  
metaheuristic in a journal article by Dorigo in 1991, and later in his PhD thesis in 1992 
[7]. Dorigo studied the work of entomologists Pierre-Paul Grassé, Goss, and others [1]. 
Goss et. al. developed an equation (1) based on observations of the Argentine ant for the 
probability that an ant would choose a path given that she had two choices, and that 







.      (1) 
 
 
Where m1 and m2 are moments in time since the ant has visited path 1 or path 2 
respectively, and h and k are constants with h≈2 and k≈20. 
Dorgio’s first ACO algorithm used a path selection formula that computed the 
probability of selection based on pheromones that are elevated in an exponential manner 
as described in (2). 
 
𝜏𝑖𝑗 ← (1 − 𝜌) ∙ 𝜏𝑖𝑗 + ∑ Δ𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑘𝑚
𝑘=1    (2) 
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Where τij is the pheromone along an edge joining cities i and j, ρ is the 
evaporation rate, m is the number of ants, and 𝛥𝜏𝑖𝑗
𝑘  is the quantity of pheromone laid on 
edge ij by ant k. 
Since Dorgio’s original work, numerous improvements have been made [9] – 
many of them by Dorgio.  He developed the Simple Ant Colony Optimizer, and the Ant 
Method. Other improvements by other researchers have continued to this day. 
2.1.2. Repulsive Pheromone Research (a.k.a. “Negative,” “Anti-Pheromone,” 
etc.).  In 1996, Schoonderwoerd et. al. were pioneers in suggesting that an anti- 
pheromone could be useful in speeding convergence [10]. 
In 1999,  Roux, Fonlupt, Robilliard, and Talbi reported on a methodology they 
called the ANTabu [11].  Their approach combines a conventional ACO with a 
conventional Tabu Search. These algorithms are applied repeatedly in sequence to 
develop an optimal solution. The ACO is used to develop an initial schedule which is 
then optimized by the Fast Tabu. 
In 2002, Montgomery and Randall wrote about three different ACOs that employ 
an “anti-pheromone” to speed convergence to a solution [12]. Montgomery and Randall 
described their solvers as variants of an Ant Colony System (ACS). 
• Their Subtractive Anti-Pheromone algorithm is like the ACS and uses a single 
pheromone, but it has an additional step during the pheromone evaporation 
process to favor the evaporation of paths that are shown to be poor performers. 
• Their Preferential Anti-Pheromone algorithm is like the ACS, but uses two 
pheromones—one for good solutions and another for bad solutions. Global 
evaporation is applied at the end of an iteration to all pathways. 
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• Their Explorer Ants algorithm uses a single pheromone like the ACS, but some of 
the ants are programmed to find their own pheromone repulsive. Thus, these ants 
explore unexplored territory when given the opportunity. 
Montgomery and Randall made these comparisons while studying the Traveling 
Salesman Problem. They found their Anti-pheromone solvers did not offer a statistically 
significant improvement over the ACS benchmark. 
In 2013, Ramos, Rodrigues, and Louca reported a Second Order Swarm 
Intelligence method which was essentially an ACO that used both attractive and repulsive 
pheromones to solve the TSP [13] [14]. They found that “by using two different sets of 
pheromones, a second-order co-evolved compromise between positive and negative 
feedbacks achieves better results than single positive feedback systems.” They showed 
that the algorithm compared favorably against the benchmarks. It is also noteworthy that 
their use of "no entry signals and negative feedback” allowed “a colony to quickly 
reallocate the majority of its foragers to superior food patches.”  They also note that “this 
(was) the first time an extended ACS algorithm (was) implemented with these successful 
characteristics.” 
In 2014, Ezzat and Abdelbar described a Less Exploitative Variation of the 
Enhanced Ant Colony System [15]. It is similar to the TabuACO in the sense that paths 
that have already been analyzed by ants can be flagged to prevent further (unnecessary) 
analysis. Their method utilizes a “don’t-look bit” to prevent further exploration, and a 




In 2015, Haynes and Corns described an Algorithm for a Tabu Ant Colony 
Optimizer [16]. This conference paper introduced the TabuACO algorithm and tested it 
against a few prize-collecting Steiner tree problems. The TabuACO was compared to a 
conventional ACO and found to outperform the conventional ACO. 
2.1.3. QAP-Related Research. In 1999, Gambardella, Taillard, and Dorigo  
introduced Ant Colonies for the Quadratic Assignment Problem [17]. Taillard also 
developed a Robust Taboo Search (RTS) for the QAP [18]. Taillard was kind enough to 
post the source code for this algorithm, and the RTS is used later in section 3.3.4 as a key 
benchmark algorithm. In subsequent years other researchers have conducted experiments 
in this area. Talbi et. al. combined a parallel ACO with a Tabu search in an effort to solve 
the QAP. The design alternated between these two search methods to narrow and focus 
the search [19]. 
Wiesemann and Stutzle introduced Iterated Ants: An Experimental Study for the 
Quadratic Assignment Problem [20]. Qi presented A Modified Ant Algorithm for Solving 
the Quadratic Assignment Problem [21]. 
2.1.4. Scalability. In a 2010 journal article by Sameh, Ayman, and Hasan, each 
ant runs on a separate processor [22]. They describe a parallel ACO algorithm in which 
pheromones are shared in a common environment. Their research extends parallelization 
strategies suggested by Stutzle [23].  
2.1.5. Multi-objective ACOs. Lopez-Ibenez in his 2004 thesis described an ACO 
in which he leverages the Max-Min Ant system to develop a multi-objective ACO in 
which a single pheromone is used to represent multiple objectives [24]. 
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In 2005, Pinto, Baran, and Fabregat described a Multi-Objective Multicast 
Routing based on Ant Colony Optimization [25]. The algorithm maintains a population of 
ants and an external set of Pareto solutions. The algorithm uses a classic evolutionary 
algorithm to develop solutions. The distribution of the ants within the environment is 
controlled by the chromosome. Good distributions which lead to good solutions are 
evolved using crossover and mutation to generate solutions which improve with 
successive iterations. 
2.1.6. Multi-pheromone ACOs. In 2010, Alaya, Solnon, and Ghedira described 
an Ant Colony Optimization for Multi-objective Optimization Problems [26]. Their m-
ACO algorithm utilizes multiple pheromones – one for each objective. It also supports 
multiple colonies – one for each objective. Ants randomly choose a pheromone trail 
corresponding to an objective to optimize.  
2.2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE APPLICATION 
The improvements to the smart grid present many opportunities for improvement, 
optimization, and problem solving. This research applied the Tabu ACO solver to 
implement a planning function which worked to protect distribution assets and organize 
the delivery of energy through the grid from producers to consumers. A portion of the 
findings were published in [27]. The results are described more fully in section 4. . The 
approach taken was rather unique. The distribution network was modeled as a graph. 
Producers, consumers, and certain other assets were modeled as nodes, while wires were 
modeled as edges. In one effort the ants themselves were tasked with observing the 
constraints of the assets and identifying a viable solution in which the interests of the 
stakeholders were satisfied. The solver was given a scenario from the IEEE 34 node 
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feeder model. The ants, through the network identified a constrained asset and protected 
it while implementing an energy market function. These results are presented in Section 
4.8. This experiment proved the concept but did not test scalability. A larger experiment 
was conducted in which the test for the fitness of the circuit, and a test for the objective 
of the solver (implementing an energy market) were performed. Engineering Analysis 
software from EPRI was used to test proposals that were generated by the Tabu ACO 
solver. These results were published in [27] and are presented in more detail in Section 
4.9. The Tabu ACO was able to form contracts between the stakeholders, while the EPRI 
OpenDSS software was able to identify a market scenario that limited the PV 
contribution to manageable levels. 
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3.  THE TABU ANT COLONY OPTIMIZER 
In Section 3.  the TabuACO will be described and tested against a variety of 
puzzles. A generalized form of the solver is first presented, then it is applied to the 
Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP), Quadratic Assignment Problem (QAP), and the 
Steiner Tree Problem. 
3.1. DESCRIPTION OF THE ALGORITHM 
This section will describe the TabuACO at a high level. The TabuACO has many 
of the traits of a conventional ACO. Both the TabuACO and conventional ACO can be 
described at a high level by Figure 3.1. After initializing the environment, the code 
implements a loop which implements an ant sortie. If the stopping criteria are not met, 
the ant is sent out looking for “food.” If she finds food (or runs out of time), her sortie 
ends and she returns home. If food was found, its quality is evaluated and the ant returns 
home. She applies attractive pheromone in response to the quality of the find. The 
TabuACO and conventional ACO both incorporate all of these features. The TabuACO is 
different than the conventional ACO in the way the ant behaves when she finds an empty 
node, and in how she computes chooses paths. The TabuACO uses two pheromones 
(attractive and repulsive) while the conventional ACO uses only one pheromone 
(attractive.) This difference in behavior for the ant is found during the sortie process. This 









The activity in red is unique to the TabuACO. This is a distinguishing feature that 
sets it apart from a conventional ACO. The TabuACO differs from a conventional ACO 
in three ways: 
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1.) The ability to apply a rule to identify edges that may be deprecated. 
2.) The deposition of repulsive pheromone. 










The TabuACO makes gains over traditional ACOs by effectively “trimming” 
paths from the graph which are known to be unproductive trails for the target food type. 
The algorithm requires a sense of direction in the graph. Undirected graphs will need to 
be overlaid with a reference direction. This is necessary so that pheromone meaning can 
be interpreted in the graph setting. Attractive pheromones on an edge are interpreted to 
mean that a recommendation exists from other ants to go in the direction of the arrow. If 
the arrow is pointing into the node where the ant is located, it represents a 
recommendation to not go down the edge. Similarly, repulsive pheromones on an edge 
are interpreted to mean that travel in the direction of the arrow is discouraged. Instead, 
ants should travel against the direction of the arrow. Attractive pheromones are used to 
attract ants to a food source. Repulsive pheromones are used to discourage ants from 
traveling to empty leaf nodes. 
When ants are placed at a nest in the graph, they forage until they find food and 
return home. Ants remember the way home as they forage. Ants can be assigned a 
specific type of food to find and they lay a pheromone that corresponds to that food type. 
Different nests or different ants from the same nest may have different agendas and lay 
pheromones that are ignored when they don’t agree.  
If an ant forages, finds a leaf node, and determines that the leaf node lacks the 
type of food it is looking for, the ant will deprecate the node by marking all of the edges 
connected to the leaf node with repulsive pheromone.  
If an ant forages, encounters an inner node, and determines that it lacks suitable 
food, she will also consider all of the adjoining edges (except the edge homeward). If 
none of the adjoining edges have any attractive pheromone, and all of them have some 
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repulsive pheromone, the ant deprecates the node by deprecating all of the adjoining 
edges. 
If the ant finds the food she is looking for, she will lay attractive pheromone all of 
the way back to the nest. This behavior, with the deposition of attractive pheromone, is 
just like a conventional ACO. 
3.1.1. The Deprecation Rule. If the prize-collecting ant travels an edge to  
encounter an empty node that has all other edges (insomuch as they exist) deprecated, 
then the just-travelled edge may also be deprecated. 
Rationale: 
1.) A deprecated edge is effectively “trimmed” from the solution and temporarily 
trimmed from the puzzle. 
2.) An empty leaf node may be deprecated. 
Then, a node containing one unexamined edge, and N-1 deprecated edges, is 
determined to not contain a prize. All N-1edges may be deprecated per the first rationale, 
leaving an empty leaf node which in turn may be deprecated per the second rationale. 
3.1.2. Pheromone Deposition. Once an ant completes a sortie, the fitness 
function is computed to determine the goodness of the outcome. The fitness function 
renders a score, and the score is used to determine the relative goodness of the find 
(compared to previous finds). The ant then retraces her footsteps back to the nest and 
applies an attractive pheromone using an exponential moving average function. All edges 
have a reference direction, and a positive or negative value is deposited to represent 
attraction depending on the reference direction of the edge. 
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A repulsive pheromone is deposited by the ant, in full concentration, on 
deprecated edges, according to the rules described in section 3.1.1 above. All edges have 
a reference direction, and a positive or negative repulsive value is deposited to represent 
repulsion depending on the direction of the edge. 
The code accounts for attractive and repulsive pheromones separately. One does 
not merely erase the other. The rules for pheromone deposition and evaporation are 
different for each type. If the pheromones were to be stored as a single (positive or 
negative) value, certain path geometries in the puzzle could allow useful information to 
be lost. 
3.1.3.  Pheromone Initialization. At the start of a trial, all pheromones in the  
model, both attractive and repulsive, are zeroed. 
3.1.4. Pheromone Evaporation. Attractive pheromones are periodically  
evaporated using an exponential moving average formula. The formula averages zero into 
the pheromone values. Both positive and negative values are moved towards zero when 
this occurs. An attractive pheromone (𝜏𝑎) is scaled back by an evaporative constant (𝜌𝑎𝑒) 
between zero and one. A repulsive pheromone (𝜏𝑟) can be scaled back in a similar way. 




𝜏𝑎 = 𝜏𝑎 × 𝜌𝑎𝑒 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠
𝜏𝑟 = 𝜏𝑟 × 𝜌𝑟𝑒 , 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠
           (3) 
 
 
3.1.5. Edge Selection. The ant computes a probability density function (PDF)  
based on pheromone deposits found on each path. Paths that loop back to a node on the 
path home are assigned a zero probability (unless the path back is the only option). From 
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the PDF a CDF is computed. The CDF also relates to each connected edge just as the 
PDF. The ant then selects a number between zero and one. The random value selected is 
then related back to an edge number contained in the CDF, and the process ends with an 
edge being selected. These details are described in the pseudocode in the sections below. 
3.1.6. Problem Setup. The ACO begins with a setup of the problem which  
relates the process to be optimized to a graph (or tree) structure. The TabuACO requires 
that the edges have a reference direction. This is so that the attractive and repulsive 
pheromone clues can be interpreted correctly by the ant. The graph must be organized to 
represent the problem to be solved. It also provides an environment for ants to store data. 
Some puzzles naturally have an organization to them which leads to an obvious up/down 
directional relationship between edges and nodes. Other puzzles do not have an obvious 
top and bottom. For these puzzles, an arbitrary up/down or left/right directionality can be 
imposed. 
A common stopping criterion is when no improvement has been made in the score 
after some number of trials. 
When the ant forages, the ant selects a path influenced by environmental factors. 
The edges and nodes that represent the environment may be modeled to reflect the 
constraints of the puzzle. Certain moves may be illegal due to the puzzle constraints. 
Other moves may be permissible only if certain runtime criteria are met. Of the moves 
that are allowed, the ant’s selection is influenced by both the attractive and repulsive 
pheromone present in the environment. The ant sortie is a series of moves in which the 
ant is allowed to travel until she encounters a “find” or her travel is otherwise exhausted. 
Ants remember the path home, avoid forming loops, and prefer to not backtrack. Ants are 
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assigned a specific type of food to find and they lay a pheromone that corresponds to that 
food type. In the TabuACO, if the ant encounters an empty leaf node, the edge leading to 
the leaf node is deprecated. The ant has just explored a location that will never have a 
“find” and never needs to be explored again. In a similar manner if a node is encountered 
that is completely surrounded by deprecated edges, has no attractive pheromones, and the 
remaining edge has been travelled and fully explored as well, then all of the edges on the 
node can be marked as deprecated. In this way deprecation can start at a leaf node and 
spread outwards through the graph as topology and travel allow.  
Once an ant has encountered a find, a score is computed, and the ant returns 
home. During the trip home, the ant lays attractive pheromone as a function of the score. 
On rare occasions, the environment is updated, and pheromones are globally evaporated.  
This general pattern is used for all of the applications of the TabuACO – whether 
they be known benchmark problems or new applications of the solver which have not 
been modelled before.  
The TabuACO has been tested against several different benchmark problems. In 
each case the optimizer was modified somewhat to suit the problem being solved. The 
QAP was modelled as a tree, and unidirectional travel occurred from the root to the leaf. 
The Steiner tree problem was modelled as a graph, and the ant allowed to roam in any 
direction. Each variant of the TabuACO offered improvements to accomplish different 
purposes.  
3.2. THE TRAVELING SALESMAN PROBLEM 
The Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) was promoted in the 1800s by William 
K. Hamilton and Thomas Kirkman. In this problem, there are n cities to be visited 
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(numbered one through n). A fully interconnected graph represents the travel between 
cities, with a cost cij associated with each edge. The challenge is to find the least 
expensive path, while visiting all n cities, and returning to the starting point. The TSP 







𝑖=1        (4)  
 
 
The TSP is considered a classic problem. It has been heavily studied and is described in 
countless literature. The TSP is considered NP complete. Puzzles with dozens of cities 
can be challenging. A particularly difficult puzzle containing a million cities have been 
devised. While considered unsolvable by most methods, some progress has been made 
with divide and conquer techniques [28] [29]. 
3.2.1. Proposed Methodology. The TSP puzzles used by [12] will be used here  
to compare the TabuACO to a reference ACO. The reference ACO will be the TabuACO 
operated with attractive (and no repulsive) pheromones. 
3.2.2. TSP Modeling. The TSP is represented by a fully interconnected graph.  
Every node is connected by an edge to every other node. Nodes are not connected to 
themselves. There is a cost of traveling every edge. Puzzles will be drawn from the 
TSPLIB. The TSPLIB presents data in XML. The cost of traversing each edge is 
presented in the XML as each edge is declared. Some puzzles are presented in an (older) 
geographic format. In this format, each row represents a city along with an X-Y 
coordinate. In this case it is assumed that it is possible to navigate to each city from every 
other city, and the cost of travel is the distance between the two cities.  
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Each city has a number. Reference directions are overlaid on the graph by 
defining nodes (cities) with a lesser number to be upstream from nodes with a higher 
number. By way of example, Figure 3.3 contains a fully interconnected mesh graph with 
4 nodes. Each node has a number. A direction is overlaid on each edge based on the node 













3.2.3. Path Selection. A Probability Density Function (PDF) is computed  






















   (5) 
      
 
 
Where, nj is node j, pij is the probability of path selection along the edge from 
node i to node j, 𝑃𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒𝐿𝑖𝑠𝑡







current position, 𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗  is the attractive pheromone along edge between node i and j, 𝜏𝑟𝑖𝑗 is 
the repulsive pheromone along the edge between node i and j. 
If an edge selection would cause the ant to loop back and cross into its path 
history, the probability of selection is zero. If an edge selection would cause the ant to 
backtrack, the selection is discouraged relative to other choices – being reduced by a 
factor of ¾. Otherwise, a probability of selection is the sum of the attractive and repulsive 
pheromones. However, given that the graph is directional, and either pheromone can be 
positive or negative, the sum of the two lies somewhere between -2 and +2. This is 
adjusted to become a number between 0 and 1. 
3.2.4. Pheromone Deposition and Score Dissemination. For all edges along  
ant k’s path home, deposit positive attractive pheromone along edges where the reference 
arrow points away from the nest, and negative attractive pheromone along edges where 
the reference arrow points toward the nest. This is stated mathematically in (6). 
 
 
For ∀𝑒𝑖𝑗 ∈ 𝑃𝑝𝑎𝑡ℎ𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑘  ,        (6) 
{
𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗 × 𝜌𝑑 + (1 − 𝜌𝑑), 𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑤 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡




3.2.5. Expected Results. There is little reason to expect that the TabuACO  
solver will outperform the ACO solver. Negative pheromone deposition only occurs 
when the ant can find a leaf node to trim away. There are no leaf nodes in these puzzles. 
3.2.6. Experiments. The puzzle is set up at the start of each sortie with fresh 
 food at each node location (each city). City #1 is selected as the nest. An ant will be sent 
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on a sortie, expected to visit each city, and upon claiming the last prize, return home. The 
code has been set to force the ant to use the remaining single hop home.  
If repulsive pheromone application is enabled, the ant will watch for opportunities 
to lay down repulsive pheromone.  
The TabuACO (with both attractive and repulsive pheromones enabled) will be 
allowed to run for 104 sorties, and progress towards completion noted. Twenty trials will 
be conducted, and the mean and standard deviation calculated. 
Similarly, the reference ACO (with attractive pheromones only enabled) will be 
allowed to run for 104 sorties, and progress towards completion noted. Twenty trials will 
be conducted, and the mean and standard deviation calculated.  
The Student’s T-test will be used to identify significant performance differences 
between the two solvers. 
3.2.7. Data. The TabuACO solver was tested on a series of TSP problems. The  
TSP puzzles selected are depicted in Table 3.1. 
 
 







Sorties Percentage above best-known 
score 
ACO TabuACO 
eil51 426 104 422 424 
eil76 538 104 162 162 
gr24 1272 104 110 111 
kroA100 21282 104 613 610 
d198 15780 104 3479 3479 
lin318 42029 104 1672 1674 






3.2.8. Discussion of Results. It is interesting to note that the set of TSP puzzles  
studied here are the same ones studied by Montgomery in his anti-pheromone research 
[12]. Montgomery, running a variety of anti-pheromone algorithms, found no discernable 
improvement over the reference ACO. Our results for the TabuACO also found no 
discernable difference between the TabuACO and our reference ACO. For the Tabu vs. 
classic ACO, the outcome is explained by the nature of the problem being solved. The 
TSP graph has no extraneous nodes. Every node in the TSP must be visited by the ant in 
order to form the solution. The TabuACO did not find anything it could deprecate. It was 
not able to effectively reduce the search space. Thus, it offered no advantage over a 
conventional ACO. Increasing the number of sorties will not make a difference in the 
outcome because the setup of the problem prevents nodes from being trimmed away. 
When the TabuACO deprecates an edge, there is always a node somewhere which is also 
being deprecated. All of the nodes present in the TSP puzzle must be present in the 
solution. This prevented the TabuACO from identifying any edges to deprecate [30]. 
3.3. THE QUADRATIC ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM 
The Quadratic Assignment Problem (QAP) was described by Koopmans and 
Beckmann in 1957 [31] [32]. It is NP-hard  [33].  It is commonly used as an expression of 
a facilities planning problem [32]. 
 













𝑖=1     (8) 
 
 
Where, Π𝒩 represents all of the permutations of 𝒩. 𝒩 is a set of numbers one to 
n. A and B are NxN arrays which represent distance or cost. π is a 1xN array which 
represents the ordering of the solution. 
With the solution being drawn from the set of numbers one to N without 
replacement. The solution size grows as N!. With n=12, a search space of 479 million 
possibilities is created. If a brute force solver were to test each possible combination at a 
rate of one every 100 ms, it would take more than 1.5 years to complete the evaluation.  
The QAP offers a type of problem which can offer a large search space, and a 
challenge to those who wish to represent the problem with a model. Memory constraints 
usually allow only a mere fraction of the model to be retained in memory at any given 
time. The challenge of the researcher is to identify the salient features that can be used to 
represent the problem and guide the solver to optimization.  
3.3.1. Proposed Methodology. In most forms of Computational Intelligence  
problems are solved by forming an objective function which is then maximized or 
minimized. Code reuse is facilitated when the solver can be separated from the objective 
function. However, for successful convergence of an ACO it is important that as much of 
the results as possible be retained in the model.  
The starting point for the TabuACO is that repulsive pheromones are utilized in 
addition to attractive pheromones. However, in order for a problem to be solved, it must 
first be modeled. The ACO is well suited to solving problems that are modelled as a 
graph. The TabuACO requires that the graph have directional edges. If the puzzle to be 
solved does not naturally have directionality, it must be assigned as part of the setup of 
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the problem. The TabuACO uses the directionality to help the ant interpret the meaning 
of the pheromone. In a graph setting, a foraging ant can find herself inclined to choose an 
edge that has pheromone on it. The TabuACO uses the pheromone sign (positive or 
negative) along with the direction of the arrow to interpret the direction the ant should 
travel. A positive pheromone (attractive or repulsive) will guide the ant in the direction of 
the arrowhead. Similarly, a negative pheromone value is used to guide the ant away from 
the direction of the arrow. Without directionality defined, an ant can be drawn up a trail 
she is meant to go down.  
A tree is a simplified form of a graph. When foraging occurs in a tree it can be 
confined to be unidirectional. When this occurs, it simplifies the code. There is only one 
direction for the ant to follow and pheromones cannot be misinterpreted by the ant. In this 
special case, the ant decision process does not need to consider the sign of the pheromone 
with respect to the direction of the edge. 
Whenever a foraging ant arrives at a node, she will encounter a series of edges. 
She must make a decision (as depicted in Figure 3.4), and does so from clues she finds in 
the environment (if they are available).  
The proposed algorithm uses the overlaid graph directionality to interpret a signed 
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In this application of the ACO, ants will start at a root node (at the top as depicted 








that treasures are stored in leaf nodes. This application has a zero cost in travelling to a 
find. The combination of paths used to reach a find represents a potential solution. In a 
conventional ACO, we would expect that the ant would lay attractive pheromone along 
paths that yield good results. This approach assumes that good finds are located near each 
other. If this is not true, and good finds are randomly distributed among all locations, the 
solver may eventually find the optimum, but it may be no faster than a brute force search. 
The TabuACO goes beyond a conventional ACO by adding additional 
information beyond the attractive pheromone: 
• An edge is given a mode which indicates if it is unexplored, partially explored, 
fully explored, or prohibited by virtue of the puzzle. 
• The solver may supplement this with repulsive pheromones. (Note: All 
pheromone values, attractive and repulsive, must be signed when bidirectional 
foraging is allowed.) 
• The solver may deposit other information in the environment such as an 
indication of the best score ever discovered while travelling that edge. 
The TabuACO will use any combination of the above stigmergy to find the 
optimum.  
3.3.1.1. QAP modeling. A tree is used to model the QAP. An example is shown 
in Figure 3.6. Black lines represent potential choices. The red lines represent prohibited 











A node is modeled as having N downstream edges and one upstream edge. A root 
node is introduced at the top tier.  The root node fans out to N navigable edges at tier 1. 
Tier 1 nodes in turn fan out to N-1 navigable edges and 1 non-navigable edge. Tier 2 
nodes fan out to N-2 navigable edges and 2 non-navigable edges. The process continues 
to Tier N where there are no navigable edges and N non-navigable edges. This constitutes 
a leaf node. This creates a structure in which there are conceivably NN+1 nodes and 
N(NN+1) edges. 
Figure 3.7 describes the Class Design for the TabuACO experiment used when 
modeling the QAP. Each node has a “name” one through N. The edges take on one of 












3.3.1.2. Pheromone calculation. The research implemented in [16] uncovered a 
fundamental difficulty with laying attractive and repulsive pheromones in response to the 
quality of a find. As a solution converges, the quality of the find tends to improve. What 
was once considered a good find, in retrospect, over the course of time, becomes a 
comparatively bad find. Most pheromones that are laid on paths indicating the quality of 
a particular find will become obsolete. A conventional ACO would evaporate all 
pheromones in an effort to destroy obsolete and misleading information, but not all 
pheromones are necessarily misleading. The TabuACO attempts to remedy such loss of 
information by storing non-evaporative “best of” score data along each edge in addition 
to pheromone information.  
The pheromone and score data are then used to compute a PDF of the selection 




3.3.1.3. Path selection. When an ant explores and selects an unexplored path, the 
solver promotes the edge status from “unexplored” to “partiallyExplored.” If every 
downstream edge subordinate to a downstream node has been explored, then the edge 
leading to the downstream node may be promoted from “partiallyExplored” to 
“fullyExplored.” The edge status is used to select the pheromone formula used in the 
calculation of the PDF. 
The TabuACO may be operated in several different modes. Ordinarily both 
attractive and repulsive pheromones are used. (In this section the notation “TabuACO-
A1R1” for convenience.) For test purposes it may be operated in other modes. It can be 
operated with attractive pheromones only (called “TabuACO-A1R0” in this paper.) It can 
be operated with negative pheromones only (A0R1), and just for comparison sake, it can 









There are four probabilities identified in Table 3.2. The probability of selection 
for a path that would cause the ant to wander off the model is zero (no formula 



















Probability of selection 
A0R0 No No 0 P1/N P1/N P1/N 
A0R1 No Yes 0 P1/N PR 0 
A1R0 Yes No 0 P1/N PA PA 
A1R1 Yes Yes 0 P1/N PAR 0 
 36 
 
calculation from the table yields a probability of zero. The probability formula for 
attractive pheromones PA is computed by (12), repulsive by (13), and the combination of 
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                                                         (11)  
𝑃𝐴 = {
𝑃𝐴𝑅 , 𝑖𝑓 𝜏1 > 0
𝑃1/𝑁 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                                   (12) 
𝑃𝑅 = {
𝑃𝐴𝑅 , 𝑖𝑓 𝜏1 < 0
𝑃1/𝑁 , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                                                   (13) 
 
 
Where α is an exponential value used to tune the solver, bestOfScoreij is the best 
(minimum) score identified along any of the partially explored downstream leaf nodes 
while traversing edge ij, localAveragei is the average of all path scores among the 
partially and fully explored edges (prohibited and unexplored paths are excluded) 
connected downward at node i, maxLocalScorei is the worst score identified among the 
downstream edges which have been partially or fully explored downward at node i, N is a 
puzzle dimension as described by (2). 
When an ant is faced with N paths, she must choose one of them. Many paths may 
be prohibited. They are given a likelihood of selection of zero. Paths which are 





. If the score history indicates that 
 37 
 
traversing the edge has proven advantageous, a contribution proportional to the quality of 
the find 𝜏1 is added to the probability function.  
Note that the PDF values for the various N pathways do not always sum to exactly 
1.00 with the above formulae. However, the code contained a normalization function 
which caused the CDF to provide a value which did indeed start with zero and end with 
1.00. 
In another design note, it should be mentioned that the formula would have 
assigned a probability of zero to pathways which loopback onto the ant’s path history. 
However, since the entire problem was modeled as a tree, loops are not possible, and this 
portion of code was omitted. The ant did however contain a bias to her decision making 
which prevented her from backtracking. This appeared to speed the solvers to 
convergence, and was applied to the TabuACO as well as the reference ACO. 
3.3.1.4. Pheromone deposition and score dissemination. In this model of the 
QAP, a tree structure is synthesized where the root is pictured at the top (tier 0), and 
leaves are at the bottom (tier N). The score is computed for a given “path” through the 
tree which generates a sequence of numbers between the root and a leaf.  Whenever the 
ant completes a sortie by encountering a find, a new score for that combination of 
pathways is computed. The ant traverses back from the find at the leaf node to the root. 
The ant updates the “best score” for each edge involved in the solution. If the solution 
produces a better score than the historical best score for that edge, the new best score 
replaces the historical best score on that edge. Each edge is considered in turn until the 
ant arrives home.  
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The ant uses this score information to compute a local best score, as well as her 
personal experience of a lifetime best score, to compute pheromones as needed as 
described in Table 3.2.  
3.3.1.5. Pheromone initialization. This version of the ACO begins with an 
environment in which there is effectively no pheromone concentration in the 
environment. It is initialized as shown in (3). 
Similarly, each edge is set to either unexplored or prohibited. The “best known 
score” for each edge is left undefined for edges with a status of unexplored or prohibited. 
3.3.1.6. Pheromone evaporation. Pheromones are derived values in this  
particular implementation of the TabuACO and ACO. However, the pheromone metadata 
can be destroyed due to the memory management process. Poor performing pathways 
may be discarded from memory. This is comparable to rapid evaporation of selected 
pathways known to be poor performers. 
3.3.2. TabuACO Pseudocode to Search Trees. Figure 3.8 describes the main  
routine used to operate the algorithm. The algorithm begins with some initialization in 
lines 1-3 and repeats in a loop until the solution score is found. During the trip to the leaf, 
the ant will choose random paths that are influenced by the pheromone calculation, which 
in turn is based upon any known scores along previously explored paths. The path chosen 
represents the QAP solution, and with the ant reaching a leaf node, enough symbols have 
been selected to complete the formation of a solution. The solution is then scored and the 
results disseminated along the path traveled. With a large puzzle, it was found that the 
best use of the ant’s time was to perform repeated sorties which explore new territory. 
Then, armed with some preliminary information, the ant is able to favor certain symbols 
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over others in the first position, second position, and so on, until an optimal solution 
emerges. As depicted in Figure 3.6, an ant will start at the root of the tree (shown at the 
top) at level 0. At each junction, she must choose a downward path, and then move 




1 Initialize the root node and an ant; 
2 antSortieHopCount ← 0; 
3 Reset run timer; 
4 Repeat 
5  createDnCDF(); per Figure 3.9 
6  decodeCDF(); per   
7  Acquire a node (new or existing) from the memory manager. 
8  Move ant down to selected node. 
9  Increment antSortieHopCount; 
10  If( ant at leaf node) 
11   Compute score using (8). 
12   Repeat 
13    Travel a step homeward. Along the edge homeward update the historical 
best score as appropriate with the newly computed score. 
14    Promote the edge status to fullyExplored if all other connected edges are 
fullyExplored or prohibited; otherwise promote the edge status to 
partiallyExplored. 
15   Until( ant home) 
16  Endif 
17 until( stopping criterion met) 
18 Report optimal and resulting scores 
 




Figure 3.8 line 5 has the ant using the “createDnCDF” routine to create a 
cumulative density function (CDF) in preparation for path selection. Then, by calling 
“decodeCDF” in line 6, the ant needs merely to pick a random number between 0.0 and 
1.0, and determine the corresponding path which has been selected as a result.     
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1 compute localAveragei, for local (downward going) edges around node i; 
2 compute MaxLocalScorei, the high score on local (downward going) edges 
around node i; 
3 //build PDF from stigmergy data 
4 for (j = 1 to N) 
5  compute P1/N using (9) 
6  compute PAR using (10); 
7  compute PA using (12) and PR using (13); 
8  case (the mode of edge j) 
9   “prohibited”: pdfij ← 0; 
10   “unexplored”: pdfij ← P1/N; 
11   “somewhatExplored”:  
12       case (pheromone usage) of 
13    “no pheromones”: 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 ← 𝑃1/𝑁; 
14    “repulsive only”: 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 ← 𝑃𝑅; 
15    “attractive only”: 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 ← 𝑃𝐴;  
16    “attractive&repulsive”: 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 ← 𝑃𝐴𝑅;  
17       Endcase 
18   “fullyExplored”:  
19       case (pheromone usage) of 
20    “no pheromones”: 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 ← 𝑃1/𝑁; 
21    “repulsive only”: 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 ←  0;  
22    “attractive only”: 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 ← 𝑃𝐴;  
23    “attractive & repulsive”: 𝑝𝑑𝑓𝑖𝑗 ←  0;  
24   Endcase 
25   “solution”: pdfij← 1; 
26  Endcase 
27 Endfor 
28 //compute CDF from PDF 
29 for k = 0 to N 
30  cdfk ← 0.0; 
31  for l= 0 to k 
32   cdfk ← cdfk + pdfl; 
33  Endfor 
34 Endfor 
35 for k = 0 to N 
36  cdfk ← cdfk / cdfN; 
37 Endfor 
 






The acquisition of a node in Figure 3.8 line 7 can be somewhat involved. The 
memory manager ranks the value of each node to the solution and recycles the node 
ranked lowest.  
Nodes far away from the root, with a poor score, and numerous edges that are 
fully explored are good candidates for reuse. (There are multiple reasons to retain score 
information in the environment. One reason is to influence the path selection by the ant in 
(3), but another reason is to influence the memory manager’s ranking and recycling of the 
limited memory resource in Figure 3.8 line 7.) 
Figure 3.9 describes the pseudocode to build the CDF used to select the path the 
ant will follow. The routine uses path stigmergy as input, and develops a path selection as 
output. 
With the CDF having built with the createDnCDF routine (Figure 3.9,) it must be 
decoded. This is done with the decodeCDF routine (Figure 3.9.) A random number 
between zero and one is selected, and this in turn maps to a corresponding range in the 




1 selection  ← 0; 
2 rvalue ← random number between 0 and 1; 
3 while((rvalue  ≥ cdfselection) and (selection < N)) 
4  selection ← selection + 1; 
5 endwhile 
6 return selection; 
 








3.3.3. Expected Results. The QAP has been shown to be an NP hard problem. 
If the entire search space were laid out in memory using a scheme similar to Figure 3.6, 
we see from Table 3.3 (the N! column) that the memory requirements can easily outstrip 
the ability of today’s computers. Even if this were viable, the time required to solve the 
puzzle can become inordinate as well. If we were to use a brute force search, and 
anticipate that on average, the optimal solution would be found by searching half of the 
search space, and that 125 thousand segments could be processed per second (where a 
QAP puzzle is N segments long), it would take the time described in Table 3.3 (columns 




Table 3.3. Estimated Time Required to Solve a Puzzle  






Time to search n!/2  
@ 125 k segments/s 
12 479x106 2x103 s 0.5 hr. 
15 1.3x1012 5x106 s 6 days 
18 6.4x1015 3x1010 s 812 yrs. 
20 2.4x1018 1013 s 3x105 yrs. 
22 1.1x1021 4x1015 s 1x108 yrs. 




An ACO solves its puzzle through information stored in the environment 
(stigmergy). Large puzzles such as the QAP can be challenging to solve with an ACO. 
The TabuACO represents the QAP as depicted in Figure 3.6. Since it cannot store the 
entire model in memory, it will store only a portion of it. This will create a challenge 
since the ACO requires information from the environment in order to solve the puzzle. A 
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memory manager will attempt to identify nodes that have the least value and recycle 
them. This could cause a loss of information which slows convergence. All of the forms 
of pheromone metadata associated with a given node (and connected edges) are destroyed 
when memory is recycled. When new (possibly recycled) nodes and edges are created by 




). As pathway history matures, scores which prove to be above average 
will influence the probability in one direction or another away from 1/N. 
With the TabuACO it is always possible for deprecation to spread. Given that the 
problem is modeled as a tree, we would expect deprecation to spread upward towards the 
root. This particular implementation of the TabuACO applies a path status to deprecate 
explored pathways. Deprecation does spread upward in the model, and nodes closer to 
the root are considered more valuable to retain in memory than those far removed from 
the root. Thus, deprecation that has spread upward has a high probability of retention in 
the model by upper edges even when the child leaf nodes and edges have been destroyed 
by the memory manager. 
3.3.4. Experiments. Two types of experiments will be conducted: one to show  
that the use of repulsive pheromones offers an improvement over an attractive-only 
solver; and another experiment to compare these solvers to other benchmark solvers. 
3.3.5. Comparison of Performance Between an Attractive-Only Pheromone 
Driven ACO to an Attractive-Plus-Repulsive Pheromone Driven ACO. A library of 
QAP problems is available from Burkard, et al. [34].  The entire series from N. 
Christofides and E. Benavent [35] was tested. The Student’s t-Test [36] was used to 
measure the significance of an improvement to a 95% confidence level. 
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3.3.6. Comparison of Performance Between Assorted Benchmark Problems. 
The benchmark testing by [17] compared the Hybrid Ant System for the QAP (HAS-
QAP) with the genetic hybrid method of [37], the reactive tabu search [38], a tabu search 
of [18], and simulated annealing [39]. Of these tests, Taillard’s tabu search [18] will be 
run alongside the TabuACO solvers on the same machine, matched by iteration count 
rather than runtime. By comparing Taillard’s tabu search to the TabuACO, it provides a 
benchmark comparison to all of the solvers tested by [17]. 
3.3.7. Data. Two sets of experiments were performed. One experiment tested the  
TabuACO against a conventional ACO. The other tested the TabuACO against other 
solvers. 
3.3.7.1. Performance comparison using attractive-only verses 
attractive+repulsive pheromones. The entire suite from Christofides and Beavent was 
tested to compare the TabuACO to the reference ACO solver. The results are summarized 














chr12a 9552 3582 62.7 49.3 
chr12b 9742 174 118.2 118.2 
104 48.0 44.9 
chr12c 11156 1102 58.3 58.3 
5x104 24.5 22.9 
chr15a 9896 1801 132.6 133.3 
104 95.0 86.2 




Table 3.4. Results Comparing the Performance of the TabuACO to the Reference ACO 
(con’t) 
 
chr15c 9504 7326 116.9 121.7 
5x104 89.7 81.8 
chr18a 11098 22541 153.1 152.6 
5x104 140.5 136.3 
chr18b 1534 55 116.9 116.8 
2x105 30.2 29.2 
chr20a 2192 220016 99.4 96.5 
106 92.1 85.0 
chr20b 2298 606779 83.2 67.6 
chr20c 14142 28646 167.3 168.9 
4x104 182.3 167.0 
chr22a 6156 452890 31 30 
106 29.5 29 
chr22b 6194 239838 31 31 
106 29.9 26.1 
chr25a 3796 440915 166 161 




3.3.7.2. Comparison to other solvers. The puzzles in Table 3.5 were solved by 
the RTS, TabuACO, and ACO solvers. In most cases the RTS solver drove the puzzle to 
the best-known minimum. In some cases, the RTS solver could not achieve this 
minimum. It was allowed to run its course, and the number of iterations used to achieve 
its best score were recorded. This same number of iterations were then used to allow the 
TabuACO and reference ACO solvers to achieve the best score they could attain. The 
percentage above ideal is expressed in the two rightmost columns. Ten trials were 

















Percent above best known 
RTS ACO  TabuACO  
bur26a 5426670 1042 0.00 4 4       
bur26b 3817852 874 0.00 3 3 
bur26c 5426795 11032 0.00 3 3 
bur26d 3821225 2294 0.00 4 4 
bur26e 5386879 2535 0.00 4 4 
bur26f 3782044 5014 0.00 4 4 
bur26g 10117172 15117 0.00 3 3 
bur26h 7098658 5457 0.00 3 3 
els19 17212548 2564 0.00 59 59 
kra30a 88900 4516 0.00 32 33 
kra30b 91420 5467 0.00 29 29 
nug20 2570 8135 0.00 13 14 
nug30 6124 29810 0.00 17 16 
tai20b 122455319 895 0.00 30 30 
sko42 15812 90800 0.00 17 16 
sko49 23386 245204 0.05 15 15 
sko56 34458 264948 0.03 15 15 
sko64 48498 18492 0.09 15 15 
sko72 66256 53704 0.08 14 14 
sko81 90998 915957 0.03 13 13 
sko90 115534 5851 0.13 15 15 
tai20a 703482 52349 0.00 12 13 
tai25a 1167256 84827 0.00 12 12 
tai25b 344355646 989 0.00 56 56 
tai30a 1818146 38009 0.00 13 13 
tai30b 637117113 32393 0.003 36 32 
tai35a 2422002 904498 0.00 13 12 
tai35b 283315445 27880 0.00 32 32 
tai40a 3139370 113095 0.70 14 13 
tai40b 637250948 22954 0.00 37 37 
tai50a 4941410 13688 1.06 15 15 
tai50b 458821517 954177 0.00 33 34 
tai60a 7208572 461004 0.89 13 13 
tai60b 608215054 639669 0.00 36 36 




Table 3.5. Comparison of RTS to TabuACO and Reference ACO Solvers (con’t) 
tai80b 818415043 343559 0.02 34 34 




3.3.8. Discussion of Results. Two different experiments are discussed. One pits a  
conventional ACO against the TabuACO. The other compares the TabuACO to other 
solvers. 
3.3.8.1. Performance comparison using attractive-only pheromones verses 
attractive+repulsive pheromones. The study shows that (for the puzzles studied) the 
TabuACO with both attractive and repulsive pheromones outperformed the solver with 
attractive pheromones only [30]. When a short run was performed, it was difficult to 
detect a difference in performance between the two. A longer run was often necessary to 
bring out the differences in performance. It is believed that this is due to the need for a 
significant amount of information to be present in the environment before the ant’s 
behavior becomes significantly affected. Compare the puzzle with a small number of runs 
to the same puzzle with a large number of runs. Quite often, a statistically significant 
difference3 is not apparent until after ten thousand sorties.  
It should be noted that the TabuACO solver is intended to work with 
computationally constrained applications which are unable to store the entire model in 
memory. If the important and relevant portions of the model are retained, convergence 
upon the optimum should be possible. If important portions of data are missing from the 
                                                 
3 Significance being quantified here by the student’s T-test.  
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model, the solver will have difficulty finding the optimal solution and may malfunction 
altogether. 
With the QAP established as outlined in Figure 3.6, a large search space is 
created. Only a portion of the travelled edges are retained in memory. An analysis of a 
completed run typically shows a count of fullyExplored edges to be approximately 
0.02%. The memory manager recycles fullyExplored nodes. Yet, due to their strategic 
location, these remaining edges served to influence the outcome of the TabuACO solver.  
The test results show that in every case which is driven toward a result, there is a 
statistical advantage to using the repulsive pheromone information in addition to the 
attractive pheromone information. 
3.3.8.2. Comparison to other solvers. The analysis in this paper compared the  
RTS solver to the TabuACO solver, and by extension, to all of the other solvers tested in 
[17]. The comparison in this case was based on iteration equivalents rather than 
computational time. The RTS solver beat the TabuACO solver in every case. The 
TabuACO and conventional ACO did fairly well on the entire “bur” series of puzzles, but 
not as well on other series. It was expected that the RTS (as a specialized solver) would 
outperform the more general-purposed ACO and TabuACO solvers. The TabuACO and 
conventional ACO both deposited attractive pheromone and attempted to converge to a 
solution by exploring combinations of numbers that appeared to yield good scores. The 
TabuACO outperformed the conventional ACO because it prevented previously explored 
portions of the graph from being reexplored. The Robust Taboo Solver (RTS) however 
made use of a prioi information. It was able to eliminate many combinations of numbers 
from the search space by exploiting properties of the QAP equation itself. 
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3.3.8.3. Memory management. The solver retained only 1000 of the most  
valuable nodes (as determined by the scores leading to them). For any puzzle studied, this 
is a remarkably small percentage of the solution space. Even for the smallest puzzle, less 
than 2 part per million of the solution space was retained in memory. For the largest 
puzzle, 1000 nodes represent a mere 1:1022 portion of the solution space. The results 
show a statistical difference in performance between single and dual pheromone 
operation. It is believed the memory manager must be doing an effective job ranking 
node value, retaining important nodes and discarding less important ones.     
3.4. THE STEINER TREE PROBLEM 
The Prize Collecting Steiner Tree Problem (PCST) is well known. Given a graph 
with nodes and edges, where a cost assigned to using every edge, and one or more nodes 
have “prizes.” The “rooted” version of the problem contains a special node which must 
be part of the solution. The cost can be expressed as the value of the prize minus the cost 
of the edges spanning between the required node and the prize node. The objective is to 
determine the lowest cost path between the required node and the prize node and from 
this information develop a minimum spanning tree. When multiple prizes exist in the 
problem, and therefore multiple trees exist in the solution, a “Steiner Forest” is created. 
3.4.1. Steiner Tree Literature Review. In 1999, Gendreau and Larochelle  
reported “A tabu search heuristic for the Steiner Tree problem” [40]. Gendreau and 
Larochelle leveraged a tabu technique which prohibited certain moves based on a 
minimum spanning tree analysis of a given tree. The tabu analysis caused certain 
unproductive moves to be categorically prohibited. This narrowed the search space to 
solve the tree to a smaller space. The solver alternates between techniques until 
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convergence. The solver was found to perform well compared to other contemporary 
solvers which were similarly able to leverage unique characteristics of the Steiner Tree. 
In her 2004 PhD dissertation, Ljubic described and developed a number of 
memetic algorithms designed to solve Steiner Tree  [41]. Memetic algorithms are 
evolutionary algorithms which purposefully leverage some aspect of the puzzle being 
solved in order to gain a computational advantage. 
3.4.2. Introduction. The “Second Order Swarm Intelligence” ACO presented  
by Ramos, Rodrigues, and Louca [14] is well suited to problems such as the TSP in 
which ants are scattered across a surface, travel, and deposit pheromones to identify a 
closed Hamiltonian circuit by highlighting the optimal path within the environment. 
However, other types of problems exist in which the objective is quite different, the cost 
function is quite different, and the solution is not obtained in the pheromone trails 
themselves but in other network related information. 
The paper presented herein examines a class of problem in which a closed 
Hamiltonian circuit is not desired. Instead, a Minimum Spanning Tree is desired from a 
root to every prize in the graph. The type of solution offered needs to support multiple 
roots competing for the same prizes. This type of problem seems closely aligned with a 
form of the Rooted Prize Collecting Steiner Tree.  
The common Steiner Tree problem allows insertion of “Steiner Points” which are 
typically representative of modifications to the build out of a network. The research 
considered in this paper focuses on a variant of the rooted Prize Collecting Steiner Tree 





Table 3.6. PCST - ACO Modeling 
 
Steiner Tree Model ACO 
Root Nest 
Prize Food source 
Objective Function Ant agent explores network to discover 




The ACO seems to be a natural fit to the Steiner Tree model (as described in 
Table 3.6.) 
In order to validate the efficacy of the dual pheromone TabuACO, the proposed 
ACO will be compared to an attractive-only pheromone ACO using the same code on the 
same machines. 
3.4.3. Proposed Methodology. The TabuACO operates to solve the Steiner tree  





1 Initialize network and ants 
2 While stopping criteria are not met 
3  Set one or more ants to have an antMode of “foraging.” Each ant is given a 
time limit to search for food. 
4  While ants are on sorties 
5   Case antMode of 
6    Foraging: 
Select an edge to traverse. As the ant moves, she must maintain a 
path history that shows how to return to the nest.  
7    Upon arrival at a node, the ant examines the node to see if it contains 
a prize for an unsolved tree. If so, the ant claims the prize and sets 
antMode to be “homeward bound.” 
8    If the new node is a leaf node, and a prize was not found, the ant lays 
down repulsive pheromone on all adjoining edges. 
 
Figure 3.11. TabuACO Pseudocode for Solving the Steiner Forest Problem    
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9    If the new node is not a leaf node, does not contain a prize, all 
adjoining edges except the homeward edge are considered. If none of 
the edges (save the homeward edge) contain attractive pheromone, 
and all (save the homeward edge) contain some repulsive pheromone, 
then all edges (including the homeward edge) are deprecated with 
repulsive pheromone. 
10    If an ant forages unsuccessfully for an extended period of time so that 
its time limit expires, then antMode will be set to “homeward bound.” 
11    Homeward Bound: 
As an ant returns home, and an unsolved foodsource was found, ants 
lay down attractive pheromone along each edge in the path between 
the foodsource and the nest according to the quality of the find. The 
antMode is set to “home.” If the ant encounters a solved foodsource, 
it ignores the find and continues foraging. 
12    Home: 
Ant reports find to nest, all contracts formed and amount spent. The 
ant sortie is over. 
13   EndCase 
14  Endwhile 
15  Evaporate pheromones 
16 Endwhile 
17 Report optimal paths to each prize 
 




In line 1 of Figure 3.11, the network is initialized. All pheromone traces are 
eliminated (zeroed). All ants are placed at their home nest nodes and not authorized to 
travel. 
In line 2, a stopping criterion is set. A certain number of iterations may be 
allowed for solutions to be found. In the case of a known solution, the stopping criterion 
could be for the ants to find the known solution.  




In line 4, a WHILE loop is set up that allows ants to run sorties in which they 
forage for food. 
In line 6, the ant originated at node nest, now sits at a node i (ni), and considers 
selecting an edge eij which would allow her to move to node j (nj).  
First a probabilistic function peij is computed for each edge connected to the node 


















     , 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
                             (15) 
 
 
If the proposed node j (nj) exists in ant k’s path history somewhere between the 
nest and two hops before node i (inclusive), it is assigned a probability for selection of 
zero. This prevents loops from forming. 
If the proposed node j is the node previously visited before node i it represents 
backtracking on the part of the ant. The likelihood of selection is discouraged but not 
prohibited. 
Otherwise, the probability of selection peij is computed based directly on the 
positive and repulsive pheromone along the edge e between i and j. 
A Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) is then computed as described in (16-
17). 
                                                 
4 Of course when the environment is a tree, only one edge may exist between two nodes, but a 
graph, by definition, allows multiple edges to exist between nodes ‘i’ and ‘j’. 
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𝑐(𝑒) = ∑ 𝑝𝑒
𝑛





      (17) 
 
 
The ant will then select a number between 0 and 1, and perform the reverse cdf 
function to identify which edge has been selected. 
Table 3.7 describes an example where an ant sits at node i and has n=4 paths to 
choose from. The ant has reached an unexplored portion of the graph, so 𝜏𝑒=0 for every 
edge. The ant travelled along edge e=1 to reach node i. The ant’s path history shows it 
must visit node j=2 to return to its nest. Based upon the rules given above, the following 




Table 3.7. Example CDF Data 
 
e 1 2 3 4 
p(e) 0.25 0 0.5 0.5 
c(e) 0.25 0.25 0.75 1.25 




The reverse cdf function is simply a matter of testing the random value against 
cdf(e) values until the correct value of e can be found. The “reverse CDF” process is one 
of converting a pseudorandomly selected number to a path number. This process is 







1 r = uniform randomly distributed value between (0,1) 
2 e = 1 
3 eFound = FALSE. 
4 While (not eFound) 
5  If ( r ≤ cdf(e)) 
6   eFound=TRUE 
7   break out of while loop 
8  EndIf 
9  e = e + 1 
10 EndWhile 
11 %the value for ‘e’ is now known 
 




The virtual ant (evaluated at line 6) travels to node j along edge eij. Edge and node 
path histories are maintained on two stacks. If the value selected j is the same as the most 
recent entry on the stack, the ant is backtracking. If the ant is backtracking, the most 
recent entries are popped from the stacks. If the ant is venturing further from the nest, the 
node and edge traversals are pushed onto the path-home stack Pk. 
In Line 7 of Figure 3.11, it is the nature of the Steiner problem for the entire prize 
to be claimed in order to maximize the profit. The cost along the edges are incurred for 
their use and independent of the amount the edge carries. 
In Line 8 of Figure 3.11, repulsive pheromone is laid along an edge by use of 
(18). The EMA factor, 𝜌, must be a value between 0 and 1. A large value for 𝜌 will 
introduce small changes in the environment. (𝜌𝑑  is the Exponential Moving Average 
factor for deposition of pheromone). The algorithm uses a large value initially to 






𝜏𝑟𝑖𝑗 × 𝜌𝑑 + (1 − 𝜌𝑑), 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒
𝜏𝑟𝑖𝑗 × 𝜌𝑑 − (1 − 𝜌𝑑), 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒
     (18) 
 
 
The resultant 𝜏𝑟 is a value that becomes nonzero as the repulsive pheromone takes 
on significance. It approaches ± 1 as the number of iterations approaches infinity5. 
In Line 11 of Figure 3.11, when a find occurs for an unsolved tree, attractive 




𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗 × 𝜌𝑑 − (1 − 𝜌𝑑), 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒
𝜏𝑎𝑖𝑗 × 𝜌𝑑 + (1 − 𝜌𝑑), 𝑖𝑓 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒
    (19) 
 
 
The resultant τ𝑎𝑖𝑗  is a value that approaches ± 1 as the number of iterations 
approaches infinity. 
In Line 15 of Figure 3.11, global pheromone evaporation occurs by use of (3).  
3.4.4. Expected Results. A PCST graph can have any topology. It will contain  
nodes with one or more edges. A node with multiple parents and no children could serve 
as a termination point in some problems. However, this is not the case with the Steiner 
Tree Problem. Any node with multiple edges could serve as a waypoint to connect to 
another point in the solution. For the PCST problem, it seems that only a node with a 
degree of one (a leaf node) can serve as a starting point for deprecation. Repulsive 
pheromone is first placed on the pendant edge and spreads from there to other parts of the 
graph by the ant as she forages. The performance of the TabuACO depends entirely on 
                                                 
5 (If evaporation occurs the pheromone concentration will settle on a lesser value.) 
 57 
 
the Steiner Tree topology. If no leaf nodes are found, we would expect the TabuACO to 
behave no better than a conventional ACO. If a leaf node is found, and the rules of 
geometry and the placement of prizes allow large areas of the search space to be 
deprecated, we would expect the TabuACO to significantly outperform a conventional 
ACO.   
3.4.5. Experiments. A library of Steiner Tree problems was published by 
Resende  
[42].  Improvements were made to these problems by Ljubic [41]. Three of the K100 
series from Ljubic were used for the testing. None of these puzzles contained leaf nodes, 
so in order to create a greater variety of graphs for testing, the K1C100.3 and K14C100.3 
puzzles were created.  
The K1C100.3 was made by taking the K100.3 puzzle and attaching a child node 
to every node in the original puzzle. Every prize in the parent node was copied to its 
child. A cost of 1000 points was assigned to each pendant edge.  
The K14C100.3 puzzle was made by taking each node of the K100.3 puzzle and 





     
     
 











The construction process is depicted in Figure with the original parent node in 
black and the children in blue. The result was that each original (parent) node was given 
14 children. The children are comprised of 8 leaf nodes and 6 inner nodes 
The K196c100.3 puzzle was made by taking each node of the K14c100.3 puzzle 
and attaching two children to it, two children to those children, and two children to each 
of those children. The result is that each original node of the K100.3 puzzle was given 
196 children connected by a tree structure. Each structure has 64 leaf nodes and 132 inner 
nodes.  
The test problems are summarized in Table 3.8.  
The ACO and TabuACO will have an objective function which takes node #1 in 
the graph as the root and determines the optimal path (minimum spanning tree) to each of 
the prizes in the forest. The score for each tree is computed as the value of the prize 
minus the cost of traveling over the minimum spanning tree to obtain that prize. The 














K100.1 42 0 9 185 4.4 0 
K100.2 24 0 8 83 3.5 0 
K100.3 26 0 8 123 4.7 0 
K1c100.1 84 42 18 227 2.7 50% 
K1c100.2 42 24 16 107 2.5 50% 
K1c100.3 52 26 16 149 2.9 50% 
K14c100.2 360 208 16 419 1.2 93% 





The cost of each tree is evaluated as the value of the prize minus the cost of the 
path from the root to the prize bearing node. The algorithm will run for 5,000 sorties or 
until the forest is solved. Optimal solutions were not available at the libraries and had to 
be determined through experimentation. 
To perform the test, the performance of a standard ACO with positive (only) 
pheromones will be compared to the performance of the TabuACO with positive and 
repulsive pheromones. 
3.4.6. Data. Each solver was allowed to run a fixed number of sorties, and the  




Table 3.9. Benchmark Steiner Forest Results for K100, K1c100, and K14c100 series 
 
Puzzle Name Best Score Sorties 
Percentage above best-known score 
ACO TabuACO 
K100.1 -558838 5000 3 3 
K100.2 -339296 5000 1 1 
K100.3 -763735 5000 0.6 0.7 
K1c100.1 -1137638 5000 46 45 
K1c100.2 -687461 5000 2.5 2.1 
K1c100.3 -1543180 1000 3 4 
K1c100.3 -1543180 5000 1.4 1.4 
K14c100.2 -729491 1000 14 13 




Results were averaged over 10 trials. It was observed that no repulsive pheromone 
was deposited during the K100 trials. Noticeable amounts of repulsive pheromone were 
deposited on leaf pendant edges during the K14c100 trials. Analysis of the underlying 
data finds no statistically significant difference between the performance of the 
 60 
 
TabuACO compared to the ACO for the K100, K1c100, and K14c series. Analysis of the 
K196c100.2 puzzle found that the 1000 sortie test was insufficient time to allow either 
solver to complete, but the TabuACO did outperform the reference ACO. Rather than 
total the scores and somehow accommodate a penalty for missing trees, it seemed best to 
change the metric and simply count the number of trees solved in the allotted time. Using 




Table 3.10. Steiner Forest Comparison for K196c100.2 
 
Puzzle Name Prizes in Forest 
Sorties 
Permitted 
Average Number of Prizes Located 
ACO TabuACO 
K196c100.2 15 1000 10 14 




Results in Table 3.10 were averaged over 10 trials. Analysis of the data6 finds a 
statistically significant difference. The TabuACO outperformed the reference ACO for 
the K196c100.2 puzzle.   
3.4.7. Discussion of Results. A graph of a Steiner Forest can take on any shape.  
In the experiment above, a series of graphs resembling a meshed network were tested (the 
K100 series). The topology of these graphs prevented repulsive pheromone from being 
deposited, and thus no difference was observed between the performance of the two 
solvers. 
                                                 
6 Using the Student’s T-test, values greater than 4 were found for t, while a value of 1.8 or greater 
was needed to conclude the result is significant with 95% certainty.  
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With the belief that leaf edges were necessary to jump start repulsion, the K1c100 
series was created, and prizes copied to the children nodes. This puzzle however was 
trivial for either solver to complete and no difference in performance was measurable.  
Continuing with the belief that a Steiner Graph containing a significant amount of 
tree topology would perform differently than graphs with mesh topology, the K14c100.2 
puzzle was created. The data showed that significant amounts of repulsive pheromone 
could be observed in the environment. However, no significant difference in performance 
was measured. The puzzle, with prizes placed downstream of existing prizes, was 
apparently fairly trivial for the ACOs to solve.  
In the final series of tests, each original node of the K100.2 was given 196 
children in a tree structure, and 7 prizes were randomly placed throughout the tree portion 
of the graph. The original 8 prizes in the mesh portion of the graph were retained. Ants 
had to navigate through the mesh to reach prizes in the trees. This puzzle proved to be 
challenging enough, and of a suitable topology, for a difference in performance to be 
noticed. It is believed that ants could easily get lost foraging in the graph. Without 
repulsive pheromone, they could waste a lot of time researching areas that have already 
been searched. In comparing puzzles, Table 3.8 reveals that when the average degree in 
the graph is approximately 1.0, or when the percentage of tree content relative to total 
graph content is approximately 99%, we see a significant difference in performance of 
the TabuACO over the reference ACO. 
3.4.7.1. Conditions within the model. There are a number of conditions which 
can affect the performance of the solvers. Once a problem has been rendered as a model, 
the TabuACO attempts to take advantage of the model topology to reduce the search 
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space the solver must examine. A number of topological conditions can influence the 
performance of the TabuACO. These are summarized in Table 3.11. 
 
 
Table 3.11. Summary of Topological Analysis 
 





Puzzle lacks any leaf nodes  No The lack of leaf nodes prevents 
deprecation from occurring 
Puzzle contains a small 




The amount of search space that can be 
trimmed is small in proportion to the 
total search space. 
The puzzle is NP hard and 
could take years of 




The hardness of the puzzle prevents 
significant penetration into the search 
space and prevents any significant 
buildup of pheromone from occurring. 
Puzzle contains a mixture 
of tree and mesh topologies 
Possible The presence of leaf nodes will allow 
repulsive pheromone to be deposited. 
The amount of territory which can be 
trimmed is generally a function of the 
number of nodes with degree = 1. If 
these are strategically located, or a large 
portion of the node population, a 
performance difference can be expected. 




Leaf nodes allow deprecation to occur 
and allow the ant to note that she has 




3.4.7.2. Conditions within the solver. When the graph appears to contain the 
conditions necessary for success, improper tuning of the solver can still prevent proper 
results. Usually, best performance is obtained when repulsive pheromone deposition rates 
are high, and repulsive evaporation rates are low. In fact, if the “food” isn’t allowed to 
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move around, and if a pathway identified as an empty leaf node will continue to remain 
empty until the puzzle is solved, then there is no need to evaporate repulsive pheromone 
at all.  
Repulsive pheromone can accumulate to a high level and remain high until the 
solver converges on a solution.  
3.5. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Results from the Steiner Tree Problem and the Quadratic Assignment Problem 
show that the TabuACO (having both attractive and repulsive pheromones) can 
outperform the reference ACO (having only attractive pheromones). The challenge is 
finding a problem of the right size with the right topology. A performance advantage is 
found on problems which are modeled as graphs with a tree topology. Likewise graphs 
which are 99% tree shaped demonstrate a clear advantage. As the number of tree 
pathways diminish, and the number of leaf nodes decline, the advantage to the TabuACO 
declines as well. The TabuACO offers no discernable advantage for graphs which have 
very little tree topology. A graph which contains 100% mesh topology and 0% tree 
topology offers no advantage. Furthermore, no advantage is found for problems (such as 
the TSP) in which every node in the model must also appear in the solution. An 
advantage is only found in graphs where nodes in the model can be temporarily removed 




4.  THE APPLICATION OF THE TABU ANT COLONY OPTIMIZER TO 
TRANSACTIVE ENERGY MARKETS 
4.1. THE “SMART GRID” 
Many systems are driven to become “ultra quality” systems. They are challenged 
to improve the quality of what they provide while managing cost. Furthermore, many 
successful systems, after they are well established, find that they must add new 
functionality, or in some cases, be repurposed to perform tasks that they were not 
originally designed for. We find all of these paradigms to be true of the Smart Grid effort. 
In it, the power grid is tasked to work in ways in which it was not originally designed, to 
improve the quality of the service provided, to provide new features not currently 
available, and at the same time to manage costs. 
The incorporation of new sources of power, and the increased flow of information 
are an important part of this transformation. There are many aspects of the grid that 
warrant improving. In the US, the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 
characterized the “Smart Grid” in part as: 
1.) Increased use of digital information and controls technology to improve 
reliability, security, and efficiency of the electric grid.  
2.) Dynamic optimization of grid operations and resources, with full cyber-security.  
3.) Deployment and integration of distributed resources and generation, including 
renewable resources.  
4.) Development and incorporation of demand response, demand-side resources, and 
energy-efficiency resources.  
5.) Deployment of ‘‘smart’’ technologies (real-time, automated, interactive 
technologies that optimize the physical operation of appliances and consumer 
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devices) for metering, communications concerning grid operations and status, and 
distribution automation.  
6.) Integration of ‘‘smart’’ appliances and consumer devices.  
7.) Deployment and integration of advanced electricity storage and peak-shaving 
technologies, including plug-in electric and hybrid electric vehicles, and thermal-
storage air conditioning.  
8.) Provision to consumers of timely information and control options.  
9.) Development of standards for communication and interoperability of appliances 
and equipment connected to the electric grid, including the infrastructure serving 
the grid.  
10.)  Identification and lowering of unreasonable or unnecessary barriers to adoption 
of smart grid technologies, practices, and services [43]. 
Item #3 on the list underscores the importance of renewable energy. Indeed, since 
this act of Congress, many states and regions around the world have decided to 
vigorously pursue the adoption of renewable energy. This new direction in the industry is 
causing a paradigm shift which cannot be supported very well by the current system, and 
is the subject of the application section of this dissertation. 
4.2. SMART GRID DOMAINS 
The classic teaching by Adam Smith [44] is that when a free market is allowed to 
operate, an “invisible hand” can effectively guide a very large system (the economy) to 
an equitable outcome. This is an interesting choice of words today because it says that the 
economy operates as a self organizing system. 
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Electricity, when viewed as a commodity, can be scarce or abundant. It can be 
easy or difficult to deliver. Local prices can change customer behavior to affect the local 
demand for electricity. The energy market is used every day to solve problems and match 
generation to forecasted load. But many markets also employ a flat rate. This can have 
the effect of hiding problems with energy availability. This lack of market functionality 
has the effect of preventing economics from having its desired effect. 
Analysis by National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST, a division of 
the US Dept. of Commerce) defines seven domains in the Smart Grid Conceptual Model 












• Energy Markets 
• Network Operations 
• Service Provider 




4.2.1. The Market Control Loop. Energy is bought and sold through contracts  
within regional organizations for the energy to be transmitted throughout the United 
States. This centralized control mechanism has worked well with a base load electrical 
power paradigm, but as more distributed forms of electric power generation are 
introduced, the power supplied to the grid becomes more variable.  
The current wholesale electrical energy market for the electrical power grid is 
operated much like a control system. The energy market allows, enables, or contractually 
requires generators to contribute power at specific times and locations on the grid. This is 
done through the formation of contracts between energy buyers (who purchase large 
blocks of power on behalf of consumers), energy producers (who operate utility-scale 
generation plants), and owners of transmission systems (who are hired to move the power 
from one location to another over long distances). This market process makes it possible 
for network operators to control the grid in near real-time.  
Network operations can be viewed as a fast acting “inner control loop” which 
manages the grid in near real-time, while the energy market is a slow acting “outer 
control loop” that establishes the flow of power (Figure 4.2). Network operators manage 
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the flow of power by continually monitoring the draw of loads, the output of generators, 










The wholesale energy market is focused on the generation and transmission of 
electrical power and does not account for distribution and consumer load. While 
accounted for in the transmission circuit model, consumer loads and distribution circuits 
are commonly aggregated and represented as a single load. This has served well in the 
traditional grid comprised of centralized generation and single owner transmission and 
distribution assets [46] [47] [48] [49] [50], but new technologies are moving the electric 
grid away from single party ownership of all generation, transmission, and distribution 
assets.  
Many regions have goals of transitioning significant amounts of power from 
fossil-fuel powered sources to distributed energy resources (DERs) [51] [52] [53]. The 
bdd [Package] SmartGridModel [Market and Operations]     




















introduction of these new power sources challenges both the operation of the grid as well 
as the traditional energy marketplace [54] [55]. The shift is most often being done by 
adding significant amounts of wind and photovoltaic (PV) power into the distribution 
grid at both utility and consumer levels [56]. As the use of these DERs expands, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to regulate the voltage and frequency of power placed on 
the grid [57]. In addition to causing an overall voltage rise [58], increased use of PV 
sources increase the possibility of rapid voltages changes on the grid due to changes in 
weather than cannot be compensated for [59]. The market itself complicates the ability of 
network operators to manage the grid because some tariffs in some regions require that 
operators “must take” renewable power when it is available [60] and many DER 
providers are too small to participate in the existing bulk power markets but have an 
impact on the grid [61] [62] [63] [64]. There are a number of proposals for modernizing 
the grid as well as the energy market [64] [65] [66] [67] [68]. While these are fine ideas, 
[64] [65] [66] [67] at the present we have not demonstrated an ability to have grid assets 
that self-organize in such a way that consumers of all sizes participate in determining the 
market price for every interval of time. The proposal found in [68] is interesting in that it 
is one of the few to mention self-organization. The proposal [68] could apply to large or 
small net zero market participants, but its focus is the optimization of Combined Heat and 
Power (CHP). A building outfitted with optimized CHP would accept prices from the 
market and decide when to draw or contribute power to the grid. Unfortunately, this 
proposal doesn’t explain how this process might scale to involve all market participants. 
The introduction of a transactive energy market provides a means of decentralizing 








Transactive energy markets can be described as “an internet-enabled free market, 
where customer devices and grid systems can barter over the proper way to solve their 
mutual problems, and settle on the proper price for their services, in close to real time” 
[69]. In this paper we propose a method of implementing a self-organizing transactive 
energy market which will operate at the distribution circuit level. Each distribution circuit 
is represented as a single component in a system which models a distribution network, 
but each distribution circuit typically serves thousands of service locations. Scaling the 
current wholesale market to include every conceivable participant has been deemed by 
many to be impractical. Instead, some have called for a transactive energy paradigm to 
either supplement or potentially replace the legacy system [70] [71] [63].  Self-organizing 
systems have been shown to alleviate communication problems through methods such as 
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limited stigmergy [72]. An ant colony optimization method is implemented to create a 
decentralized control scheme. 
4.2.1.1. Timescales. Figure 4.3 describes various “control loops” which operate 
at different timescales. There is of course the fast-acting control loop that everyone thinks 
of – the real time SCADA loop used by network operators to monitors loads and adjust 
generation. There are however many additional “control loops” outside this loop. Before 
electricity is generated, it must be planned (via the energy market function). Before a 




Table 4.1. Electric Utility Function Times Relative to the Flow of Power 
 
Time relative to actual 
flow of power 
Function 
Years in advance Planning and construction 
- Transmission adequacy 
- Generation adequacy 
Months in advance Maintenance 
Hours in advance Energy Market 
- Load forecast 
- Unit commitment 
- Congestion 
- T&D efficiency 
Real time Operations 
- Energy Management 
--   SCADA 
--   Load following 
--   Demand Response 
- Voltage regulation 
- System stability 
- Outage detection, crew dispatch, and FLISR 





Before a generator can come online, it must be built. Before it can be built it has 
to be permitted. These functions operate at different timescales as shown in Table 4.1. 
4.2.1.2. Control challenges imposed by the market-selected fuel mix. The 
Energy Market will almost always optimize for “economical dispatch.” In this process, 
the least expensive fuel (e.g. nuclear) is selected first, and more expensive forms of 





Figure 4.4. Fuel Mix in Study Area With No Wind Conditions (Showing Low Cost 
Power on Bottom (Nuclear in Black) and Higher Priced Energy Above It. Legend 




In this analysis by the National Renewable Energy Lab [73], we see in Figure 4.4 
a system that draws approximately 38,000 MW at night and approximately 46,000 MW 
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during the peak of the day. An entire week is shown starting on a Monday at Midnight. 
The load is met rather nicely by dispatching sufficient amounts of power from various 
nuclear, coal, combined cycle, and hydro sources.  
In Figure 4.5, a small amount of windpower is introduced. The smooth peaks and 
valleys that we saw in Figure 4.4 are gone. They are replaced by more jagged edges 
which only approximate the load on the system. In order to accommodate the variable 
contribution from the wind, the network operator must make adjustments to the other 











The network operator would endeavor to shed the most expensive forms of power 
first, and the least expensive forms of power last – all while balancing the amount of 
generation against the amount of load. In Figure 4.6 we see even more wind power added 
to the mix at the expense of combined cycle and coal. In Figure 4.7 it reaches the level of 
a 30% contribution by wind. The smooth, periodic valleys and troughs across the top of 









Additional contribution by wind and solar displaces dispatchable generation (such 
as coal), and ultimately causes the network operator to lose control of the grid. There are 
points on the graph in Figure 4.7 (such as Monday at Midnight) where the remaining 
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Given these conditions, and the loss of control margins within the system, a 
complete and sudden drop in windspeed could make it very challenging to maintain 
voltage on the grid.  
4.2.2. Operations Control Loop. The discussion above described that there are  
multiple loops which are necessary to bring power online. Different loops control the 
construction and destruction of power plants; the financial agreements to fuel and spinup 




Network operators continually monitor the health of the electrical network. A 




• Phase imbalance 
• Insufficient real power 
• Insufficient reactive power 
• Under frequency 
• Over frequency 
Network operators ordinarily adjust generation levels in an effort to balance the 
generation against the load. However, some network operators have the option of 
adjusting the load.  Adjustment to the load – usually through some market-based reward 
for the consumer – is called “demand response.” 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) identifies 15 or more different 
activities7 which fall under the umbrella term “Demand Response.” These include: 
1.) Direct Load Control 
2.) Interruptible Load 
3.) Critical Peak Pricing with Control  
                                                 
7 It should be noted that the list of what constitutes “demand response” varies somewhat by 
organization. The FERC definition includes Ancillary Services under the umbrella term. It should also be 
noted that the FERC definition of DR, and FERC Order 745 which allows utilities to cut back generation in 




4.) Load as Capacity Resource 
5.) Spinning Reserves (Previously included in Ancillary Services classification) 
6.) Non‐Spinning Reserves (Previously included in Ancillary Services classification) 
7.) Emergency Demand Response 
8.) Regulation Service (Previously included in Ancillary Services classification) 
9.) Demand Bidding and Buyback 
10.) Time‐of‐Use Pricing 
11.) Critical Peak Pricing 
12.) Real‐Time Pricing 
13.) Peak Time Rebate 
14.) System Peak Response Transmission Tariff  
15.) Other  [75] 
There are over a dozen different techniques used for DR, but DR calls are 
generally provided a day in advance – when the energy market determines that there will 
be a generation shortfall. Sometimes the spot market can identify an hour in advance that 
there will be a price spike and/or a generation shortfall. Customers who subscribe to a 
Real Time Price (RTP) program might be informed in “real time” of the price change 
(though in some experimental programs customers are informed the day after the event 
[76]). 
DR is not a widespread capability at the time of this writing. One form of DR is 
“Direct Load Control.” The largest Direct Load Control program in the world is at FPL 
(formerly “Florida Power and Light”). With 800,000 devices deployed on customer’s 
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water heaters, air conditioners, etc. FPL is able to control over 1,000 MW of power [77]. 
No other utility has a direct load control program of this magnitude. 
This level of control is operated at the wholesale market level. It addresses 
generation shortfalls, or transmission line issues. The utility does not have real-time 
visibility to distribution assets, and cannot alleviate the strain on assets even if it knew an 
issue has developed. For example, if a service transformer were overloaded, contractual 
limitations, AMI network limitations, customer participation levels, and other constraints 




































Demand Response is called upon by network operators. Although the Energy 
Market prepares the contracts with the consumer to enable this activity, it should be 
considered an extension of network operations as described in Figure 4.8. 
4.2.3. Power Markets. This section endeavors to explain the various markets at  
work today, and ultimately show the need for an additional market to cover an uncovered 
area. 
The history of the regulated utility can be traced back to the origins of 
electrification. When Edison, Westinghouse, and others developed the many technical 
innovations necessary to operate the electrical grid, Samuel Insull developed rate 
innovations and promoted monopolies under government regulation. Today we find the 
grid undergoing considerable change as new pressures push it to be reinvented. The 
original design assumed that electricity would always flow unidirectionally from a small 
number of large generators to numerous small consumers. This design is challenged 
today to deliver power in the face of numerous distributed energy resources, investment 
in alternative power sources and underinvestment in aging generation and infrastructure. 
The electric utility industry is very capital intensive. Investments in recent years are 58% 
in generation, 31% distribution, and 11% into transmission [78].  
It is well established in the literature that a properly functioning free market 
works to the mutual benefit of both buyers and sellers of a product, and that this is a very 
desirable trait in the energy market [79]. Customers find the best products to meet their 
objectives, while sellers find the broadest possible market for their goods.  
In order to promote competition and free enterprise in the industry, many regions 
have moved toward deregulated markets. The wholesale power markets in all of these 
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regions allow producers to compete for the available business. Wholesale power markets 
are a fairly recent innovation. Deregulation actually started in other countries and gained 
wide appeal in the US around the ‘90s and 2000s. Congress formally created the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 1978 and gave the FERC the authority over 
electricity transmission. Over the years, FERC issued a series of rules which provided for 
gradual deregulation of the power industry.  
In 1992, FERC order 636 allowed for “customer choice.” In many regions, the 
program allows retail consumers to choose their provider [80]. The provider serves as a 
retail aggregator, and may offer multiple plans to their subscribers. The retail aggregators 
then in turn participate in the wholesale market on behalf of consumers. The plans 
offered by the retail aggregators may offer a variety of banking services to the consumer. 
They may be able to offer a guaranteed rate, and a fixed amount on the bill for a period of 
one year. While we don’t see it in practice, the technology exists to expose retail 
customers to real-time prices driven by wholesale market prices. When done properly, 
and with sufficient granularity, the market can be effective at attracting generation to 
relieve network congestion [81] [82] [83]. 
Industry experts observe that the grid is moving from a “fly by wire” type of 
control for dispatchable generation to a stochastic form of generation. They note that new 
methods are needed to control such a grid [84]. The rise of “prosumers” (those who 
sometimes produce and sometimes consume energy) is changing the nature of the grid. 
4.2.3.1. The free market. The idea of commerce dates back prior to recorded 
history. Many countries endeavor to facilitate free market economies. It is well known 
that a healthy marketplace competition promotes the ability of consumers to find the 
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attributes they desire in a product, and conversely, the ability of producers to find 
additional markets for their products. Two hundred years ago, Adam Smith in his book 
The Wealth of Nations described the naturally occurring self-regulation which occurs in a 
free market economy. Smith described it as if an “invisible hand” guides participants to 
“promote an end which was no part of (their) intention.” [44] The economy itself is 
commonly viewed as a self-organizing system [85]. Naturally occurring commerce in a 
free market allows prices to rise and fall in response to supply and demand. Surplus leads 
to low prices, which in turn spurs consumption, which in turn eliminates the surplus and 
brings prices higher. Conversely, shortage leads to high prices, which spurs conservation, 
which in turn eases the shortage and allows prices to fall.8 
Despite the effectiveness of a free market economy, the power industry has found 
that some degree of monopolization is practical. In 1892 Samuel Insull became president 
of the Chicago Edison Company. He argued quite successfully that given the high cost of 
generating equipment, and that these power plants were centrally located, utilities should 
be allowed to operate as a monopoly, free of competition, and be regulated by the state 
[46]. He reasoned that because the high capital investments required by the utility, 
competition would not result in lower costs or better service, but in duplication of service 
                                                 
8 It is interesting to note that many insects, including ants, work individually toward their own 
ends, but collectively find the behavior of the colony to appear to have directed organization (guided by an 
“invisible hand”). Ants individually forage for food, just as humans may individually hunt or gather. Ants 
and humans perform many other supporting roles to sustain their lives. Humans have worked together to 
form organized societies which obtain or produce the required goods. Smith argues that humans may do so 
with their own individual ambitions in mind, but collectively, through the marketplace may appear to have 
an invisible hand which guides the outcome. Ultimately, goods are produced and delivered for a price 
which is mutually agreed upon as fair. 
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and higher costs. He warned that there could be too much service in areas of greatest 
competition, and little or no service in areas where infrastructure has not been built [46]. 
This wisdom has prevailed since the inception of the grid but is being questioned as 
generators become more numerous and diverse. The original underlying belief was that 
large, centralized generation is always more cost effective than smaller distributed 
generation. This original assumption is no longer always true.  
There are those today who promote the decentralization of the electric grid [54]. 
Some argue that there are numerous thermodynamic inefficiencies in large power 
systems and argue that there are cost saving benefits of decentralized generation [86]. 
The electricity market is different from most markets because it is a commodity 
that cannot be stored in bulk in its raw form. This prevents “market makers”9 from 
participating in the market – buying and selling the commodity for a profit. Instead, a 
number of other approaches have been developed. Utilities may deal directly with 
consumers, or in some states (such as Texas) a retail layer is introduced between the 
generation and transmission companies and the consumer. This layer provides customer 
service to the consumers and aggregates retail purchases to buy power at the wholesale 
level. 
 
                                                 
9 Despite the absence of “market makers” in the electricity marketplace, similar opportunities exist 
if one has the right equipment. With energy storage equipment, it would be possible to buy energy when 
the price is low, store it, and use it when the price is high. There are a number of technologies which could 
someday be utilized in this role. Centralized storage can be found today in pumped hydro and compressed 




4.2.3.2. History. Economic theory starts with the basic premise from Adam Smith 
that free market exchange is the best mechanism to balance supply and demand at a fair 
price [44]. The rules which define a fair market mechanism are arrived at by consensus 
between government and private entities. Every region is allowed to arrive at rules that 
they feel are appropriate.  
The original economies of vertical integration argued originally by Insull [46] 
have been studied over the years. Economists Coase and Williamson find that vertically 
integrated utilities are easier to operate, [47] [48] and others find that they cost less to 
operate [49] [50]. 
The new challenge for utilities is for them to accept power from a diversity of 
clean and renewable sources when and where such power is available. In many cases this 
requires a vertically integrated utility to break up, and separate generation from 
transmission and distribution. Such utilities must now rely heavily on energy markets to 
orchestrate the energy needed to supply the projected demand. 
As the Smart Grid is developed, the view in the US is that a wholesale market can 
be operated effectively which represents the needs of the stakeholders, and that DER can 
be viewed as a load reduction within the customer domain10. Small generators are not 
allowed to participate in the energy market [87]. The view in Europe of the Smart Grid is 
quite different. DER is considered a separate (eighth) domain. In Europe, owners of small 
generation can participate in the Energy Market just as large generators [88]. DER is also 
controllable by Operations just as large generation. These fundamentally different views 
                                                 
10 Referring now back to Figure 4.1. The Seven NIST Smart Grid Domains. 
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are important in that significant levels of generation are largely ignored by the US energy 
market and recognized by the European (as depicted in Figure 4.9). 
The European view is to take the four NIST domains that have physical actuality 
and make them columnar domains in the 3D SGAM view. A fifth domain, “DER” is 
added to give place to the ability of non-utility owned generation to participate in the 
market place. The NIST domains “Markets” and “Operations” finds their place as 
“Zones” in the SGAM design. Europe (in particular Germany) calls for the creation of a 
“Smart Grid,” but also of “Smart Markets” to allow for the interaction of DER with the 





Figure 4.9. (European) Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM)  [88] 
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4.2.3.3. The argument for better markets. Different theories exist as to how a 
market should be operated for the maximum benefit of society [90] [91]. Some believe in 
shielding consumers from price spikes, while others believe in exposing consumers to 
such spikes. 
In most tariffs and most markets operating today the real cost of power is hidden 
from consumers. The consumer is instead presented a uniform price regardless of their 
location and regardless of the spot market shortage or surplus that may exist at the 
moment. As a result, consumers lack any incentive to respond to market conditions when 
there is a shortage of electricity or a constraint on the powerline. This lack of information 
for consumers can create devastating financial strains on utilities as they attempt to mask 
all of the challenges in creating and delivering power [92]. 
Some experts have concluded that the biggest problem with the current grid is not 
technical but regulatory [93] [94]. When customers pay a flat rate regardless of their 
location it causes those who live near a source of power to subsidize those who live far 
away. When customers pay a flat rate regardless of their time of use, it causes those who 
use power off-peak (when wholesale prices are low) to subsidize users who tend to use 
more power on-peak (when wholesale prices are high). Furthermore, with the deployment 
of supplemental power sources such as rooftop solar, we find that “the wealthy” are able 
to reduce their utility bills. This ultimately leaves the less affluent to pay for the 
infrastructure that serves everyone. While the matter of equity is one for state regulators 
to debate, many believe that “as a matter of principle, ethical pricing should be cost-based 
and not create subsidies between consumers” [67]. 
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The industry needs policies that incentivize investment in the appropriate areas 
[93]. Some believe the way customers are insulated from the real cost of power is a core 
part of the problem. “Price-responsive demand is essential to realize the benefit of the 
Smart Grid” [95].  “The average cost-based pricing formula precludes economically 
accurate price signals from guiding consumption decisions” [64]. When markets are 
allowed to function, the market itself offers an emergent behavior which guides the 
required behavior. High fuel prices are passed along to the customer and motivate 
conservation. Low fuel prices can also be passed along in a deregulated market and allow 
consumers to enjoy savings. When the real cost of power is scaled out from a zonal 
market to a nodal market, it promotes market based congestion management [79]. 
“Market-based determinations of capacity needs (have been found to be) superior to even 
the best guesses of regulators” [96]. 
4.2.3.4. US wholesale markets. North America is divided into separate regions 
for reliability regions called “interconnects.” In the lower 48 states, the interconnects11 
join and trade energy in three sections: The Western interconnect, the Texas interconnect, 
and the Eastern interconnect [97].  
These regions are overlaid with reliability councils, and also subdivided into 
independent systems (Independent System Operators or Regional Transmission 
Operators). The ISOs/RTOs are depicted in Figure 4.10. These organizations help move 
power and call upon spinning reserve to balance load. 
                                                 




Power producers and very large consumers of energy (such as entire utilities) 
participate in market operations within power pools located in these operating regions. It 
is possible for buyers and sellers to form contracts between each other within their power 
pool. A power producer may participate in a distant market through the use of agreements 









Transmission capacity is a very real constraint. Even though the “Eastern 
Interconnect” stretches from Kansas to the East coast, it does not mean that unlimited 
power may freely flow between all points as needed within the interconnect. Shortages 




Figure 4.11 shows that different parts of the country can pay more for energy than 
other regions (even in a fluid spot market).  
Figure 4.12 captures a moment of time within the Midwest ISO in which a price 
fluctuation occurred within the ISO. There is a spot market for energy, and corresponding 
prices. But there is also a day-ahead energy market. When proper planning can occur, 
regions tend to settle on day-ahead prices which are less (per MW) than the spot market. 










All of the wholesale markets in the US have transitioned from a “zonal market” to 
a “nodal market” [101] [102]. This creates much finer granularity in the analysis and 
improvements in the ability to address localized shortages and surpluses of power. For 
example, transitioning to a nodal system in Texas is estimated to cost between $530-660 
million, yet will save customers an estimated $5.6 billion in the first 10 years of operation 





Figure 4.12. Example Price Map at MISO Generated for Dec 20, 2017 at 23:40 Showing 




The wholesale market drives the movement of power from large (“centralized”) 
generators to distribution networks (as shown in Figure 4.1). SCADA instruments in the 
distribution substation allow network operators to see how much power flows through the 
substation, but once it is in the distribution network visibility to real-time power flow is 
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generally not available. Temporary shortages and surpluses within a given distribution 
network are generally hard to find, and there is no “retail energy market” market 
mechanism to correct these differences. All of the costs are “internal” and owned by a 
single entity. 
Distribution networks are designed to be worry free. Power engineers who design 
the distribution network will size the substation transformers based on the power needed 
downstream. They will ensure that the conductors that carry power from the substation to 
the service transformer are adequately sized. (Customers select a service capacity and 
thus directly influence the size of the service transformer.) Everything is carefully 
engineered to deliver the power the customers say they need when they say they need it. 
However, distribution networks are big and slow to change. A growth spurt of new 
construction in one area can outstrip a substation transformer’s ability to deliver power to 
that area. Infrastructure can suffer weathering or damage and lose capacity. New and 
unexpected types of loads (such as electric vehicles) can catch a utility off guard and 
unable to serve the accumulated demand within a service territory. Customer-sided 
generation (such as wind and solar) is outside the utility’s control. Customers can 
contribute power to the grid (or not contribute) in ways the utility energy purchaser 
cannot rely on or control. All of these can create localized shortages of energy, yet these 
shortages are not reflected in the cost of power. Residential consumers tend to pay a flat 
rate, regardless of their time of use, and regardless of the distance energy must travel to 
reach their load. 
4.2.3.5. Day ahead and hour ahead markets. All dispatchable generation is  
planned based on a load forecast, which in turn, is based on the weather forecast. In order 
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to accurately gauge the need for power, these forecasts are refined over time. The “next 
day” weather forecast tends to be far more accurate than the forecast for the next week. 
The forecast for the “next hour” tends to be more accurate than the forecast for the next 
day. These short-term markets tend to reflect the real cost of generating power.  
For the most part, all residential consumers pay the same price per kWh at every 
time of day regardless of the availability and price of power. By insulating the customer 
from the “pain” that the utility feels, the customer is prevented from participating in the 
solution.  
4.2.3.6. Large generation. The markets operate by first determining the amount 
of load that is expected to be required in each region. The load forecast is largely based 
on the weather forecast. In the wholesale energy market, buyers meet sellers armed with 
this information. The load requirements generally outstrip the ability of any single power 
plant to provide. The market thus identifies the lowest cost provider and accepts that bid. 
More power is usually needed, so the next lowest cost bid is accepted, and so on until 
sufficient generation is contracted to meet the forecasted load and ancillary service 
requirements. Large generation is usually able to offer power at a lower price than small 
generation. In part, large generators can use less expensive fuels than small generators 
(such as U235 or coal). But these plants usually also require that a significant portion of 
the plant capacity be utilized, and that it is not operated in a dynamic fashion that requires 
numerous ramp ups and ramp downs in reaction to a wildly varying load.  
4.2.3.7. Retail markets. The cost of electricity consists of energy costs and 
network costs [104]. Ordinarily a utility will offer a variety of tariffs to retail customers. 
All of the tariffs are different yet all of them are considered fair. The most commonly 
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used tariff employs a flat rate. The flat rate charges consumers the same price for energy 
regardless of the time or amount used. Residential customers have very predictable usage 
patterns. Flat rates are easily metered by a simple watthour meter. 
4.2.3.8. Real time pricing. Opinions as to the ideal and most equitable pricing 
mechanism continue to be a source of vigorous debate. Ahmad Faruqui writes: 
 
Flat rate pricing, which has been in place for the past century creates an 
enormous subsidy between customers with varying load shapes. It is 
unethical and needs to be replaced by dynamic pricing. Not only will this 
be more ethical, it will also improve the economics of the power system 
and lower costs for all customers [67]. 
 
Efforts to develop time-based rates (in particular Time Of Use based rates) date 
back to the original rollout of the grid. Improvements in technology have allowed the 
consideration of other rates which are more reflective of wholesale market activity. A 
landmark paper proposing “Dynamic Pricing” was written by Vickrey in 1971 [66]. 
Since then, there have been pilot programs to expose retail customers to real-time 
prices [105]. These have been well received in concept, but slow to find implementation. 
A rare example of a retail RTP program can be found at Elevate Energy, Chicago Illinois 
USA [76].  Residential customers participate and use either the price from the wholesale 
market from the G&T that supplies the electricity. One G&T posts the day-ahead price 
from the wholesale market. Another G&T uses a dynamic spot market price which is 
adjusted throughout the day. Customers can learn about the real time price by: 
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• Visiting a website 
• Text message alerts 
• Email alerts 
They can call the utility on the phone and talk to a person and ask them about the 
price forecast. 
Customers settle up after the fact with the price they paid during the market 
interval during which they consumed the power. 
The barriers to implementation appear to be political rather than technical [67] 
[106].  
In terms of raw power, Georgia Power (Southern Company) operates the largest 
RTP market in the US. It was felt that opening up the pool of all available power to all 
market participants was the fairest mechanism [107]. However, to participate in this RTP 
market, a customer has to be 1 MW or larger. This limits the number of participants to 
80. 
However, one could question the fairness of real time prices which were based on 
a criterion the customer didn’t want. A better approach would be to develop a 
“transactive energy market” which optimizes along the criterion (or criteria) specified by 
the consumer. 
4.2.3.9. Transactive energy. “Transactive energy” is the name given to the 
notion that numerous small customers can effectively participate in the wholesale market 
to buy and sell energy by contracting to activate customer owned DER. Efforts (such as 
the OASIS Energy Market Information Exchange) have been made to develop protocols 
for transactive energy [108]. In theory, this would allow a customer to buy DER power 
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from a neighbor. Unfortunately, the OASIS eMIX standard doesn’t identify a means to 
communicate these messages in real time to the participants [109]. 
The GridWise Architecture Council has developed ideas similar to those proposed 
here [110]. The tenets proposed by the GWAC include: 
• “The information age will revolutionize the way in which energy systems work 
today. 
• Intelligence (better information supports better decision making) will invade all 
levels of the energy systems from generation, to bulk transmission, local 
distribution, and residential, commercial, and industrial consumption. 
• Value is best judged in a fair market environment open to participation and 
review by regulatory authority. This should be exposed at all levels of the system. 
• Transparency of value allows market participants to develop and deploy 
economical solutions that cross traditional enterprise and regulatory boundaries. 
• The system will evolve from its present form of operation, through a series of 
tractable changes over time. Changes include organizational boundaries 
(ownership and operational responsibility), technology deployment, and forms of 
collaboration between system components. 
• Collaboration based upon autonomous decision making enhances the resilience of 
complex systems to system-wide failure and accommodates evolutionary 
changes” [65]. 
Technology minded customers would know that each of the alternative energy 




4.2.3.10. New challenges. It is not always possible to upgrade everything at any 
time. Not all utilities have the funds to undertake significant construction projects. Yet, a 
significant upgrade may be required if there is a rapid adoption of Electric Vehicles 
(EVs). A study by Bloomberg forecasts that the cost of EVs will drop to match the cost of 
comparable gasoline powered vehicles in the year 2020 [111]. When this happens, it 
could prove to be a tipping point in the market and a rapid shift to the adoption of EVs. A 
rapid charging EV can draw more power than the power drawn by the house it is parked 












This type of loading will complicate both the energy market and operations. Add 
to this the adoption of DER. It is possible for energy to appear where and when it isn’t 
needed. This too can cause difficulties in operating the grid. (Note the red curve in Figure 
4.13 that dips below zero during the 10 a.m. to 2 p.m. window). 
There is research that suggests that given a centralized knowledge of the electric 
vehicles, their locations, and their charging requirements, it would be possible to 
incentivize vehicle owners (as Demand Response participants) to stagger their vehicle 
charging in a way that levels the load on the available generation [114]. This in turn 
would allow lower cost generation to serve the load and minimize the need for expensive 
peaking generation. 
In a similar fashion, given a centralized knowledge of the real-time consumption 
of electricity, and the strain on every distribution asset, it would be possible (in theory) to 
issue some type of Demand Response program to alleviate the strained asset. But current 
DR participation ranges from zero to 100% at different service transformers. DR 
participation ranges from 0.1% of peak load to 10.2% at different ISOs/RTOs, and an 
ability to shed as much as 6.2% of peak load for all ISOs/RTOs combined [115]. The 
only mechanism that does reach every consumer is the marketplace. 
The marketplace must continue to support large, centralized generation, but also 
accommodate DER. If DR is built out in an area, a local marketplace needs to support all 
sizes of DR entrants to the market. The energy market needs a mechanism to support an 
“all of the above” energy policy. Large and small generators, large and small consumers, 
large and small DR participants. Remote participants would require the support of 
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transmission operators, while local participants require the support of distribution 
operators.  
There are two ways this can be approached: 
1.) Build out the centralized energy market to have improved granularity in the 
markets and improved visibility to distribution issues, or 
2.) Develop a type of distributed energy market which offers improved granularity in 
the markets and improved visibility to the distribution issues. 
Either approach could be made to work. Building out a centralized system allows 
for a simpler algorithm, but it creates new challenges. A centralized approach could 
introduce a single point of failure in the architecture. It also requires enormous amounts 
of data to traverse vast distances bidirectionally in real time. If the current data is not 
available to the centralized system, it cannot compute an optimal result. On the other 
hand, a distributed system is more difficult to destroy. A computing node is responsible 
for fewer participants, so the loss of a computing node causes less damage to market 
participation. 
The transactive energy (TE) market endeavors to be this mechanism. TE allows 
numerous, small, local markets to be created to form a local price, and through the free 
market, solve local problems locally. With generation and ancillary services put in place 
(as DR programs) the market can then hand off planned exchanges to network operators 
to execute.  
TE can create customized price for electricity which is as individualized as every 
service location. This can serve as an alternative to the flat rate tariff, and an answer to 
the problems the flat rate tends to perpetuate. As long as the majority of residential 
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customers operate on a flat rate tariff, it will be difficult for the wholesale energy market 
to scale out and engage small users in a way that will protect the interests of all of the 
market participants. The flat rate tariff actually creates subsidies between tariff classes 
[67]. It hides the true cost of delivering power to each service location. It perpetuates 
many of the problems the market currently has in promoting competition and responding 
to fluctuating fuel costs. 
4.3. STATEMENT OF NEED 
A market mechanism is needed that will accept participants of any size, apply a 
consistent set of rules, and scale to include all participants. 
4.3.1. Distributed Energy Resources. The introduction of significant amounts of 
wind and photovoltaic (PV) power into the distribution grid as distributed energy 
resources (DER) can create voltage and frequency regulation challenges [57]. Not only 
can a significant penetration of PV power cause the overall voltage to rise [58], even 
moderate amounts of PV penetration along with windblown clouds, can create a situation 
in which rapid voltages changes are introduced onto the grid, and substation tap changers 
are not able to keep up [59]. The introduction of these new power sources challenges both 
the operation of the grid as well as the traditional energy marketplace [54]. “The present 
electric power delivery infrastructure was not designed to meet the needs of a 
restructured electricity marketplace, the increasing demands of a digital society, or the 
increased use of renewable power production”[55]. New approaches are needed which 
consider the needs of consumers, producers, and the grid itself.  
The traditional grid has a long history of centralized generation accompanied by a 
single owner of transmission and distribution assets [46] [47] [48] [49] [50]. However, 
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the trend in deregulation is to split up the ownership of generation, transmission, and 
distribution assets. This paves the way for small independent power producers to 
participate in the grid, but small participants are generally excluded from the bulk power 
market [61] [62]. With many areas now legislating renewable portfolio standards ranging 
from 20 to 100% penetration in sourcing power to the grid, the opportunity for small 
power producers to participate should not be ignored.  
4.3.2. The US Wholesale Power Market. Transmission and distribution circuits  
are very different from each other. The thinking supporting the design of these circuits is 
very different. They are constructed using different rules and operate at different 
voltages. In the wholesale energy market, an entire distribution circuit (consisting of a 
substation transformer and everything electrically downstream) might be aggregated and 
represented as a single node in a transmission model. Transmission level “nodes” or 
“regions”[101] might participate in a wholesale energy market, but distribution-level 
stakeholders typically do not. By aggregating all of the details of the distribution circuit 
into a single node (and a single “load” in the model), the issues within the distribution 
circuit become obscured. The wholesale market participants are not informed of activity 
within the distribution circuit and, as a result, cannot do anything to address local issues 
that may arise. 
Independent System Operators (ISOs) and Regional Transmissions Organizations 
(RTOs) cover regions that serve approximately two-thirds of the nation’s electricity load 
(depicted in Figure 4.10). The ISOs & RTOs foster competition for electricity generation 
by, in some cases, forming or, in other cases, supporting a wholesale energy marketplace. 
Bids are made in the marketplace to optimize for cost (called “economic dispatch”) [116]. 
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The energy buyers are often utilities who need to acquire power to serve to their 
customers. The energy sellers are the owners of large generators. (The generator might be 
owned by a utility or it might be independently owned.) The owners of transmission 
participate in, and facilitate the sale. The contracts formed cover a variety of possibilities 
including sometimes the option to buy between zero and all of the power available at a 
power plant. Frequency and voltage regulation are often handled in a contract for 
“ancillary services” in which one or more buyers hold the option to buy power as needed 
in real time. 
4.4. INTRODUCING TRANSACTIVE ENERGY 
Distributed generation is the new reality. Nevertheless, to offer a fair price to 
participants of all sizes, a way needs to be developed to engage the smallest of consumers 
and producers in the energy market (including those connected to distribution voltages) 
[44] [63] [64]. Such a change can engage large numbers of small producers and 
consumers to alter their behavior in response to the corporate needs of the community. 
Higher (or lower) energy prices can stimulate changes in consumer behavior in response 
to prices, as well as smarten investment. Only when the granularity of the market is 
extended to include all consumers and producers will we see the smallest assets (such as 
individual service transformers) protected by market economies.  
A decentralized energy market known as “transactive energy” (TE) has been 
proposed to supplement and eventually replace [70] the legacy, centrally controlled 
system. TE supports both market [71] and control functionality. In layman’s terms, one 
might describe transactive energy as “an internet-enabled free market, where customer 
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devices and grid systems can barter over the proper way to solve their mutual problems, 
and settle on the proper price for their services, in close to real time” [69]. 
The marketplace needs to continue to support centralized generation but must also 
make room for DER. DER might be able to relieve a strained asset, but so might Demand 
Response where it has been sufficiently built out downstream of the asset, and the 
network operator has visibility to the situation. The market needs a means to support an 
“all of the above” approach to energy and consumption. TE aims to become that 
mechanism through individualized markets with a large number of participants. 
4.4.1. “Fairness” Under the Transactive Energy Paradigm. There are many  
different tariffs in place at each electric utility. These tariffs also vary from utility to 
utility. Each of these distribution tariffs are considered “fair” yet they are different. The 
transactive energy market departs from these traditional practices and endeavors to apply 
the rules considered “fair” at the wholesale level to the retail level. The notion of what is 
“fair” in the energy marketplace has been argued for the past 100 years, and the debate 
will not be settled here. Creating a retail energy market which is similar to the wholesale 
market implies that consumers would have to pay individually for power from the 
sources they select, and they would have to pay for the transportation of that power as 
well. One consequence of a retail energy market is that producers must compete against 
each other at a retail level; and conversely, consumers compete against each other as 
well. When competition occurs in the marketplace usually it is considered beneficial. In 
this competition we expect: 
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• Consumers willing to pay more should be able to extend their reach and obtain 
power from distant locations (provided no network assets constrain their 
purchase). 
• Consumers willing to pay more should be able to obtain expensive local power 
when inexpensive distant power is unavailable due to network constraints. 
• Generators should end up with contracts from a mix of consumers – some local, 
some distant. 
• Any given asset should end up with contracts from a mix of consumers which are 
electrically downstream from the generators. 
• Consumers may end up with a of mix generation sources (of various costs) even 
when they specifically asked the solver to provide the lowest cost solution. 
The TabuACO achieved all of these outcomes in the contracts that were formed. 
The process of incrementally obtaining power (using an ant authorized to purchase small 
amounts of power at a time) allowed all of the consumers and producers to compete in 
the marketplace simultaneously and arrive at an equitable sharing of the opportunities. 
Another approach to achieving this particular outcome would be to formally control the 
sale of power so that only small increments of power could be sold under any contract, 
and thus the solver (whatever it is) must labor to form many thousands of contracts to 
obtain the power any given consumer requires. This gradual release of energy to the 
marketplace allows for some degree of competition between consumers and an 
opportunity for some consumers to purchase low cost power some of the time. 
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In the experiments, consumers seeking the lowest cost would sometimes get 
contracts with generators that were low cost but not the lowest cost. There are several 
things to be said about this outcome: 
1.) The stochastic search process which authorizes higher prices when low cost 
solutions cannot be found will occasionally form a contract with a distant 
generator that is low cost and bypass a local generator that was lower cost. The 
Tabu ACO algorithm used in the TE application is a “greedy” algorithm in the 
sense that it acquires any suitable power it can obtain. It takes the view that it is 
better to acquire the power required in the marketplace at a reasonable price than 
to run the risk of falling short before the market window closes. 
2.) Depending on a consumer’s strategy, this outcome is not necessarily suboptimal. 
It is usually a good practice to diversify one’s supply portfolio in order to improve 
product availability and maintain lines to multiple suppliers. Portfolio 
diversification is practiced by many purchasing agents around the world. We can 
say that the selection of multiple sources for generation is actually a desirable 
outcome. 
3.) This “proof of concept” experiment did not employ the “evaporation” commonly 
used by ACOs to converge to a solution. Instead it allowed the ant to form a 
contract with any generator that met the purchase criteria. This is deferred to be a 
future work in section 6.2.5. One approach to attaining the lowest cost would be 
to implement a form of selective “evaporation” with the contracts. Once all of the 
required generation has been found, an application-specific evaporation algorithm 
can be used. The algorithm can identify cost paid for the least expensive contract, 
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and the energy obtained by the most expensive contract. A new (cost saving) 
sortie can be issued in which the ant seeks a replacement for the most expensive 
contract. If a replacement is found during the bidding period, it can be approved, 
and the expensive contract can be cancelled or possibly demoted to an agreement 
to provide spinning reserve instead of power. This process can continue until the 
lowest available outcome is acquired within the time allowed. Of course, nearly 
everybody wants the lowest cost generation, but not everyone will be able to 
acquire it. It can be said that it is “fairer” that people pay an average price. This is 
part of the debate. The other side would argue that not all consumers are 
“average” and that consumers should pay in proportion to the actual cost of goods 
and services. 
4.) Alternatively, the existing algorithm can be used to seek the lowest cost 
generation. A user who really values hitting a certain cost target, can name their 
price, and if the ant doesn’t find generation available at that price,  adjustment 
their strategy before the market window closes. In this way, the existing algorithm 
is perfectly satisfactory. Of course, this strategy risks experiencing an energy 
shortfall at the close of the market window. 
Furthermore, on the subject of marketplace competition, a real commercial 
application would likely want tighter guarantees of fair play. In the proof-of-concept 
experiment, equity was assured by running all nests for equal iterations on the same 
computer. If processing is distributed so that every nest has its own processor, similar 
controls are needed to ensure that some nests do not gain an unfair advantage due to 
differences in processing power and network performance. 
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4.4.1.1. Overages and shortfalls. There are several scenarios that may occur in 
which a consumer uses more or less power than contracted, or a generator contributes 
more or less power than agreed. Who pays for these differences? In the wholesale market 
the participants pool their power. If a generator goes offline, it loses out on revenue, and 
additional power is (often) purchased on the spot market to compensate for the shortfall. 
Sometimes network operators can simply raise the contribution from the spinning reserve 
and frequency reserve allocation to address the shortfall. A similar thing can occur here. 
Consumers can use the transactive energy market to agree to purchase the minimum 
amount of power they think they will require, agree to purchase spinning reserve to cover 
any additional amount of power they think they may require, and allow network operators 
to control the spinning reserve contribution in order to stabilize the grid. What if a 
consumer draws more power than their energy and spinning reserve contracts allow? As 
described in section 6.2.3, this is a subject for future work. However, we would expect 
uncontracted power to be supplied by a power pool, and settled at a price higher than 
average. The energy market provides a first pass approximation in matching the level of 
generation to the load, but network operators have the means to tune the output of certain 
generators until the level of generation matches the load.  
A consumer with onsite generation may elect to operate their system off-grid, but 
if they go on-grid they have access to additional generation beyond what they own. This 
simple connection usually results in higher reliability and higher availability. But the 
ability to purchase the power necessary to meet the local need is something that may 
cause consumers to recalculate their investment in local generation. For those who are 
off-grid, local power is “free,” but only after a substantial initial capital investment.  
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The normal behavior for the stakeholders is described in Figure 4.14. Consumers 
are expected to form a contract for low cost power which is the minimum they believe 
they will need to use, and another contract with a generator for spinning reserve. The 
spinning reserve costs something because the equipment is “rented” and standing by to 
serve the consumer. If called upon to contribute, fuel will be spent, and the delivered 
power which was held in reserve utilized. This source will likely be more expensive than 
the other contracts the consumer holds. It should also be mentioned that the “network” 
that transports the power is not expected to have zero resistance. There will be electrical 
losses along this network. If a consumer elects to buy power from a generator that is quite 
remote from their location, they do so with the understanding that some of the power will 
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The corner case analysis is always more difficult than the happy path. What 
should happen to our contractual agreements if a network outage occurs? It may be that 
the loss of a transmission line allows distant generators to continue to operate but due to 
the severed line, cause their power to be delivered to different consumers instead. What is 
fair in this case? On one hand, it could be argued that electrons are fungible and that 
electrons added at one point on the grid don’t necessarily make it to their contractual 
destination anyway. Let consumers pay the rate they have used. On the other hand, it 
could be said that high cost electricity can make or break certain industrial applications, 
and cost matters a great deal to the economics of the business process. Should consumers 
be informed of a transmission line outage and be asked to curtail? What if it is a local 
outage and they become informed as their lights go out? This is described in Figure 4.15. 
If the communications network were still operational, and the solver able to 
perform a rapid analysis for the energy market, it may be possible for the consumer’s 
equipment to immediately negotiate new contracts with local generation. Suddenly, the 
power which would have left the area for sale elsewhere is no longer able to leave, just as 
the power generated remotely is unable to enter the area. Can the old contracts be 
temporarily set aside, and new contracts negotiated under the new (temporary) grid 
topology? The distribution network (and/or network operator) could inform the 
consumer’s equipment of the grid failure, and of power shortfall. 
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If the communication network is a high-performance network, it may be possible 
for the network to isolate the fault, come to understand its new topology,12 and allow new 









                                                 
12 Products to monitor transmission asset health are common. Products to monitor distribution 
asset health are available today, and costs are falling. 
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The discussion of what is “possible,” “affordable,” and “fair” is left for 
implementers to negotiate. Much of what is considered “fair” or “reasonable” is often 









It should also be noted that this usecase introduces the “power pool” actor. This is 
a bit of an artificial construct. The power pool is a collection of various participants who 
have excess power for sale. The list includes: 
• Generators that contribute power to the grid as part of their startup or shutdown 
process that is not specifically under contract. 
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• Generators that have unsold spinning reserve that could readily contribute power 
at the request of the network operator. 
• Consumers that do not consume all of the power they have bought. 
Another scenario is the case of the consumer using more power than they have 
agreed to purchase. Figure 4.16 depicts the usecase scenario. What is reasonable in this 
case? Should the consumer be disconnected the moment they exhaust the contract? Most 
of today’s “smart meters” can easily support “prepay” metering and automatically 
disconnect when the account balance reaches zero. They can also support a grace period. 
Should the proposed system be invoked to acquire a purchase off of the spot market? 
Should the consumer instead be assigned a purchase from the power pool at the current 
market price? Some consideration has to be given to the ability of the communication 
network. If it is highly capable, it may be possible to negotiate a new contract in less than 
a second. If the network is instead optimized for cost, it may be that power is allowed to 
flow to the extent the network can tolerate it, and payment is reconciled after the fact. 
Integration with other systems is cited as a future work.  
Consumers are expected to sign up for spinning reserve so that they may draw 
power at their discretion. Spinning reserve is expected to be inexpensive to reserve, but 
above average in cost to utilize. As a cost saving measure, consumers may designate a 
fixed amount of power to be applied before any spinning reserve is utilized. Generators 
under spinning reserve are controlled by the network operator. Generators assigned a 
fixed contract may contribute their block of power at the appointed time without further 










What happens if the consumer doesn’t use the amount of fixed power they 
contracted for? (Such a situation is depicted in Figure 4.17). Case law would probably 
find that since the contractor(s) delivered on their end of the agreement, the consumer is 
obliged to pay them for their services. The excess power would flow to the “power pool” 
entity for use at the discretion of the network operator. 
Sometimes generators have problems and must go offline for unscheduled 
maintenance or repair. (The usecase scenario is considered in Figure 4.18) 
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There are many options to be considered. 
• The generator might use the solver to resell its contracts to other generators 
• The network operator might inform the consumer of the generation shortfall and 
inform the consumer that they will be purchasing power from the power pool at 
the spot market price until the consumer finds a replacement generator. 
• The consumer, once informed of the failure, might elect to conserve power and 
work within the constraints of the available power from other generators also 
under contract. 
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Large generators often must use or contribute a bit of power in order to get 
synchronized to the grid. This is usually considered a negligible amount of power by the 
generator, but what is to be done with it? What if an altruistic owner of solar generation 
simply adds their excess power to the grid? What is to be done with excess “free” power? 
(The usecase scenario is considered in Figure 4.19). The network operator will be 
expected to monitor power production conditions, detect excess contributions, and 






Figure 4.19. Generation Excess 
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4.4.1.2. Ancillary Services. The legacy energy market sells ancillary services as 
well as energy. Ancillary services are used to handle the corner cases described above 
which lead to generation/load mismatch. It is likely that anciallary services will still have 
a place in the marketplace in addition to energy sales. 
The conclusion of the analysis is that different regions will likely continue to have 
different needs and subscribe to different notions of fairness. Any commercialized system 
will need flexibility to support the range of options that real users would require. The 
notion of fairness is best settled regionally. A real time spot market will likely be 
required. A high-performance network would allow for immediate renegotiation of 
contracts in the event of a network fault. If the network and solver perform sufficiently 
well, it may be possible for the network operator to leverage “immediate renegotiation” 
as a new tool to use in the event of an unplanned network event. 
4.4.2. Disaster Recovery. There are many things that can damage the grid. A 
massive solar flare could destroy much of the grid [117]. Large storms have been known 
to destroy the grid [118]. Damage can occur to not only the transmission of power but 
also to the monitoring and control of power. However, the introduction of significant 
amounts of distributed generation along with distributed controls can change the 
paradigm. Power will not necessarily be lost when a transmission line is lost. For 
example, if a transmission line between a major generator and a substation is severed, any 
distributed generators downstream of the substation will continue to serve the load. The 
disconnected network may continue to operate in an islanded fashion.13 By the same 
token, a neighborhood with significant amounts of distributed generation should be able 
                                                 
13 Usually with poor voltage and frequency regulation, but continuing to operate nevertheless. 
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to operate independently from the grid (as a “microgrid”) if disconnected due to a 
disaster.14  
Distributed systems are well known in the literature for their advantages over 
centralized systems when it comes to robustness. Distributed generation, distributed 
control, along with a distributed energy market could allow an entire system to bootstrap 
from an outage after a storm. Smart (communicating) distribution assets could determine 
which lines and transformers were still in service. An automated fault location, isolation, 
and service restoration (FLISR) capability could bring up portions of the grid that survive 
the storm, and allow islanded systems to operate for months before being reconnected to 
the regional interconnect. This type of capability is possible with the transactive energy 




Table 4.2. GridWise Architecture Council Transactive Energy Framework Nodes [63] 
 
Node Name Scope 
Regional Represents an entire region such as an ISO or RTO 
Control Area Represents a legacy control area and its automatic 
generation control 
Distribution Represents one or more distribution networks 
Market 
Participation 
Represents a wholesale market participant. (A market 
participant may be active in more than one region). 
Supply Represents a market participant which is not part of the 
legacy system, and any size. 
Building Represents all of the load at a premises or otherwise 
connected to the grid 
                                                 
14 A disaster in this case would include a hurricane, thunderstorm, earthquake, as well as a man 
made disaster (e.g. terrorism). 
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4.4.3. The GWAC Transactive Energy Framework. The GridWise 
Architecture Council envisions a system architecture for transactive energy which 
overlays the structure of the current power control and energy market [63]. The 
architecture is summarized in Table 4.2. It is thought that participants can change roles at 
any time. A supply node could become a building node (load) as conditions change. 
4.5. STATEMENT OF SCOPE 
This dissertation proposes a method of implementing transactive energy (TE) 
using the TabuACO. It does not attempt to utilize TE as a control mechanism. This 
instead is left to other researcher endeavors. A literature review finds that other research 
is underway to leverage TE as part of a grid control system [119]. Linear programming, 
artificial neural networks, and other approaches are being considered.  
4.6. PROPOSED TRANSACTIVE ENERGY MODEL 
Implementation of a transactive market with ant colony optimization requires a 
new architecture to describe the control relationship (ref. Figure 4.20). The transmission 
and distribution networks will still operate in a similar manner, with the main difference 
being the creation of a new market. This new market is supportive of the design 
constraints of the distribution circuit. Much like the process in the wholesale market, the 
transactive retail market will form contracts between three parties: 
1.) The owner of the generation 
2.) The owner(s) of the grid assets 




In this representation, the consumers are the nest for the ACO, and the energy at 
the generation sites represent the food the ant agents are seeking. The grid itself is 









When an ant finds a food source (generation), it forms a contract with that 
generation asset and the grid assets along the path it traversed to deliver the energy to the 
































consumer. This architecture operates as an object-oriented model (per Figure 4.20) with a 
set of rules and assumptions: 
• A consumer may change roles and become a producer (and vice versa). Each 
actor is represented as playing only one role during a market interval – the role 
which represents their net requirements.  
• A market interval is typically a 15-minute period of time (but could be operated as 
being more or less). 
• The grid consists of assets (wires, transformers, switches and other gear) used to 
move electricity from one location to another. Each grid asset has capacity 
constraints and can be contractually reserved for use by contract through 
negotiation. 
• Each asset may be reserved for up to its rated capacity, but the owner of the asset 
may have reasons of their own to limit the usage to a level below the maximum 
rating of the asset. 
• Forward and reverse flows are accounted for separately – so an asset which is 
completely reserved in the forward direction may still accept reservations in the 
reverse direction until both directions reach capacity. 
• Consumers shop for both generation, and transportation via the power grid 
through contractual reservations which are communicated via the communications 
network. 
• Software agents (ants) act on behalf of the consumer to make the reservations. 
• The consumer is not required to reserve 100% of the capacity of a given generator 
or grid asset. 
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• Only real energy will be sought in the marketplace, although reactive energy and 
other services exist.  
• Negotiation is dynamic and occurs anew every market interval. 
• Negotiation for a given market interval on the calendar may occur a day ahead, an 
hour ahead, or minutes ahead of the actual need. 
Negotiation for a given market interval must complete within the time of the 
market interval, so that it can be closed out, and negotiation for the next interval begin. 
4.7. APPLICATION OF THE TABU ANT COLONY OPTIMIZER 
A mapping from the market elements to ACO elements are described in Table 4.3 




Table 4.3. ACO Correspondence 
 
ACO element Market element 
Ant Agent working on behalf of consumer to find energy sources 
Food (or prize) Energy or ancillary services. For sake of this exercise, the ant will 
only forage for real energy. As a simplification, reactive energy 
and ancillary services are considered acquired when real energy is 
required. These other commodities can be purchased by 
additional foraging in a future work. 
Food retrieval A contract is formed to secure energy from the producer, and a 
contract is formed with each asset along the route to deliver 
power to the service location.  
Nest Consumer’s revenue meter (point of common coupling between 
utility wiring and premises wiring). 
Pheromone Hints left by agents (in a public data store located in field assets) 
as to what can be found further down the pathway. (Note: these 
agents may be agents of any consumer.)  
Node A grid asset which is not a conductor 
Edge A grid asset which is a conductor 
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4.7.1. Application of a Reference Direction. A reference direction is overlaid on  
the wires model to turn it into a directed graph. In the distribution network, wires which 
run toward the substation are considered “upstream.” Wires which run away from the 
substation are considered “downstream.” When a distribution network is fed by multiple 
substations or a single substation with multiple busses, one source is arbitrarily modeled 
as “upstream” and all of the others are labeled as “downstream.” 
4.7.1.1. Leaf and root nodes. A leaf node is any node with a degree of one. A 
tree network will ultimately have leaf nodes along its outmost edges. However, due to the 
setup of the problem and the assignment of reference directions, certain information can 
be derived from the reference directions to indicate a stopping criterion for the foraging 
ant. A substation will likely have multiple feeders connecting to a bus which radiate 
outward. This substation bus can be viewed as a significant source of power. Unless some 
capacity constraint is reached, an ant will not visit a substation bus looking for power and 
walk away. In the model, the root of the tree which models the distribution network will 
be depicted as a node with a degree greater than or equal to one, and for these edges, the 
reference direction for all edges face the same direction. Example topologies for the leaf 











Leaf nodes are interesting to the ant because they may contain a food source, a 
nest, or be empty. 
4.7.1.2. Intermediate nodes serving as waypoints. Nodes which are not leaf 
nodes are intermediate nodes. Example topologies are depicted in Figure 4.22. All such 
nodes have a degree greater than one and reference directions into and out of the node. 
Such nodes may be service transformers, tie points, protective devices, poles, or any 









4.7.2. Pheromone Accounting. Two pheromones are used for each commodity  
being sought: one pheromone is used to attract, and another pheromone is used to repel 
the ant to or from traveling along a given direction on the edge. 
4.7.2.1. Attractive pheromone. An attractive pheromone takes on a positive 
value when it recommends to the ant that she be drawn in the direction the arrowhead is 
pointing, and a negative value when she is to be attracted to the arrow tail (attracted to the 
opposite direction the arrow is pointing). 
4.7.2.2. Repulsive pheromone. The repulsive pheromone takes on a positive 
value along an edge when it recommends to the ant that she be repelled away from the 
arrow tail. A positive repulsive value will therefore cause the ant to follow the direction 
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the arrowhead is pointing. A negative repulsive value repels the ant away from the 
arrowhead. A negative repulsive value therefore drives the ant towards the arrow tail.  
4.7.3. Deposition. The TabuACO has the ant deposit pheromone under two 
different sets of rules. One rule is applied when the ant encounters a find. Another rule is 
applied when the ant doesn’t encounter a find. 
4.7.3.1. Attractive pheromone. When an ant forages she maintains a path history 
of the path she must take in order to return home. Since she is foraging in a graph, and 
multiple paths may exist to get home even among a given set of nodes, the path history 
















Upon finding a food source and striking an agreement to purchase power, she 
returns home along the path on record. As she travels, she deposits attractive pheromone 
to lead ants back to the find, and she firms up agreements with each asset to rent a portion 









forages. Once a find is identified, and the ant travels homeward, edges pointing away 
from the find are painted with negative attractive pheromone.  
Edges pointing toward the find are painted with positive attractive pheromone. 
The sign used depends on the reference direction as depicted in Figure 4.23. The formula 
for deposition of attractive pheromone is described in (19). 
Each find by the ant results in a new trail of attractive pheromone being laid (in 
addition to any pheromone already present) between the food source and the ant’s nest. 
4.7.3.2. Repulsive pheromone. Repulsive pheromone is laid while an ant  
forages. If she finds a leaf node which does not have a food source, she deprecates the 
node and all edges connected to it. Pheromone is a signed value. If the edge to the leaf 
node is upstream (pointing away from the node), she applies positive repulsive 
pheromone. If the edge to the leaf node is downstream (pointing into the node) she 
applies negative repulsive pheromone. The sign used depends on the reference direction 











If the node has a food source, and the ant could not afford it, she does not 







If the ant encounters an intermediate node that does not have a food source, she 
examines all of the edges connected to it. If all of the edges except one have been 
deprecated with repulsive pheromone, she decides to deprecate this node. This is done by 
deprecating the remaining edge. If it is an upstream node positive repulsive pheromone is 
laid. If it is a downstream node, negative repulsive pheromone is laid. 
The formula for deposition of repulsive pheromone is described in (18). 
4.7.4. Evaporation. The TabuACO contains two types of pheromone. These  
pheromones evaporate at different rates. 
4.7.4.1. Attractive pheromone. It is possible for a food source to become  
exhausted. Pheromones which led ants to a particular node become obsolete when the 
food source is no longer present. The attractive pheromones along every edge will be 
partially evaporated with every iteration. This is done by multiplying the pheromone 
values by a number between zero and one. 
4.7.4.2. Repulsive pheromone. Repulsive pheromones are not evaporated. 
Areas of the network which do not have food will not have food at some later point 
during the market interval. They remain deprecated for the duration of the evaluation. 
4.8. EXPERIMENT TO SHOW THAT THE TABU ACO CAN SERVE A RETAIL  
MARKET AND ABIDE BY DISTRIBUTION NETWORK DESIGN LIMITS 
Section 4.2.3 described how the existing wholesale energy market performs a 
function to arrange the scheduled movement of power through the transmission network 
between generators and loads. The arrangement observes all of the design constraints of 
the assets involved. It also arrives at a mutually agreed price for the power and use of the 
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transmission assets to transport it. We would expect a retail energy market to do the same 
at the distribution level.  
4.8.1. Experiment. A test was performed on the “IEEE 34 Node Test Feeder” 
[120] model. Its purpose was to confirm the ability of an ACO to recognize a new issue 
in the network and endeavor to work around it as it sought to form contracts between 
buyers, sellers, and transporters of power. It also served as a small-scale proof of concept 
test for the algorithm.  
It should be noted that despite the “O” in “ACO”, the TabuACO solver is used in 
this experiment to analyze and manage the contribution of power to the grid – not 
optimize the purchase of power to ensure a particular consumer received the lowest price.  









The IEEE model contains information regarding a feeder circuit, complete with 
node ratings, node locations, conductor ratings, and loads at various locations. There are 
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six “spot loads” identified with nodes 830, 840, 844, 848, 860, and 890. There are 
nineteen “distributed loads” identified in the IEEE model that occur along a conductor 
between nodes. 
The IEEE model represents aggregate loads and other pieces of equipment at 
various “nodes” along the feeder. Additional detail is needed in order to conduct this 
experiment. Small generation must be added at various points throughout the feeder, and 
prices must be set as bids for power from these locations. Furthermore, additional detail 
needs to be supplied regarding the various loads.  
Figure 4.26 shows the additional detail drawn (not to scale) of the generators and 
loads under the modeled nodes. The color indicates the price bid for the generation. 
Substation power (at node 800) is bid at a very low price. The other blue ovals are 
somewhat higher in price (but still low), yellows are higher, and reddish purple is the 
highest price. Pricing for this particular experiment is arranged so that ants will prefer 
substation power. Price data are found in Appendix C.   
A study of the IEEE data finds that node 890 requires 503 kVA, but transformer 
XFM-1 is rated for 500 kVA. This invariably creates a situation where an IEEE-defined 
transformer will be overloaded with an IEEE-defined load. This will serve as the 
condition for a test. 
In this test, two groups will be compared. The control group will simulate power 
delivery to a legacy wholesale energy nodal market, where the only node visible to the 
market is node 800. A day-ahead load forecast will be available for the feeder as a whole 
as presented to node 800. The test group will model a transitive energy market at Node 







































































































Figure 4.26. Modified Distribution Feeder Model Depicting Source of Power and Prices 




The successful method will be the one that alleviates the strain on transformer 
XFM-1. The load at node 890 will participate in the transactive energy market, as well as 
at least one other node upstream of XFM-1. Nests at these nodes will represent 
consumers and seek to form contracts with generators and power network providers as 
described in section 4.9.1.1. Furthermore, in this multinest environment, the objective of 
the solver will be to secure the first available generation that meets the cost criterion. The 
highest priority of the solver is to secure the power required by the nest. A second order 
priority is to keep the costs low. The consumer defines a “buy immediately” action that is 
to be taken if a certain cost target is met. The upper cost limit is the rate that the ant is 














4.8.1.1. Proposed methodology and detailed modifications to the IEEE-34 
feeder model. To solve this problem models are created to represent the feeder 
connectivity, the assets deployed along the feeder, the loads, the distributed generation, 
and other grid assets. Each service requesting power is represented as a nest, and ants 
leave the nest to forage for energy. The details of the model are posted in Appendix 2.  
4.8.1.2. Theory of operation. A transactive energy market as described in Figure  
4.3 will be operated as the experiment. The TabuACO solver will match individual 
consumer loads with all available generators. The solver will allow multiple nests to 
compete simultaneously for the available resources. The solver will allow each nest to 
form contracts within the solver’s model for the resources and energy the nest needs. The 
ant performs resource locking of the assets as she forages, then at the end of the sortie, 
either releases or commits to the portion reserved. Ants incrementally reserve resources 
as funds and network constraints allow, until all desired energy is acquired.  
4.8.1.3. Class design. This experiment is a small-scale test to prove out the 
concepts suggested. A node has properties which identify its type (pole, transformer, 
etc.), its kVA rating, its coordinates, polyphase connection, as well as its contracted kVA 
in each direction. An edge represents a conductor. Every conductor has exactly two ends, 
and a node at each end. It too has a kVA rating (based on its ampacity and insulator 
voltage rating). Edges in the model have a direction. All edges point upstream, and since 
the IEEE model is a distribution network, all edges point to Node 800 (the substation 
transformer). The Edge model records how much kVA has been contracted in each 
direction. A contract for some amount of power through the conductor in the upstream 
direction is treated independently from a contract for power flowing in the downstream 
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direction. While Kirchoff’s current laws say that these flows would actually cancel each 
other out, they cannot be relied upon to be present. So, a current flow up to the rated 
amount is allowed to occur contractually in each direction.  
4.8.1.4. Ant agency. An ant from each nest is given authorization by the nest to 
spend money and form contracts on the nest’s behalf. As the ant travels, she has a certain 
cost criterion in mind. Any generation that meets the cost criterion is immediately 
purchased. However, if an ant cannot locate affordable generation very readily, she is 
authorized to spend more at various hop count setpoints as determined by the nest. The 
ant will not go above the maximum setting authorized by the nest.  
The ant keeps records of the path home, but also of the contracts she has signed 
along the way. The ant examines the constraints of every asset she travels. If the asset is 
fully committed, she will not attempt to transit it. If some margin remains, but it is less 
than the full amount she is looking for, she will reduce her contractual requirements to 
the amount the asset can carry, then transit the asset. The ant will limit the contract with 
the generator to be no greater than the constraints allowed. Should the ant doubleback in 
her foraging, any constraints imposed by that asset will be lifted. In the path from the nest 
to the generator, the ant has “locked” the portion of the asset necessary to deliver the 
intended payload.  
Once the ant forms a contract with a generator, the deliverable payload is finally 
known. The generator may have less power available than the ant was authorized to 
purchase. As the ant travels home, she finalizes the contracts with each asset. Contracts 
with assets will be adjusted downward (as necessary) to become only the amount needed 
for the generator. Unneeded portions will be freed for use by other ants. 
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The ant also considers the losses of carrying energy across the asset. The series 
resistive losses of the conductors are considered and used to derate the payload amount 
delivered. 
The cost per kVAh is modelled, and the ant computes the financial cost to move 
the payload through the series of assets along the path. This travel cost will also serve to 
limit the range of the ant to what is affordable and keep her near her nest. 
4.8.2. Expected Results. The data contains numerous loads and sources of  
generation under each node in the IEEE model. Many of these added sources of 
generation are priced below the price of power from the main substation transformer. 
This should cause the TabuACO to find and exhaust all of the low-cost sources of power. 
This should result in different nests to arrive at different average costs. A “price map” 
should be generated by the transactive energy market that resembles the price map 
generated by the wholesale market.  
Node 890 requires 503 kVA, yet transformer XFM-1 is rated for 500 kVA. Power 
at node 8901 is priced higher than many sources upstream of XFM-1. It is expected that 
the TabuACO will get 500 kVA from low cost sources upstream of XFM-1, then when 
the limit is reached, obtain the balance of the required power from the higher priced 
source downstream of XFM-1. 
4.8.3. Results. In hundreds of trials of the TabuACO, the ant always found the  
constraint at transformer XFM-1. Contracts totaling 500 kVA were formed with low cost 
supplies upstream of XFM-1, while a contract for higher priced power at node 8900 was 
formed for 3 kVA.  









Figure 4.27. Location Cost Map for Experiment After Run (Plotted to a Proportionate 




Figure 4.27 looks different than Figure 4.25 because it is plotted to scale. The 
feeders serve a mixture of sparse and crowded service locations. The size of the load is 
depicted by the size of the circle. Larger circles represent larger loads. Filled circles 
represent loads that participated in the market. The color of the fill represents the average 
cost paid by the customer. 
Figure 4.28 offers a closeup of the upper right area of Figure 4.27. This area 








          X-coordinate 
Figure 4.28. Closeup View of Nest 890 (red) and Other Nests that Competed (blue) in the 




4.8.4. Discussion of Results. Ants were given a small portion of the load and 
tasked to acquire a contract for generation. As ants incrementally built contracts between 
node 890 and the substation at node 800, they eventually found that the node representing 
transformer XFM-1 refused to grant passage of any more contracts for power. Ants were 
forced to look elsewhere for power. Eventually, after walking far enough, they were 
authorized to spend more. They could eventually afford the power available locally at 
node 8900 and finally fulfilled the needs of the nest. 
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At no time did the ants fail to see the constraint and attempt to work around it. 
Occasionally they ignored the pheromone recommendations and wandered into 
unproductive areas. A histogram of the ant hop count is pictured below in Figure 4.29. 
We see it is a bell shape which is skewed to the left. This is typical of the TabuACO. 
Often the ant is “lucky” and finds results quickly – thus the skew to the left; however 









4.9. EXPERIMENT TO SHOW THAT THE TABU ACO CAN SERVE A RETAIL 
MARKET AND ABIDE BY DISTRIBUTION NETWORK OPERATIONAL 
LIMITS 
Section 4.8 described how the TabuACO could implement a retail energy market 
and abide by network design constraints. However, there are situations where the static 











distribution network was originally designed for the unidirectional flow of energy, from 
centralized generation to distributed loads. The addition of distributed generation 
complicates matters. The original design assumptions are no longer valid, and the original 
constraints no longer sufficient to regulate the operation of the substation. A dependency 
exists on the load present. A test will be conducted to determine if the algorithm can 
leverage an external engineering analysis tool to determine the limits of the distribution 
network in order to accept as much PV power as possible. Again, by way of reminder, 
there are multiple loops at work as described by Figure 4.3. The energy market serves as 
an outer, planning control loop, while other systems operate inner loops to control 
substation operation as it runs. Only the energy market planning loop will be tested here. 
Implied in the discussion is that spinning reserve is still required for network operations, 
and that acquiring a contract for spinning reserve can be formed using the same technique 
as a contract for power. Customers will be expected to form contracts for spinning 
reserve, as a percentage of the power they buy, to the level specified by the regional 
RTO/ISO. 
4.9.1. Experiment. A large-scale test on real utility data was conducted to test the  
scalability of the concept15. The scalability test will use real substation data supplied by 
the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) [59]. This data set (known as “Feeder J1”) 
represents a distribution circuit located in the northeastern US with a 12-kV feeder circuit 
that serves approximately 1300 residential, commercial, and light industrial customers via 
                                                 
15 The scalability test also tests the refinements in the code after numerous improvements were 
made as a result of benchmark testing. The Proof Of Concept testing used simple code which was not 
necessarily tuned. The POC code had a number of limitations including an inability to handle a graph 
where loops may be present in the network topology. 
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58 total miles of primary line. The peak load on the system is approximately 6 MW and 
the circuit contains 1.7 MW of customer-owned PV systems (Figure 4.35). The J1 Feeder 
data set includes a substation, several PV arrays (red circles), and a large number of 
electrical loads (indicated with the blue circles). The Feeder J1 data set is of interest 
because customers have complained of overvoltage conditions after several sets of PV 
arrays were added to the feeder. This was noted even though the feeder J1 has four 
voltage regulators throughout the circuit, and five capacitor banks (three of which are 
voltage controlled) to help control voltage [59].  
This experiment analyzes the contribution of power from multiple sources of 
power, into the grid, drawn by multiple loads, with the contribution being limited to safe 
levels. It does not optimize the cost paid by the participants. This effort is deferred as a 
future work in section 6.2.5.1. 
This data set was represented in the ACO architecture as a tree graph by 
identifying the substation’s connection to the transmission network as the root of the 
graph, and all other nodes and edges as being downstream in the distribution network, 
resulting in 4840 nodes (1147 of which are nests), 4852 edges, and 1147 ants.16 The EPRI 
Feeder J1 data set was analyzed with EPRI’s OpenDSS software [121], which allowed 
for the visualization of the network (Figure 4.35) to be generated. 
The scalability test consists of two experiments: a baseline experiment which does 
not use the ACO for correction, and a test which uses the ACO to limit the operation of 
the system to safe levels. 
                                                 
16 Not all loads became nests because some of the loads had an issue which prevented them from 
being viably served (for example, some were present in the model, but not connected to the circuit). 
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The baseline experiment was an evaluation of the current market (Figure 4.2). 
This represents the use of the wholesale energy market to serve the needs of the Feeder J1 
distribution circuit modeled as a single node. In this baseline experiment, all loads were 
served by the substation. No visibility is provided to the wholesale market related to any 
issues which arise on the distribution circuit. OpenDSS was also used to simulate the 
engineering results of using this data set without any correction by the TabuACO 
algorithm. This experiment provides the baseline information on the current methods 
being employed and their ability to mitigate voltage variations. 
The ACO experiment was an evaluation of the market with PV assets contributing 
power to the grid which are interrupted and then restored. A comparison is made using 
the current methods as described in section 3 to the transactive energy market module 
added to operate a “retail level” market on the Feeder J1 circuit (Figure 4.3). In this 
experiment, the TabuACO algorithm was used to match loads with any available source 
of power. For the TabuACO experiment, ants were able to purchase from the substation 
or the PV arrays. Different power sources were assigned different prices with substation 
power being more expensive than PV power. Ants were given spending authority 
sufficient to buy PV power first, and as foraging progressed ants would eventually gain 
the authority to purchase substation power. In both experiments the OpenDSS software 
was used to validate each proposed purchase scenario. The OpenDSS software was used 
to validate each proposed resource reservation from the TabuACO algorithm and either 
accept or reject each matchup based on a test for overvoltages. The proposed power 
sources and loads are sent to OpenDSS which performs an engineering analysis and 
produces a data file. The ACO reads the voltage file produced by OpenDSS, and 
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compares every voltage to the allowed upper threshold. If all of the voltages are within 
the acceptable voltage range, the proposed sale (represented by power and loads in the 
OpenDSS model) is accepted. If any voltage exceeds the allowable range, the proposal is 
rejected, and the ant is forced to forage further to find another source. To encourage the 
use of PV power, PV power was priced at 1¢ while substation power was priced at 7¢. 
The ant was initially authorized to purchase power at a cost below both. If she is 
unsuccessful in purchasing PV power, she will eventually become authorized to buy the 
higher priced power at the substation transformer. As the ACO operated, ants searched 
for 1% of each nest’s energy requirements with each sortie. All of the ants competed 
concurrently for the same resources. 
The EPRI Feeder J circuit is different from the IEEE 34 Node circuit, and they 
have different issues. A study of Feeder J doesn’t find any constrained assets in the 
design. Instead, with the EPRI Feeder J circuit, voltage can be difficult to regulate.  
The Engineering Analysis software used in this research is EPRI’s OpenDSS. 
OpenDSS is able to simulate a variety of timescales. In the Feeder J data, a voltage 
source is modeled at the substation bus. A voltage source is able to source tremendous 
amounts of current, up to the MVA rating of the transformer, and holds a steady voltage 
at that point in the circuit. The substation also models a tap changer which can 
automatically regulate the voltage. Due to the timing of the operation of the tap changer, 
a baseline analysis is conducted with the tap changer functioning. A voltage increase is 
studied by temporarily disabling voltage regulation. Details on the setup of OpenDSS, 
calls to OpenDSS, and other instructions on how to operate the system is described in the 
OpenDSS material [121]. 
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The EPRI Feeder J data is defined in terms of OpenDSS defined elements. The 




Table 4.4. Engineering model to TabuACO model mapping 
 






Vsource (voltage source at a substation) Node 




When an ant finds a food source (a power source), the reservation must be 
validated both financially and electrically. There are numerous concerns that must be 
considered such as overloading of individual assets, as well as the operation of the system 
outside the acceptable voltage range. The Engineering Analysis software used in this 
research is EPRI’s OpenDSS [121], which can be used to simulate a variety of electrical 
loads and sources at a variety of timescales. The EPRI Feeder J1 data is used by the ACO 
architecture to create a model of the feeder and propose solutions. The solutions are 
evaluated by the OpenDSS software to determine whether demand was met and the 
voltage conditions on the feeder. 
4.9.1.1. Proposed methodology. To solve this problem models are created to 
represent the feeder connectivity, the assets deployed along the feeder, the loads, the and 
the distributed generation. Each service requesting power is represented as a nest, and 
ants leave the nest to forage for energy. Two types of files are exchanged between the 
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TabuACO solver and OpenDSS. One file contains a model representing connectivity. 
This file is expressed as OpenDSS commands, and is imported into both OpenDSS and 
the solver. The solver edits this model to update the loads at each location and passes the 
updated model to OpenDSS for evaluation. The solver asks OpenDSS to render voltages. 
OpenDSS then publishes a file representing voltages. The voltages are examined by the 
solver for compliance with the required bounds. If any voltage at any point exceeds the 
bounds the proposal is rejected. If all voltages are within bounds the proposal is accepted.  
4.9.1.2. Theory of operation. A transactive energy market as described in Figure 
4.3 will be operated as the experiment. The TabuACO solver will match individual 
consumer loads with all available generators. OpenDSS will be used to perform an 
engineering analysis of the PV and substation contributions. Both the solver and 
OpenDSS will use a model of the EPRI Feeder J1 circuit. The solver will use the model 
to perform resource locking as multiple nests compete simultaneously for limited 
resources. Also, since the solver is an ACO, it will accrue virtual pheromones as a 
solution emerges. 
4.9.1.3. Class design. An object-oriented design is used, and the objects are 
described in the following Ant, Edge, and Node subsections. 
• Ant.  
In the Ant class, attributes are used to record the ant’s current node, a history of 
the nodes and edges which serve as the path home, and the nest node which the ant calls 
home. An attribute describes the ant’s mode: if the ant is foraging, resting at home, or 
travelling home. A series of attributes keep track of the power sought, and the power 
acquired. An array which corresponds to the path home identifies the kVA constraints 
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encountered along the path. In order to determine the ant’s level of effort, the ant 
maintains a count of its movements (hops). An array of authorized price points defines 
what the ant is authorized to pay. An attribute also maintains the cost of traveling home. 
The authorized funds minus the cost home leaves the amount of funds available to 
purchase power. Functionally, the ant is able to deprecate a path, forage for food, or 
return to the nest. Functionally, the ant is able to deprecate a path, forage for food, or 





authorizedPricePoints, an array that describes the prices the ant is allowed to pay 
as a function of hopCount. 
contractNode, the ID of the node with which the ant signed a contract. 
costHome, the running total of costs incurred to lease assets along the path home. 
kvarAcquired, the amount of reactive power acquired. 
kvarSought, the amount of reactive energy sought. 
kwAcquired, the amount of active acquired. 
kwSought, the amount of real power sought during the current market interval. 
locationID, the nodeID the ant is currently at. 
mode, ant mode: foraging/home/homewardBound  
nestID, the nodeID of the ant’s origin. 
pathConstraintsHome, list of kVA constraints on the path home. 
pathEdgesHome, the list of edges to the nets. 
pathEfficienciesHome, a list of efficiencies on the path home. 
pathNodesHome, the list of nodes to the nest. 
pathReservationsHome, a list of power amounts reserved at each segment along 
the path home. 
previousLocation, the node the ant was previously at. 
ttl, time to live. 
deprecatePath(·), lay repulsive pheromone 
forage(·), look for food 
returnToNest(·), lay attractive pheromone if warranted 
 







• Edge.  
An Edge class is used to model conductors and transformers. Edge properties are 
typically imported from a wires model. Each edge has exactly two ends. Due to the 
directionality of the graph, one end is identified as these are called the “up” node 





attPheromoneKvar, attractive pheromone for kVar 
attPheromoneKw, attractive pheromone for kW  
delivCommitKw, downstream commitments 
dnNode, the downstream node (arrow tail connection) 
ID, the edge ID within the network 
kvaRating, the conductor’s rated capacity in kVA 
length, conductor length in feet. 
linecode, the class of conductor described by the dataset. 
name, the name assigned by the dataset to this edge  
recdCommitKw, commitment to allow current flow upstream 
repPheromoneKvar, repulsive pheromone for kVar 
repPheromoneKw, repulsive pheromone for kW 
travelCostPerKva, cost in dollars for each kVA to travel through the edge. 
travelEfficiency, the efficiency with which energy traverses the node. 
type, conductor/transformer  
upNode, the upstream node (having an arrowhead) 
evaluateQuery(·) 
 




Each edge has an ID, a name imported from the wires model, a kVA rating, a 
length, and a travel cost which is expressed as a travel efficiency. Pheromones are 
deposited on edges. One attribute is used to maintain the attractive pheromone level, and 
another to record the repulsive pheromone level. Edges are grid assets and as with any 
resource have to be reserved. An attribute is used to describe the commitment of power 
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flowing upstream, and other for the commitment of power to flow downstream. A UML 
class diagram of the Edge class is presented in Figure 4.31. 
• Node.  
A Node class is used to represent service locations, generators, poles, and every 
other asset that is not an Edge.  
Node 
ID, the node ID within the network 
name, the name assigned by the dataset 
type, asset type: transformer/pole/substation/PV 
kvaRating, the node’s kVA rating 
xloc, geographic x location 
yloc, geographic y location 
upstreamEdges, a list of edges which lead upstream to the substation 
downstreamEdges, a list of edges which lead downstream 
travelCostPerKva, cost in dollars for each kVA to travel through the node 
travelEfficiency, the efficiency with which energy traverses the node 
delivCommitKw, the kW commitment sold in the interval 
delivCommitKvar, the kVAr commitment sold by node 
recdCommitKw, the kW purchased by node 
recdCommitKvar, the kVAR commitment purchased by node 
desiredkW, amount of real power this node needs  
desiredKvar, amound of reactive power this node needs 
fundsAvail, the unspent funds currently available  within the current market 
interval. 
antAgents, a list of ants which serve this nest pricePerKwh, price per kWh for 
energy from this source 
availKw, uncommitted real power available 
availKvar, uncommitted reactive power available 
delCntrctFromNode, an array of entries describing a contract for delivered power 
delCntrctKw[·], a list of contractual kW 
delCntrctFunds[·], funds owed to the node 
delCntrctAnt[·], ants which have formed contracts 
evaluateQuery(·) 
 




The Node’s properties are typically imported from a wires model. Each node has 
a geographic x-y location, an ID, a name, a rating, a cost for using the asset, an efficiency 
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in using the asset. Since the network is a graph it can have “zero to many” upstream 
edges, and “zero to many” downstream edges. Class attributes store reservations for 
power to flow downstream and upstream through the node. If the node has load 
characteristics, an attribute tracks the amount of power the node is seeking (as a Nest). 
The funds available to spend are tracked, as are the ant IDs which belong to the nest. If 
the node has generator characteristics, the selling price is kept as an attribute, as is the 
available uncommitted power. Class attributes also track the funds owed to this node, or 
owed by this node to other grid assets. A UML class diagram of the Node class is 
presented in Figure 4.32. 
4.9.1.4. Ant agency. The ACO foraging process imbeds an evaluation of the 
conductor (edge) and transformer (node) constraints. Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show the 
basic function of the TabuACO. Figure 4.33 now shows these concepts applied to the 
energy market. The pathways originally described in Figure 1.1 now model conductors. 
Nodes of Figure 1.1 model transformers, poles, and other transformational assets. The 
consumer’s system represents the “nest,” and authorizes an ant to look for “food.” This 
purchase involves traveling a viable path, and not only finding energy for sale, but 
finding it at an affordable price. Every step that the ant takes causes a pedometer to 
increment. As she forages a great distance, an authorization function allows her to spend 
more. She may forage in a way that brings her back to a food source she passed by 
previously because she could not (initially) afford the purchase.  
Upon finding a source with an acceptable price, the ant forms a contract with the 
producer and lays attractive pheromone back to the nest. She thus communicates with 
















[Sought item was never sold here or is sold out]
loop 




[Node is a producer]
Report find







Lay pheromone to identify good find
Tentatively reserve (or cancel
reservation of) asset on behalf
of ant





4.9.1.5. The TabuACO applied to transactive energy. In the context of this 
application, each service location will be represented as a “nest.” Each ant is tasked with 
fulfilling a small percentage of the energy required for that service location using a given 
amount of money (and pay a certain rate). As the ant forages, she makes tentative 
contracts with the network elements along the path traversed to reserve the resources she 
needs. If the edge or node will not permit the full amount required, the amount available 
is reserved. If a network element that cannot be reserved is encountered, the ant turns 
back and forages elsewhere. 
In addition to the availability of energy resources, the ant also considers the cost 
of travel through the network assets. If she has insufficient funds to travel further, she 
turns back toward the nest. She may also turn back because a leaf node is encountered, or 
simply because the random foraging process results in such a choice. When the ant 
travels back along the same path toward the nest, she unlocks the resources she 
previously reserved.  
When the ant finds an acceptable and available source of power, she will form a 
contract, accept the offer from the generator, and lock in a portion of that resource. On 
the return to the nest, she will reserve every conductor, transformer, transmission and 
distribution asset required to move the power from the generator to the nest. Certain 
contracts may need to be adjusted downward if the original energy amount cannot be 








1 Initialize network and ants 
2 While one or more nests are unsatisfied 
3  Set one or more ants to have an antMode of “foraging.” Each ant is given a time 
limit to search for food, a specific quantity of a specific commodity to find, and a 
formula which authorizes increasing price payments as a function of ant hop 
count. The formula identifies an initial bid and a maximum cost the buyer is 
willing to pay. 
4  While ants are on sorties 
5   Case antMode of 
6    Foraging: 
Select an edge to traverse. As the ant moves, she must maintain a path 
history that shows how to return to the nest. If she moves further away from 
the nest, she must form a tentative contract with the edge owner to carry the 
item she is looking for homeward. The asset must consider the sum of all 
contracts formed to see if capacity remains to accept another. If she moves 
towards the nest (retracing her footsteps) she must cancel the contract 
previously formed along that edge (and with the node she just left behind). 
7    Upon arrival at a node, the ant attempts to form a contract with it. If it is a 
grid asset (e.g. transformer), the contract is to carry the prize across it. If the 
node is a generator, the ant examines the node to see if it contains the 
sought prize for an acceptable price. If so, the ant claims the prize and sets 
antMode to be “homeward bound.” Otherwise, she continues foraging. 
8    If the new node is a leaf node, and the prize was not found, the ant lays 
down a repulsive pheromone (particular to the prize type) on all adjoining 
edges. 
9    If the new node is not a leaf node, does not contain a prize, all adjoining 
edges except the homeward edge are considered. If none of the edges (save 
the homeward edge) contain attractive pheromone, and all (save the 
homeward edge) contain some repulsive pheromone, then all edges 
(including the homeward edge) are deprecated with repulsive pheromone. 
10    If an ant forages unsuccessfully for an extended period of time so that its 
time limit expires, then antMode will be set to “homeward bound.” 
11    Homeward Bound: 
As an ant returns home, and a prize was found, the ant lays down attractive 
pheromone along each node and edge along the way. Upon reaching the 
nest, the antMode is set to “home.” 
 
Figure 4.34. TabuACO Pseudocode for Solving the Transactive Energy Market    
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12    Home: 
Ant reports findings to nest, all contracts formed and the amount spent. The 
ant sortie is over. 
13   EndCase 
14   Decrement the ant’s time-to-live  
15   Increase the ant’s authorization to pay more for the prize. 
16  Endwhile 
17  Evaporate pheromones (positive only) 
18 Endwhile 
19 Report optimal paths to each food source. 
 




4.9.1.6. Engineering validation of proposed contract. When the ant finds a food 
source, the potential sale must be validated with engineering analysis even though the 
sale is known to be valid financially. There are numerous concerns that could be 
considered by the engineering analysis such as overloading of individual assets, as well 
as operation of the system outside the acceptable voltage range. Feeder J, being a real 
circuit, has many conditions which could affect its performance. However, EPRI 
identifies one condition in the circuit which is particularly bothersome to customers [59]. 
This particular condition will be the focus of the simulation and the event the ants work 
to guard against. 
The “Feeder J” circuit is fed primarily from a substation in the SE portion. In 
Figure 4.35, solar arrays are in red. Loads are small blue circles. Ordinarily voltages are 
regulated fairly well. In a feeder with PV arrays installed, troubling overvoltages can 
happen on a partly cloudy day. When the wind drives the clouds along, it can move a 
shadow over the location of the PV array. This will cause the contribution from the array 
to drop off precipitously. If the PV array was supplying a significant percentage of the 
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load, this loss will cause the local voltage to drop as well. The voltage regulation 
equipment in the substation will adjust one step upward (+2.5%) to correct the voltage 
back up into the proper range. When the shadow moves off the array the PV will return to 
contributing full power. If this occurs quickly, it can cause the voltage to rise before the 
voltage regulators have time to react. A voltage swell will occur, and potentially damage 











During the night, and on overcast days, the Feeder J circuit relies entirely on 
power from the substation. The substation is located at the lower-right end of the wide 
blue trail depicted in Figure 4.35. The result is a well-behaved distribution voltage which 
stays well away from the upper and lower limits. Figure 4.36 shows the allowable high 
and low voltage tolerancces as horizontal red lines at 1.05 and 0.95 pu respectively. 





Figure 4.36. OpenDSS Rendering of Feeder J Voltage as a Function of Distance from the 





When the power from the PV arrays joins with the contribution from the 
substation, it causes voltages at some locations to jump above the tolerable limits. A 
baseline evaluation of the feeder J1 was performed to find the voltage versus distance 
from the substation bus. Different customers will have different experiences depending 
on their distance from the substation, and their proximity to the PV arrays. The red, blue, 
and black solid lines in the middle of the Figures 4.36 through 4.38 are the three phase 
voltages. The solid lines for each phase are the medium voltage lines and the dashed lines 
below are the low voltage lines. A nominal voltage would be at 1 pu right through the 
middle of the graph. In Figure 4.36, the voltage at the substation starts at 1.02 pu (102% 
of nominal). As power travels down the feeder, voltages drop due to resistive losses in 
the conductors. One can see the medium voltages (represented as solid lines) steadily 
decline out to a distance of 5 km from the substation. The low voltage lines (represented 
as dashed lines) lose voltage even more quickly over short distances. These are seen 
below the solid lines forming “the beard” in the diagram. In Figure 4.36, the voltages 
jump at a distance of 5 km up to 1.04 pu due to the action of voltage regulators and 
capacitor banks. This pattern can be seen to repeat as the distance from the substation 
increases as a means of maintaining an acceptable line voltage. Voltages drop from 5 km 
to 8 km and are boosted at 8 km due to voltage regulation, as can be seen in the voltage 
drops from 8 km to 13 km which are boosted at 13 km. Voltages continue to drop from 
13 km to the end of the feeder, where we see that medium voltages are at nominal (1.00 
pu), and low voltages are lower but acceptable, running at 0.99 pu. When voltages are 
properly regulated, they stay well within the red lines running horizontally along Figure 
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4.36 at 1.05 and 0.95 pu. However, when distributed generation is present, the ability of 
the voltage regulators to maintain the voltage within this range may be compromised. 
The voltage increases we saw in Figure 4.36 occurring at 5, 8, and 13 km are due 
to static volt/var corrections in the circuit. One can see that if these corrections were not 
made in the circuit, voltages would become unacceptably low. However, these same 
locations now become vulnerable to excessive voltages when the entire circuit runs high 





Figure 4.37. OpenDSS Analysis of Feeder J Voltage After a Cloud Moves off PV Array 




4.9.2. Expected Results. As the ACO operates, ants will take a small (1%)  
portion of each funded nest and search for energy sources. All of the ants will be 
authorized to operate concurrently, but due to computational constraints will take turns. 
Ants will trim leaf nodes and begin to follow useful trails to find power sources. As time 
goes by, the ant agents authorization to spend more money will increase, and she will 
eventually buy the higher priced local power (provided that the consumer has authorized 
such a rate). 
4.9.3. Results. In the baseline experiment substation power was supplied to the  
loads, and no overvoltages were detected. The (simulated) voltage regulators were able to 
compensate for any load changes and maintain nominal voltage (as described above and 
in Figure 4.38.) 
In the ACO experiment the addition of unreliable PV power was considered. 
When PV power freely supplements substation power and there is an interruption it 
results in overvoltages as depicted in Figure 4.37. This is the result when the proposed 
algorithm is not applied. When the TabuACO was implemented, ants foraged for power 
from a variety of sources. Ants (from nests representing loads) formed contracts with low 
cost PV sources first until an overvoltage occurred. The overvoltage predicted was 
attributable to the PV source. The ant then worked instead to obtain power from other 
sources until arrangements were made that proved to be viable. The TabuACO algorithm 
was able to limit voltages to safe levels in the ACO experiment (Figure 4.38.) High 
voltages are found on the medium voltage (solid) lines at a distance of 5 to 11 km from 
the substation. However, the algorithm tested the low voltage (dashed) lines to ensure 
that no loads would suffer overvoltages. 
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The TabuACO is a stochastic optimization process and so different runs 
sometimes produce different outcomes. A typical outcome is found in Table 4.5. and in 
Figure 4.38.  
In this example, a total of 1526 kW was purchased from the PV sources before a 
3% overvoltage would have been encountered. The balance of the projected load was 
served by the substation. Repeating the experiment for 80 trials resulted in a mean of 
1752 kW purchased from the PV sources with a standard deviation of 266 kW (with the 
balance of the required load coming from the substation).  Every run resulted in a 
successful outcome. Other runs of the solver resulted in different PV allocations, but all 
met with the same upper limit although the PV allocation differences caused differences 




Table 4.5. TabuACO Findings Regarding Limits to PV Contributions on Feeder J 
 
Source Name Source Type kVA rating kW purchased 
C_Existing13 PV 16 16 
B_Existing12 PV 8 8 
A_Existing9 PV 11 11 
C_Existing2 PV 12 12 
C_Existing11 PV 11 11 
B_Existing7 PV 11 11 
3P_ExistingSite3 PV 836 572 
3P_ExistingSite2 PV 209 209 
3P_ExistingSite4 PV 523 464 
B_Existing3 PV 11 11 
C_Existing5 PV 22 22 
C_Existing10 PV 11 11 
3P_ExistingSite1 PV 314 168 





It may also be noted that as the TabuACO ran, ants would initially forage from 
each nest everywhere, in all directions. However, as ants discovered leaf nodes, deposited 
repulsive pheromone, and discovered unproductive trail nodes which led to leaf nodes, 
soon entire trails were deprecated. This, along with any positive pheromones which may 
have been deposited by other ants serving nearby nests, led the remaining ants to quickly 
find viable power sources and converge to a solution. It was observed (but not quantified) 
that as time passed, the algorithm appeared to run faster. Ants spent less time aimlessly 





Figure 4.38. OpenDSS Rendering of Voltages Along Feeder J with Limits Applied. 
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4.9.4. Discussion of Results. An EPRI model of a real distribution circuit was  
studied. Using an ant colony approach, a retail energy market with location marginal 
pricing was simulated within a distribution circuit. Figure 4.37 shows the behavior of the 
circuit when the algorithm limits are not applied. In this baseline experiment, it shows the 
voltage escalating to 6% above nominal. Overvoltages can damage equipment. Compare 
this to Figure 4.38 which shows the behavior of the circuit when the algorithm limits are 
applied. The ACO experiment showed that the voltage could be successfully limited to a 
target value (3%) above nominal.  
The market endeavors to plan a suitable fuel mix prior to the real-time operation 
of the grid. The transactive energy market modeled in this approach resolves market 
contracts in a bottom-up fashion – whereas the conventional (wholesale) energy market 
creates arrangements in top-down fashion.  Furthermore, ACO’s are known for their 
emergent properties. Solutions arise out of the data in a self-organizing fashion. The 
ACO solver operated each nest independent of every other nest. Competing ants actually 
collaborated to deposit pheromones along trails and share information (this is known as 
“stigmergy”). The system self-organized without any centralized coordination. This is an 
important point because a distributed energy market, accompanied by distributed control 
of the grid could fit well with distributed generation.  
It should be noted that there may be an increased cost to install and operate 
communication equipment which can capture, communicate, and resolve the market and 
operational issues. To some degree the cost is the cost of improving the granularity of the 
analysis – regardless if the analysis is performed in a distributed fashion or a centralized 
fashion. A distributed architecture also requires a different approach to implementing or 
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enforcing global goals for the system. A systemwide maximum or minimum may be 
difficult to achieve without a systemwide measurement. On the other hand, that doesn’t 
prohibit such measurements from being made, disseminated and acted upon. Some 
measurements (such as line frequency) are disseminated systemwide automatically. Other 
measurements however shift the burden from moving data from the field to a central 
location, to instead move measurements from a central location to the field. The scale of 
the experiment is also notable. The results show that the solver operated an energy 
market for an entire distribution circuit. The 14 sources identified in Table 4.5. are used 
to feed 1147 loads. If an entire distribution circuit can operate as an energy market, then 
it should be possible to integrate this market with a transmission level energy market. An 
interface could be created at the substation to tie these markets together. (This research 
shows the possibility of operating at least all of the medium voltage distribution circuits 
as independent markets.) But this is not to say the entire system must convert to one 
methodology or another. When tied together through a well-defined interface, it would be 
possible for a mix of methodologies to be employed. All of the markets could be operated 
bottom-up, some of the markets operated bottom-up and others top-down, or the entire 
market in a top-down centralized fashion. This research added equipment to provide 
granularity, to expose distribution circuit issues and, to allow small-stakeholder 
participation. The TabuACO solver employed a methodology which lends itself to 
deployment in a distributed manner, but in truth, it ran on a “centralized computer” which 
merely modeled the possibility of distributed operation. By using a technique that 
incrementally converges to a solution, and validating each step towards a solution with an 
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engineering analysis package such as OpenDSS, it was possible to arrive at a solution 
that was both financially and technically viable. 
4.10. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE APPLICATION OF THE TABU ACO 
TO THE ENERGY MARKET 
The ACO implemented a transactive energy market for one market window for an 
entire feeder. A “Proof Of Concept” test (section 4.8) and a “Test To Scale” (section 4.9) 
both found that the  transactive energy market was able to communicate the information 
needed to limit contributions from certain sources and promote the contribution from 
other sources in order to avoid electrical catastrophes on the grid.  
The TabuACO was able to identify the appropriate fuel mix ratio which 
maximized the PV contribution while avoiding the conditions that caused the PV 
contribution to create voltage spikes that would overpower or outpace the substation 
voltage regulation. This analysis mix kept service voltages within the allowable limits 
which would be violated using the uncontrolled mix. The tabu property of the algorithm 
was able to quickly eliminate unproductive leaf nodes and unproductive pathways. The 
ACO property of the algorithm was able to guide the ant agents to low cost PV power 
sources, verify the proposal, and resort to more expensive substation power when the PV 
mix reached its viable limits.  
The TabuACO performed well on this problem because it was able to trim away 
ineffective paths. Ant agents were able to easily find power sources, and generally avoid 
wasted effort. While an ant colony optimizer is not the only method that can arrive at a 
solution, the difficulty in most other methods is that they require data to be collected in a 
central location. This can work well for hundreds or possibly thousands of participants, 
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but scaling to millions of participants can be difficult. In a real-world grid application, 
each interconnect may contain hundreds of millions of meters. Large networks require 
more computing time than small networks. Distributed methods offer advantages in 
keeping the analysis smaller, moving less data, and eliminating single points of failure 
from the architecture. If a distributed or federated architecture is used, the designer would 
still need to determine how it would be sized and how the architecture itself would be 
optimized. The TabuACO manages this by allowing the consumer to set the funds the ant 
is authorized to spend, and the network identifies how much it costs to move power from 
one location to another. This effectively puts the ants “on a leash” so that they cannot 
wander very far from their nest. The size of the ants roaming territory is determined by 
consumer preferences, not by architectural constraints. 
The legacy wholesale market provides a top-down market solution and limits 
itself to only consider transmission level loads. This research introduces a bottom-up 
market solution that considers every load and every constraint – no matter how small. By 
moving the energy market to a local level, local issues can be identified and addressed. 
The fact that the solver operated an energy market in a distributed, bottom-up fashion is 
significant. Distributed architectures are well known for their robustness. By enabling 
local problems to be solved locally, it: 
• Eliminates the challenges in moving vast amounts of data long distances;  
• Eliminates the difficulties in keeping records in a central location current; 
• Eliminates the opportunity for catastrophic failure due to a weather disaster taking 
out the centrally-located control center; 
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• Creates an opportunity for local markets to operate with the assets that remain 
standing after a natural disaster destroys grid assets that ordinarily tie a locale to 
the grid. 
The goal of the paper was to show that calculations for decentralized market 
operation are possible; and that swarm intelligence such as Ant Colony methods can offer 
viable alternatives to traditional methods. This is accomplished through the self-
organization of energy buyers and sellers within a model of a wires network.     
While cloud cover is mentioned in the data set, this approach was not reliant on a 
weather forecast. The speed of the regulator recovery and the tolerance of the grid to 
accept both load and PV generation is used by the ACO to determine the limits. If instead 
the weather is overcast it becomes a moot point – the PV will not contribute very much to 
the grid regardless of what anyone does. If the weather is sunny with no clouds, the limit 






5.  CONCLUSIONS 
The TabuACO has been found to perform well, and even outperform conventional 
ACOs in several benchmarking problems. The TabuACO performs better than a 
conventional ACO because it preserves information unlike a conventional ACO. When 
an unproductive path is found, it is not merely ignored, it is noted. This difference in the 
algorithm is important. The repulsive information deposited in the environment was 
found to be sufficient to solve network problems just as attractive information (in a 
conventional ACO) can solve a network problem. The TabuACO was tried with repulsive 
data only and it performed similarly to its performance with attractive data only. The 
TabuACO with both repulsive and attractive data significantly outperformed either 
pheromone by itself.  
Testing of the TabuACO against a variety of benchmark problems led to the 
discovery that the rules in use are very effective for trimming unproductive leaves from a 
tree. The rules allow deprecation to spread so that entire branches may be deprecated 
from a tree. However, it was discovered that as a graph becomes less tree-like and more 
mesh-like, the effectiveness of the TabuACO is reduced. The increased 
interconnectedness of the graph prevents deprecation from spreading very far. A fully 
interconnected graph may prevent deprecation from being applied altogether. The 
development of computationally-safe rules which could be used to trim highly-
interconnected nodes is a topic for future research.  
The testing also yielded other finds. Testing against the QAP problem 
demonstrated that the algorithm could scale to tackle large problems. Furthermore, the 
code did so without storing a model of the entire problem. The solver stored data for only 
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the most promising paths. In the benchmark problems it retained a model of the 1000 
most interesting nodes yet the model was able to effectively represent a puzzle containing 
many hundreds of millions of nodes. Such storage efficiency could be useful for 
computationally constrained applications. This characteristic can be particularly useful in 
distributed applications which either cannot store, or do not need to store the entire 
model.  
The TabuACO was applied to the Smart Grid Energy Market. One important 
remaining challenge in the Energy Market is to find a way to extend the existing market 
mechanisms, refine their granularity, and reach all of the individual stakeholders. The 
market hasn’t been operated to such a scale. This research modeled a distribution circuit 
and matched individual loads to power sources while observing the constraints of the 
circuitry. It found that it was able to operate each service location as a nest, and with 
thousands of nests operating concurrently, the TabuACO generated contractual 
agreements between power producers, network asset owners, and consumers. The 
improved granularity allowed market mechanisms to protect distribution assets much like 
the mechanism the wholesale market currently uses to protect transmission assets.  
A test of the TabuACO using the IEEE 34 Node feeder model was able to identify 
a constrained transformer and protect it with market mechanisms. (Higher priced local 
generation was brought on line to supply power so the constrained asset did not have to 
be overloaded.) In a similar fashion EPRI Feeder data along with OpenDSS were used to 
discover the limits to which local PV arrays could safely contribute to the grid. 
By operating a complete distribution network as a single power pool, it can 
double as the node which currently represents the aggregate load at the same location in 
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the existing wholesale market. This means that an entire distribution network can operate 
as a microgrid, independent of other connections, yet buy and sell power through the 
transmission grid to other participants. It means that the existing nodal wholesale markets 
can operate much as they currently do, but the concept of locational margin pricing can 




6.  FUTURE WORK 
There are many exciting opportunities for additional research related to this 
dissertation. 
6.1. ACO RESEARCH 
The fact that clear improvements in performance can be made in certain situations 
with the simple rules provided in the TabuACO imply that more sophisticated rules can 
yield additional improvements. 
6.1.1. Advanced Subnet Deprecation Rules. The rules presented above are  
merely a starting point for additional research. Additional rules could be developed in 
which nodes with a degree greater than one could be deprecated.17 The ant maintains a 
history of the path home. This history could be expanded, and the ant analysis improved 
so that portions of a subnet which do not contribute to the solution could be identified and 
deprecated.18  
With the current deprecation process, foraging ants which happen across a useless 
node will trim it. With more sophisticated deprecation rules, it may be that an ant must 
transition to a special form of foraging so that she temporarily places a higher priority on 
closing out the investigation of the subnet than on foraging for food. A third form of 
pheromone may be beneficial in this case. When an investigation finds that a subnet has 
been investigated, and found to potentially contribute to a solution, the environment 
                                                 
17 At one point a mistake in the Steiner tree research allowed multi-edged nodes at the bottom of a 
subnet to be deprecated. This yielded faster convergence, however, the rules were not computationally safe. 
18 It may be that the ant would have to be aware of the objective function (such as travel cost) in 
identifying edges to deprecate. 
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should be marked with a neutral pheromone to indicate this fact. This neutral pheromone 
should prevent the ant from investigating the territory again. 
The new rules may also introduce another dimension of tuning which is required 
for this third type of pheromone. Tuning might control the point at which an ant places a 
higher priority on subnet investigation than on foraging for food.  
6.1.2. Refinement of the Path Selection Formula. The research above  
experimented with several forms of computing the probability of path selection as a PDF 
with a variety of formulae19. The literature review shows quite a bit of experimentation 
has occurred into various approaches for depositing attractive pheromone and leveraging 
the data found in the environment to select a path. Quite often the attractive pheromone 
value is raised to an exponential power to amplify trace amounts of pheromone and allow 
the pheromone to dominate the selection. Some experimentation with different 
approaches to repulsive pheromone deposition and utilization can be expected to occur 
with subsequent research.   
6.1.3. Parallel Processing. The Energy Market Application was written in a way  
that thousands of nests each sent out a single ant at a time on a sortie, but with multiple 
processors, it would be possible to take advantage of the hardware resources to deploy 
multiple ants simultaneously. Research could be conducted with multiprocessor platforms 
to explore practical interfaces for model sharing among a multitude of processors. 
 
                                                 
19 Compare the simple formula used in section 3.2.3 and 3.4.3 to the more sophisticated approach 
in section 3.3.1.3. 
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6.2. ENERGY MARKETS 
Transactive Energy, if implemented to scale, could fundamentally change the 
operation of the grid. However, additional research is needed to drive it to 
commercialization. 
6.2.1. A Complete Transactive Energy Market. The exercise described in  
section 4.7 was limited to one commodity. However, in a real system, multiple 
commodities must be balanced. In a practical system, real and reactive energy must both 
be balanced, and ancillary services must also be provided. In addition to frequency 
regulation and spinning reserve, distributed generation (itself) brings about the need for 
additional services. Distribution networks all have three phase power near the substation. 
However, such networks tend to be radially fed with single phase circuits covering large 
remote areas. Power contributed on one phase will not propagate to the other phases. 
Furthermore, phases are separated in time. Energy markets need to address each phase. It 
is entirely possible that a phase imbalance could develop. Abundant energy could appear 
on one phase with a deficit on another. Contributions of power to one phase could also 
result in congestion that does not appear on other phases. Contributions can cause a 
voltage imbalance between phases, as well as movement of the phase angle. A three-
phase participant in the affected region would have the option of addressing a market 
phase imbalance by buying energy inexpensively on one phase and reselling it on 
another. 





6.2.2. Secure Transactions. All contracts between machines should be protected  
by authentication. Establishing security can be challenging. A “chain of trust” must be 
established. New developments in blockchain technology offer an interesting research 
opportunity in its application to transactive energy markets [122]. 
6.2.3. Expansion to Multiple Markets. This dissertation studied a circuit which  
spans the distribution circuit. An interface can be formed at the substation transformer 
(and substation meter) so that the entire downstream circuit is aggregated into one market 
and represented by a node in the wholesale energy market. This is profound because it 
would finally allow all markets to be joined. A hierarchy of suppliers and demands can be 
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The needs and/or capabilities of the aggregated distribution circuit can interact at 
the wholesale level to complete the scaling of the market. The support described in 









An interface can be formed at the substation transformer so that all downstream 
loads and generators are aggregated into one market and represented by a node in the 
wholesale energy market. Bids and contracts could flow across this interface, while 
power flows across the existing electrical interface. Today’s Wholesale Energy Market 




  : Low Voltage




  : Medium Voltage

























resolves bids every 15 minutes. The Transactive Energy Market would be expected to do 
the same. 
The needs of the consumer should also be identified in an automated fashion. This 
aggregation technique can be extended downward so that a Home Area Network (HAN) 
strives to identify consumer requirements and load sensitivity to price variation. Each 
market resolution process correlates to a domain as depicted in Figure 6.2. 
Thus, a “smart grid” could be formed which has the ability to provide location 
marginal pricing with full granularity, and provide a market mechanism to respond to 
issues large and small. Such an exchange would seemingly benefit all stakeholders. Large 
generators benefit by moving away from flat tariffs toward a cost-based pricing system. 
Small generators would benefit by participating in additional types of markets only 
available today to large generators. Consumers would benefit by having a say in which 
power is purchased on their behalf, by being able to potentially store and resell power, 
and by having local (microgrid) market alternatives to centralized power. Transmission 
network operators would benefit by having an additional (aggregate) entity which they 
can call upon in time of need. 
By having consumers purchase ancillary services as they buy energy, and by 
joining federated markets, it could become possible to operate the grid entirely in a 
bottom-up instead of a top-down fashion. This could be explored and tested for 
scalability and robustness. 
6.2.4. Expansion to a 24-Hour Market. The dissertation research took the view  
that a single market interval (typically 15 minutes) would be evaluated before it was due. 
The approach could be extended to cover a 24-hour planning period of 96 fifteen-minute 
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intervals. A fairly simple modification to the code could occur to allow a vector array of 
96 intervals to be carried and tracked by each object instead of a single value.  
During this 24-hour period, a consumer may elect to defer certain loads to a less 
expensive period of time. A “shiftable load” could be defined as “a load that the 
consumer can move to occur earlier or later in time.” (Examples of shiftable load include 
electric vehicle charging, clothes washing machines, dishwashing machines, and hot 
water heating. An assumption can be made that these loads can be programmed to start 
automatically under algorithm control.) A “non-shiftable load” could be defined as “a 
load that the consumer wants to draw at a time of day that is, from their perspective, non-
negotiable.” In wholesale markets prices rise and fall throughout the day in relation to the 
load (and the cost of fuel). The research can be changed to have ant agents shop for 
power for consumers over a 24-hour span. In each interval of time, the ant would shop for 
the nonshiftable load required during that interval, and if the price is favorable, consider 
also purchasing power for the shiftable portion of the load. (The shiftable load would be 
defined by time boundaries and any other constraints that it may have.) Resource locking 
could also occur among the grid assets using a 96-element vector. Ants would return 
home with a 96-element vector representing contracts with generators and network 
providers. 
By having all of the nests compete concurrently in the free market, they obtain 
power fairly, on a first come, first served basis. 
The Energy Market is commonly operated to optimize for cost while maintaining 
reliability. Other optimizations could be considered. In some parts of the USA “Customer 
Choice” programs are in effect which allow consumers to choose retail suppliers. By 
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enabling individual consumers to choose individual power providers, it would allow them 
to choose preferred fuel types, or other optimizations the customer wishes to pursue. The 
use of alternative energy has consequences [124] [125] [126] [127] [128]. Consumers 
should be allowed to weigh these consequences as they choose their power sources. 
6.2.5. Optimizations. The research presented here demonstrated the viability of  
the Transactive Energy, but a number of optimizations should be considered on the path 
to commercialization. 
6.2.5.1. Performance. The code used to drive the Feeder J research could be  
improved to run faster. The largest gains can be made by improving the Engineering 
Analysis software runtime. 
6.2.5.2. Consumer objectives. It would be possible to modify the algorithm used 
in this research so that a consumer could drive their purchase in a given direction (such as 
the lowest possible cost). This can be done by overbooking a given commodity and then 
cancelling the contracts which are the least favorable (e.g. most expensive). This process 
can continue until the market window closes or until it is found impractical.  
6.2.5.3. Communication. It is common for communication protocols to be  
optimized to operate more efficiently [129]. Quite often context is leveraged to gain 
operational efficiencies. Ants communicate in a common environment by laying 
pheromones. Ants leverage this context to efficiently arrive at a solution. It may be 
possible to develop a new protocol which formally communicates pheromone 
information between smart grid applications.  
6.2.6. Integration to Real-time Control. The introduction of significant amounts  
of distributed generation (DG) will no doubt affect many aspects of the grid. Figure 4.2 
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shows an outer planning loop performed by the energy market, and an inner control loop 
performed by network operations. The market domain (depicted in Figure 4.1) interacts 
with generators and energy distributors differently when a transactive energy market is 
utilized. Consumers also interact with wholesale providers of energy. Transactive energy 
involves a new level of monitoring and control that needs to accompany the deployment 
of a new market paradigm. Real-time monitoring of smart meters needs to occur at the 
distribution level, much like the real-time  SCADA monitoring that occurs presently at 
the transmission level. Furthermore, for a transactive market to coexist with a wholesale 
market (as depicted in Figure 6.1,) a transactive power pool entity would have to be 
managed and funded much like a wholesale power pool entity. Such a system would 
anticipate the ability to monitor and report net energy flow every few seconds, remotely 
connect and disconnect customers, and issue commands to distributed generation. The 
grid tied DG will need to accept up/down commands and power factor adjustments. A 
new caliber of AMI network would need to be developed to support these new 
requirements. The current wholesale energy market updates every 15 minutes. A 
transactive energy market would need update at a similar rate so that network operations 

















Ancillary Services: wholesale market services (other than the sale of bulk power) which 
are necessary to sustain the grid. These services include spinning reserve (which can be 
called upon to supplement the power already being supplied to the grid), and frequency 
regulation. 
 
Ant: a software component which serves as an agent on behalf of its client. 
 
Ant Colony Optimizer: a nature-inspired optimization technique that solves problems by 
using (virtual) pheromone trails deposited in (a modeled) environment. 
 
Customer Choice: the ability of a utility customer to freely choose the sources of power 
and payment plan. 
 
Demand Response (DR): A generic term used to describe an approach to incentivize 
consumers to reduce consumption when energy is scarce. Some definitions of DR include 
Ancillary Services. 
 
Distributed Energy Resource (DER): small generation or energy storage which is not 
located near large generators and often customer owned. 
 
Graph: a mathematical structure which contains Nodes and Edges. A pair of Nodes 




Leaf: a node in a tree which has one or more upward edges but no downward edges. 
 
Locational Marginal Pricing: the localized price of wholesale electric energy when 
influenced by patterns of load, generation, and the physical limits of the transmission 
system. 
 
Microgrid: an electrical distribution system containing loads and distributed energy 
resources (such as distributed generators, storage devices or controllable loads) that can 
be operated in a controlled, coordinated way either while connected to the main power 
network or while islanded. [130] 
 
Near Real time: a term used in various contexts to mean the performance of a task 
during a period of time just before the actual moment (that it is required for a planning 
system) or just after the actual moment (that something has occurred for a reporting 
system) without intentional delay. 
 
Nest: a node which an ant identifies as its home. 
 
Nodal Market: a market operated by an ISO in which energy is traded at a nodal level 
(where a node represents a bus or aggregation point). 
 




Pheromone: in the model, a signed value between -1 and +1 associated with graph edges, 
which represents the colorless, odorless chemical placed in the environment by ants to 
communicate the success of a find.  
 
Proof Of Concept (POC): a small test performed to confirm the viability of an idea. 
 
Real time: to perform a task “live” within a period of time with sufficient speed to serve 
as a control  
 
Root: a node in a tree (or directed graph) which has downward running edges and no 
upward edges. 
 
Spanning Tree: a subtree which does not include all of the nodes in the original tree. 
 
Smart Grid Architecture Model (SGAM): a European effort to define the Smart Grid. 
 
Subgraph: a portion of a graph which does not include all of the nodes in the original 
graph. 
 
TabuACO: an ACO (described herein) that uses both attractive and repulsive 
pheromones to converge on a solution. The attractive pheromone is applied to draw the 
ant into productive areas of the model. The repulsive pheromones are applied to 
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discourage travel to areas that have been previously explored and found to be 
unproductive.  
 
Transactive energy: a system of economic and control mechanisms that allows the 
dynamic balance of supply and demand across the entire electrical infrastructure using 
value as a key operational parameter. [63] 
 
Traversal: the problem of finding a path from one node to another node in a graph. 
 
Tree: a specialized form of a graph that contains only a single edge to link two nodes. 
 
Utility Death Spiral: a theoretical process in which the adoption of DER could allow 
consumers to go “off grid” and raise the cost of energy for those who remain on the grid. 
This in turn would further incentivize the remaining customers to invest in DER and 
leave the grid.  
 
Zonal Market: a market operated by an ISO in which energy is traded at a zonal level 



















A copy of the code used to implement the research as well as the data can be 





































The IEEE 34-Node model needed additional detail so that generators could be 
present as well as loads. A drawing of the detailed model is available in Figure 4.26. 
Table C.1 below provides additional underlying detail regarding the model used by the 
research. The detail added to the model adds poles, service transformers, service 








X Loc Y Loc Extended node type 
IEEE Defined Load 
Ph 1 Ph 2 Ph 3 
kW kVAr kW kVAr kW kVAr 
800 0 0 Substation       
802 2580 0 Pole       
8040 2585 -5 transformer       
8041 2685 -15 Service   30 15   
8042 2785 -15 Service     25 14 
806 4310 0 Pole       
808 36540 0 Pole       
8090 36545 -5 transformer       
8091 36645 -15 Service   16 8   
810 36540 -5804 Pole       
812 74040 0 Pole       
814 103770 0 VoltageRegulator       
850 103780 0 Pole       
816 104090 0 Pole       
818 104090 1710 Pole       
8190 104090 1705 transformer       
8191 104190 1690 Service 34 17     
820 104090 49860 Pole       
8210 104095 49855 transformer       
8211 104195 49840 Service 135 70     
822 104090 63600 Pole       
8230 104095 63595 transformer       
8231 104195 63580 Service   5 2   
824 114300 0 Pole       
8250 114305 -5 transformer       
8251 114405 -20 Service   40 20   
826 117330 0 Pole       
8270 114295 -425 transformer       
8271 114290 -420 service     4 2 
828 114300 -840 Pole       
8290 114305 -845 transformer       
8291 114405 -860 Service 7 3     
830 134740 -840 Pole       
8300 134745 -845 transformer       
8301 134845 -860 Service 10 5 10 5 25 10 
854 135260 -840 Pole       
8550 135265 -845 transformer       
8551 135365 -860 Service   4 2   




Table C.1. Modifications to IEEE 34 Node Types, Locations, and Loads (con’t) 
 
852 135260 35990 VoltageRegulator       
832 135260 36000 Pole       
888 135260 36000 transformer       
890 145820 36000 Pole       
8900 145825 35995 transformer       
8901 145925 35980 Service 150 75 150 75 150 75 
8570 135255 41825 transformer       
8571 135250 41820 service 4 2 15 8 13 7 
858 135260 41830 Pole       
8630 135265 41825 transformer       
8631 135365 41810 Service 2 1     
864 135260 43450 Pole       
8330 135265 43445 transformer       
8331 135365 43430 Service 4 2 15 8 13 7 
834 141090 41830 Pole       
842 141090 42110 Pole       
8430 141095 42105 transformer       
8431 141195 42090 Service 9 5     
844 141090 43460 Pole       
8440 141090 43460 Cap Bank       
8441 141095 43455 transformer       
8442 141195 43440 Service 135 105 135 105 135 105 
8450 141095 43455 transformer       
8451 141195 43440 Service 0 0 25 12 20 11 
846 141090 47100 Pole       
8470 141095 47095 transformer       
8471 141195 47080 Service   23 11   
848 141090 47630 Pole       
8480 141090 47630 Cap Bank       
8481 141095 47625 transformer       
8482 141195 47610 Service 20 16 20 16 20 16 
8590 143105 41825 transformer       
8591 143107 41820 service 16 8 20 10 110 55 
860 143110 41830 Pole       
8600 143115 41825 transformer       
8601 143215 41810 Service 20 16 20 16 20 16 
8350 145780 41825 transformer       
8351 145785 41820 service 30 15 10 6 42 22 
836 145790 41830 Pole       
8390 145795 41825 transformer       
8391 145895 41810 Service 18 9     
8392 145995 41810 Service   22 11   
840 146650 41830 Pole       
8400 146655 41825 transformer       
8401 146755 41810 Service 9 7 9 7 9 7 
862 145790 41550 Pole       
8370 145795 41545 transformer       
8371 145895 41530 Service   28 14   




Table C.2 below describes the ratings of each node, a randomly assigned 



























800 Substation  2500.0 833.3 833.3 833.3 2500.0 12.4 
802 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8040 transformer  112.5    0.0 0.0 
8041 service 33.5 48.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 3.8 86.8 
8042 service 28.7 48.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
806 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
808 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8090 transformer  25.0    0.0 0.0 
8091 service 17.9 24.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 1.9 74.4 
810 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
812 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
814 Voltage Regulator  2500.0      
850 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
816 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
818 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8190 transformer  50.0    0.0 0.0 
8191 service 38.0 48.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
820 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8210 transformer  225.0    0.0 0.0 
8211 service 152.1 192.0 38.4 0.0 0.0 38.4 111.6 
822 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8230 transformer  10.0    0.0 0.0 
8231 service 5.4 9.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.4 111.6 
824 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8250 transformer  50.0    0.0 0.0 
8251 service 44.7 48.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 1.0 111.6 
826 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8270 transformer  10.0    0.0 0.0 
8271 service 4.5 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
828 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8290 transformer  10.0    0.0 0.0 
8291 service 7.6 9.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
830 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8300 transformer  112.5    0.0 0.0 
8301 service 49.3 96.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
854 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8550 transformer  10.0    0.0 0.0 
8551 service 4.5 9.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 74.4 
856 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
852 Voltage Regulator  2500.0      
832 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
888 transformer  500.0    0.0 0.0 
890 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8900 transformer  750.0    0.0 0.0 
8901 service 503.1 720.0 24.0 24.0 24.0 72.0 24.8 
8570 transformer  45.0    0.0 0.0 
8571 service 36.2 45.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 5.4 62.0 
858 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8630 transformer  10.0    0.0 0.0 
8631 service 2.2 9.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 1.1 74.4 
864 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8330 transformer  45.0    0.0 0.0 
8331 service 36.2 43.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
834 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
842 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
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Table C.2. Modified IEEE 34 Node Ratings and DER Offer Prices (con’t)  
 
8430 transformer  25.0    0.0 0.0 
8431 service 10.3 24.0 3.4 0.0 0.0 3.4 74.4 
844 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8440 Cap Bank  100.0      
8441 transformer  750.0    0.0 0.0 
8442 service 513.1 720.0 43.2 43.2 43.2 129.6 111.6 
8450 transformer  112.5    0.0 0.0 
8451 service 50.6 96.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
846 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8470 transformer  37.5    0.0 0.0 
8471 service 25.5 36.0 0.0 5.8 0.0 5.8 74.4 
848 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8480 Cap Bank  150.0      
8481 transformer  112.5    0.0 0.0 
8482 service 76.8 96.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
8590 transformer  225.0    0.0 0.0 
8591 service 163.2 216.0 14.4 14.4 14.4 43.2 37.2 
860 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8600 transformer  112.5    0.0 0.0 
8601 service 76.8 96.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.9 99.2 
8350 transformer  112.5    0.0 0.0 
8351 service 92.6 96.0 4.5 4.5 4.5 13.4 37.2 
836 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8390 transformer  112.5    0.0 0.0 
8391 service 20.1 48.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
8392 service 24.6 48.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.5 24.8 
840 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8400 transformer  45.0    0.0 0.0 
8401 service 34.2 43.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.9 24.8 
862 Pole  2500.0     0.0 
8370 transformer  50.0    0.0 0.0 
8371 service 31.3 48.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 2.9 24.8 




There are two transformers identified in the IEEE 34 Node Feeder Model. The 








High Side Low Side 
kV Configuration kV Configuration 
Substation 2500 69 Delta 24.9 Wye 






Each node is connected by a conductor. Conductors (network edges) are defined 
in Table C.4. Each line has two endpoints. The network has an upstream/downstream 
sense to it. The upstream direction is always towards the primary source of power (in this 
case the substation bus.)  









Type kVA Rating 
1 800 802 2580.0 300 7470 
2 802 806 1730.0 300 7470 
3 802 8040 7.1 301 5602.5 
4 806 808 32230.0 300 7470 
5 808 810 5804.0 303 1369.5 
6 808 812 37500.0 300 7470 
7 808 8090 7.1 303 1369.5 
8 812 814 29730.0 300 7470 
9 814 850 10.0 301 5602.5 
10 816 818 1710.0 302 1369.5 
11 816 824 10210.0 301 5602.5 
12 816 8230 63595.0 302 1369.5 
13 818 820 48150.0 302 1369.5 
14 818 8190 5.0 302 1369.5 
15 820 822 13740.0 302 1369.5 
16 820 8210 7.1 302 1369.5 
17 824 826 3030.0 303 1369.5 
18 824 828 840.0 301 5602.5 
19 824 8250 7.1 303 1369.5 
20 824 8270 425.0 301 5602.5 
21 828 830 20440.0 301 5602.5 
22 828 8290 7.1 301 5602.5 
23 830 854 520.0 301 5602.5 
24 830 8300 7.1 301 5602.5 
25 832 858 5830.0 301 5602.5 
26 832 888 0.0 301 5602.5 
27 832 8570 5825.0 301 5602.5 
28 834 842 280.0 301 5602.5 
29 834 860 2020.0 301 5602.5 
30 834 8590 5840.0 301 5602.5 
31 836 840 860.0 301 5602.5 
32 836 862 280.0 301 5602.5 
33 836 8390 7.1 301 5602.5 
34 840 8400 7.1 301 5602.5 
35 842 844 1350.0 301 5602.5 
36 844 846 3640.0 301 5602.5 
37 844 8430 1355.0 301 5602.5 
38 844 8440 0.0 301 5602.5 
39 844 8441 7.1 301 5602.5 
40 844 8450 7.1 301 5602.5 
41 846 848 530.0 301 5602.5 
42 846 8470 7.1 301 5602.5 
43 848 8480 0.0 301 5602.5 
44 848 8481 7.1 301 5602.5 
45 850 816 310.0 301 5602.5 




Table C.4. Modified IEEE 34 Node Feeder Model Line Sections (con’t) 
47 854 852 36830.0 301 5602.5 
48 854 856 23330.0 303 1369.5 
49 854 8550 7.1 301 5602.5 
50 858 834 5830.0 301 5602.5 
51 858 864 1620.0 302 1369.5 
52 858 8330 1615.0 301 5602.5 
53 860 836 2680.0 301 5602.5 
54 860 8350 2670.0 301 5602.5 
55 860 8600 7860.0 301 5602.5 
56 862 838 4860.0 304 1867.5 
57 862 8370 7.1 301 5602.5 
58 864 8630 1630.0 302 1369.5 
59 888 890 10560.0 300 1248 
60 890 8900 12066.4 301 936 
61 8040 8041 100.5 301 5602.5 
62 8040 8042 200.2 301 5602.5 
63 8090 8091 100.5 303 1369.5 
64 8190 8191 101.1 302 1369.5 
65 8210 8211 101.1 302 1369.5 
66 8230 8231 101.1 301 5602.5 
67 8250 8251 101.1 303 1369.5 
68 8270 8271 7.1 301 5602.5 
69 8290 8291 101.1 302 1369.5 
70 8300 8301 101.1 301 5602.5 
71 8330 8331 101.1 301 5602.5 
72 8350 8351 7.1 303 1369.5 
73 8370 8371 101.1 303 1369.5 
74 8390 8391 101.1 301 5602.5 
75 8390 8392 200.6 301 5602.5 
76 8400 8401 101.1 301 5602.5 
77 8430 8431 101.1 301 5602.5 
78 8441 8442 101.1 301 5602.5 
79 8450 8451 101.1 301 5602.5 
80 8470 8471 101.1 301 5602.5 
81 8481 8482 101.1 301 5602.5 
82 8550 8551 101.1 303 1369.5 
83 8570 8571 7.1 301 5602.5 
84 8590 8591 0.0 301 5602.5 
85 8600 8601 0.0 301 5602.5 
86 8630 8631 0.0 302 1369.5 




The kVA rating of a given line segment is determined by multiplying the 
distribution voltage of the given line segment (24.9 kV or 4.16 kV) times the ampacity of 
an aluminum conductor of the size specified in the IEEE configuration table. Each 











300 0/1 100 
301 #2 75 
302 #4 55 
303 #4 55 
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